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A review of research on bank financing reveals that banks can either engage in transaction 
and/or relationship lending when financing firms. However, when dealing with small and 
medium enterprises (SMEs), studies suggest that relationship lending is the suitable 
methodology due to the information opacity of these firms while transaction lending is 
preferred for larger firms which are considered more information transparent. Studies also 
suggest that there are mutual benefits to be gained by both borrowers and lenders when 
they engage in relationship lending yet most studies emphasize demand side or borrower 
benefits and largely ignore lender benefits. With the increased interest in the SME sector 
by commercial banks, it is important to determine supply side or lender benefits if lenders 
are to continue serving these firms whether by use of the relationship lending method or 
any other suitable method. The main objective of this study was to determine the benefits 
that commercial banks gain and the role played by the relationship the bank has with the 
customer, when they finance small and medium enterprises. Data was collected through 
semi structured interviews conducted with SME bank managers who work closely with 
SMEs and analysed using content analysis. The study finds that commercial banks employ 
both relationship lending and transaction lending when dealing with the SME customer 
but more importantly establishes that relationship lending is only employed together with 
transaction lending. This leads to the suggestion of the use of the term “relational 
transaction lending” when referring to the use of relationship lending as it is always 
employed together with transaction lending. The study also establishes how soft 
information is processed for use in the SME lending decision and finally, articulates 
fourteen benefits that commercial banks are enjoying from engaging in SME lending. In 
summary, this research has made three significant advances to knowledge through the use 
of a qualitative research methodology. The development of a conceptual framework for 
borrower knowledge processing in SME lending; the development of a conceptual 
framework for the interplay between transaction and relationship lending methodologies 
resulting in the proposal of the use of the term relational transaction lending and, the 
establishment of the benefits generated from engaging in SME lending by commercial 
banks in Kenya.   
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY 
 
 
1.1 Background of the Study 
 
Commercial banks around the world have been facing significant competition in the 
corporate and retail sectors which has led to increased interest in the previously 
underserved small and medium enterprise (SME) market (Calice, Chando, & Sekioua, 
2012; De la Torre, Peria, & Schmukler, 2010). According to the International Finance 
Corporation (IFC) the gap in financial services (referred to as “the missing middle”) 
provided to SMEs appears to be shrinking the fastest in emerging markets (low and 
middle-income countries) where this gap has been the widest (IFC, 2010). This indicates 
that there is growth in the banking of SMEs and as such, contrary to the conventional 
perception that financial institutions are not interested in the SME segment, banks now 
perceive this segment as large, unsaturated and with good prospects, even considering this 
segment as strategically important (Calice et al., 2012). Small and medium enterprise 
(SME) financing has been a topic of keen interest in research because of the key role that 
SMEs play in economic development and their potentially important contribution to 
economic diversification and employment (Ayyagari, Beck, & Demirguc-Kunt, 2007; 
Beck, Demirguc-Kunt, & Levine, 2005a; UN/ECE, 2007). In developing economies, 
including Sub-Saharan Africa, SMEs are typically more credit-constrained than large 
firms, severely affecting their possibilities to grow (Ayyagari, Demirgüç-Kunt, & 
Maksimovic, 2008; Ayyagari, Demirgüç-Kunt, & Maksimovic, 2012; Beck et al., 2005a; 
Beck, Demirguc-Kunt, & Maksimovic, 2008; Beck & Demirguc-Kunt, 2006).  
 
In Sub-Saharan Africa, banks have an important role to play due to their dominance in the 
financial systems and the limitations of informal finance, especially in regard to serving 
the higher end of the SME market (Ayyagari et al., 2012). SMEs depend on these financial 
institutions for their external financing needs because their small size and lack of 
substantial public information about their quality prevent them from accessing public 
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capital markets such as through the issuance of commercial paper, bonds, or publicly 
traded equity (Beck et al., 2008a; Holod & Peek, 2013; Santikian, 2014).   
 
A bank is an institution whose primary activities are receiving of deposits and the granting 
of loans (Ongena & Smith, 2000). In its simplest form, the primary role of a bank is to 
bring together those who have excess funds to save and those who need to borrow. This 
role of a bank as an intermediary can be compared to a securities market where financial 
contracts are created to facilitate the movement of funds between savers and borrowers 
(Ongena & Smith, 2000). To ensure its credibility as a savings institution, a bank is also 
counted on to quickly redeem deposits to savers on demand. As such, a bank not only 
provides safety, but also liquidity. This ability to continuously offer liquidity to both 
savers and borrowers is what distinguishes a bank from “arm’s-length” securities markets 
(Rajan, 1996). However, informational frictions (asymmetric and proprietary information) 
provide the most fundamental explanation for the existence of financial intermediaries 
(Bhattacharya & Thakor, 1993, Boot, 2000). Boot (2000) refers to this as the raison d’ˆetre 
of banks. Informational asymmetry refers to a situation in which one party in a transaction 
has more or superior information compared to the other party (Akerlof, 1970). This often 
happens in transactions where the seller knows more than the buyer, although the reverse 
can also happen. Where banks are concerned, a borrower knows more than the lender 
about his creditworthiness and this could potentially be a harmful situation because the 
borrower can take advantage of the lender's lack of knowledge (Williamson, 1986).  
 
In their intermediary role of minimizing risks between savers and borrowers, banks have 
to screen potential borrowers to mitigate adverse selection and subsequently monitor 
borrowers to reduce moral hazard (Diamond, 1984; Miwa & Ramseyer, 2005). This ability 
of a bank to reduce information asymmetries between borrowers and savers makes it 
unique relative to other financial institutions (Bhattacharya & Thakor, 1993; Diamond, 
1984; Leland & Pyle, 1977). Further, the fact that a bank has wide access to private 
information about its borrowers makes the bank an “inside debt holder” distinguishing 
bank loans from other market loans (Fama, 1985). This suggests that the intermediary role 
performed by banks is more than just an arms-length transaction and has led to the existing 
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research on the use of relationship lending especially when lending to SMEs. Banks can 
extend financing to SMEs through two distinct technologies; transaction lending and 
relationship lending (Bartoli, Ferri, Murro, & Rotondi, 2013; Berger & Udell, 2006).  
 
Berger and Udell (2006) define a lending technology as a unique combination of primary 
information source, screening and underwriting policies/procedures, loan contract 
structure, and monitoring strategies/mechanisms. Even though they distinguish between 
the two main lending technologies when dealing with SMEs, Berger and Udell (2006) 
suggest that lending technologies are not necessarily mutually exclusive.   
 
1.1.1  Transaction Lending 
Transaction lending relies on information that can easily be quantified, commonly referred 
to as ‘hard’ information that is relatively easily available at the time of loan origination 
(Berger & Udell, 2006). According to Elyasiani and Goldberg (2004), lending decisions 
are made after borrowers go through a formally structured application process where they 
are required to provide specific financial information and security in order to qualify for 
loans. Transaction-oriented lending focuses on one transaction with a customer, or many 
identical transactions with various customers (Boot & Thakor, 2000). In a transaction-
based system, many banks bid competitively for each transaction that a firm undertakes 
(Rajan, 1992) and as such Boot and Thakor (1994) propose that transaction lending be 
viewed as arm’s-length finance as it focuses on a transaction rather than on information 
gathered over time from a customer. Berger and Udell (2006) distinguish between 
transaction lending technologies used by financial institutions. They propose that 
transaction lending is not a single homogeneous lending technology but should be 
separated into a number of distinct transaction technologies used by financial institutions 
which include; asset-based lending, fixed-asset lending, financial statement lending, small 
business credit scoring, factoring and leasing. Transaction lending is generally focused on 
informational transparent borrowers (Carbo’-Valverde et al., 2009; Elyasani & Goldberg, 
2004; Ono & Uesugi, 2009) however Berger and Udell (2006) find that while financial 
statement lending is focused on transparent borrowers, the other transaction lending 
technologies are all targeted to opaque borrowers. 
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Berger and Udell (2006) describe asset-based lending as that type of lending involves 
pledging a firm’s underlying assets as collateral as the primary source of repayment. 
Generally, the firm has to have high-quality receivables and inventory available to pledge 
and requires that the bank intensively monitor the turnover of these assets making it a 
relatively expensive method. The pledging of collateral by itself, however, does not 
distinguish asset-based lending from any of the other lending technologies because 
collateralisation is also common with for example financial statement lending, 
relationship lending and credit scoring where collateral is used as a secondary source of 
repayment. What distinguishes this method from the other transaction based technologies 
is that the extension of credit is primarily based on the value of the collateral rather than 
the overall creditworthiness of the firm. 
 
Fixed asset lending is similar to asset-based lending in the sense that fixed assets are 
pledged to the lender as collateral. For fixed-asset lending, the main data are appraised 
values of the real estate, motor vehicles, or equipment leased, that is, assets that are long-
lived and not sold in the normal course of business (Berger & Black, 2011; Berger & Udell 
(2006). However, unlike accounts receivable and inventory, the pledged assets are 
virtually always uniquely identified by a serial number or a deed. The long life and unique 
identification of fixed assets leads to very different underwriting processes, contract 
structures, and monitoring mechanisms (Berger & Udell, 2006).   
  
Financial statement lending places most of its emphasis on evaluating information from 
the firm's financial statements. The decision to lend and the terms of the loan contract are 
principally based on the strength of the balance sheet, income and cash flow statements. 
The lender views the expected cash flows as the primary source of repayment. Financial 
statement lending is best suited for relatively transparent firms with certified audited 
financial statements and as such, it is likely to be the technology of choice in bank lending 
to large firms. However, some small firms with long histories, relatively transparent 
businesses and strong audited financial statements also qualify for financial statement 




Small business credit scoring is an adaptation to business lending of discriminant analysis 
and other statistical techniques. In addition to using information from the financial 
statements of the SME, heavy weighting is also put on the financial condition and history 
of the principal owner, given that the creditworthiness of the firm and the owner are 
closely related for most small businesses (Feldman, 1997; Mester, 1997 in Berger & Udell, 
2006). This technology may be applied when there is insufficient information about the 
SME (Berger & Udell, 2006). 
 
Factoring involves the purchase of accounts receivable by a “lender” known as a factor. 
The borrower obtains financing by outsourcing its credit and collections activities and as 
such, factoring is a bundle of three financial services: a financing component, a credit 
component and a collections component. Factoring is a transactions technology because 
the underwriting process is based on hard information about the value of a “borrower’s” 
accounts receivable. This lending technology addresses the opacity problem by focusing 
primarily on the quality of the obligor, rather than the “borrower” (Berger & Udell, 2006). 
 
Leasing involves the purchase of fixed assets (equipment, motor vehicles or real estate) 
by a “lender” known as a lessor who then simultaneously enters into a rental contract with 
the lessee (the “borrower”) that specifies the payment schedule. The contract often 
contains an option whereby the lessee can purchase the assets at the end of the lease period 
at a pre-specified price. This arrangement can mitigate an adverse selection problem either 
in the new product market or in the used equipment market by encouraging a higher 
quality of product sold “off-lease” (that is, sold by lessors when the purchase option is not 
exercised) (Chemmanur & Yan, 2000; Hendel & Lizzeri, 2002). Berger and Udell (2006) 
observe that similar to asset-based lending, factoring, and fixed-asset lending; leasing is a 
transactions technology because underwriting is substantially based on hard information 
about the value of the underlying asset.  
 
1.1.2 Relationship Lending 
Relationship lending is based on the acquisition and use of “soft” qualitative data which 
is information that cannot be easily quantified and is gathered over time through consistent 
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interaction between a bank and, a business and its stakeholders (Berger & Udell, 2006; 
Elyasani & Goldberg, 2004; Schwarze, 2006). Essentially, banks engage in producing or 
gathering information beyond that which is readily available (Garriga, 2006). These 
continued bank-firm interactions tend to create a rich inventory of information (Fama, 
1985). Berger and Udell (2002) posit that soft information may include the payment and 
receipt history of the SME gathered from the past provision of loans, deposits, or other 
services to the SME by the institution; or the future prospects of the SME garnered from 
past communications with SME’s suppliers, customers, or neighbouring businesses. 
Further, Schwarze (2006) adds that soft information may include the character and 
reliability of the SME owner, gathered through direct contact over time with the bank’s 
loan officer. The soft information may often be proprietary to the loan officer and may not 
be easily observed by others, verified by others, or transmitted to others within the 
financial institution (Boot, 2000).  
 
Relationship lending focuses on asymmetric information problems associated with firms, 
especially small firms (McNulty, 2002). In most cases, small firms are relatively young 
and therefore have no past history from which banks can make decisions about expected 
future performance. Additionally, most of these small firms lack collateral to pledge for 
loans (Garriga, 2006). These firms therefore have often been labelled as informational 
opaque compared to their larger counterparts who compete for the same funds. As such, 
transaction lending is generally viewed as being focused on informationally transparent 
borrowers (Carbo’-Valverde et al., 2009; Elyasani & Goldberg, 2004; Ono & Uesugi, 
2009). Due to their small size and lack of substantial public information about their 
quality, such firms lack access to external funds, for instance, through issuance of debt or 
equity securities. They therefore tend to be dependent on banks for external funds. 
However, banks do not have sufficient information to assess the credit risk associated with 
these informational opaque firms when they receive an initial loan application. Thus, 
banks which are interested in such firms need to first invest in acquiring information and 
processing the same, as well as subsequent monitoring of firm activities (Boot, 2000; 
Freixas, 2005). Over time, the payment history of a loan customer accumulates and the 
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firm develops a “private reputation” with its lender or in other words a bank-firm 
relationship.  
 
Relationship lending is a complex phenomenon that is difficult to measure and thus has 
been proxied by different aspects (Presbitero & Zazzaro, 2009). Elsas (2005) argues that 
it is not clear which proxies should be used for relationship lending and suggests that 
directly asking one of the involved parties is a straightforward way to generate a criterion 
for assessing whether a given bank-borrower relationship is ”special” in the sense of 
relationship lending. More recently, Santikian (2014) emphasizes that even though banks 
are a primary source of capital for small, private firms, the inner workings of small firms’ 
bank relationships remain obscure. The most commonly used proxies for relationship 
lending are; duration, scope and concentration of borrowing (Degryse & Van Cayseele, 
2000; Elsas, 2005; Iturralde et al., 2010; Lehmann & Neuberger, 2001; Ongena & Smith, 
2000).  
  
Duration is the most widely used measure of relationships and reflects the length of time 
that the bank has provided loan, deposit, or other services to the firm (e.g. Petersen & 
Rajan, 1994, 1995; Berger & Udell, 1995; Ongena & Smith, 2000; Elsas, 2005). 
Theoretically, there is a positive relationship between duration and information flow 
which should improve the bank’s willingness to provide funds and thus availability of 
finance to the borrower (Berger & Udell, 2002; Degryse & Van Cayseele, 2000).  
 
Scope reflects the breadth of the relationship, that is, the number of different services or 
interaction over multiple services between the bank and the customer (Nakamura, 1993; 
Cole, 1998; Degryse & Van Cayseele, 2000). Information gathered from the interaction 
may not only have an effect on the credit terms with the borrower, (Degryse & Van 
Cayseele, 2000; Santikian, 2009) but may also affect the bank’s comparative advantage 
in lending. Boot (2000), for instance, suggests that a bank may use a firm’s checking and 
deposit accounts to assess loan repayment capability. 
Concentration of borrowing is the number of bank relationships that a borrower maintains 
(Harhoff & Körting, 1998; Ongena & Smith, 2000). Elsas (2005) argues that having one 
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exclusive relationship promotes closer ties between the bank and borrower. Iturralde et al. 
(2010) suggest that the number of relationships may be influenced by the characteristics 
of companies and the social and economic environment of a particular country. To 
determine whether a bank qualifies as a main bank (one which provides 80 percent or 
more of a firm’s products), Degryse and Van Cayseele (2000), look at the scope of the 
relationship. They further suggest that a main bank relationship should lead to more 
accurate information and therefore reduce the bank’s monitoring costs in tandem with 
Diamond’s (1984) preposition that a single bank relationship is optimal because it avoids 
duplication of screening and monitoring efforts. Foglia, Laviola and Reedtz (1998) concur 
that the larger the number of bank relationships, the higher the riskiness of the borrowers 
because monitoring of the borrower tends to be weaker.  
 
Relationship lending is emphasized in previous studies as being the most suitable 
technology to use when dealing with SMEs because these enterprises are considered 
informationally opaque (Carbo’-Valverde, Rodri’guez-Ferna’ndez, & Udell, 2009; Ono 
& Uesugi, 2009). Earlier, Elyasiani and Goldberg (2004) posit that SMEs are less 
transparent (more informational opaque) than their larger counterparts because, apart from 
having insufficient collateral to pledge, they do not have audited financial statements. Due 
to the SMEs’ opaque nature in terms of ascertaining the reliability of information 
provided, it has conventionally been assumed that small and domestic banks applying 
relationship lending are better equipped to lend to SMEs (Berger, Goldberg, & White, 
2001; Berger & Udell, 1995). However, there is also evidence that transaction-based or 
arms-length lending can be more cost-effective (Berger & Udell, 2006). Beck, Demirguc-
Kunt, and Peria (2011) add that using transaction based lending also allows larger and 
non-local banks to lend to SMEs.  
 
There is considerable evidence supporting the incidence of lender/borrower relationships 
(Boot, 2000; Iturralde, Maseda, & San-Jose, 2010), however these relationships depend 
on various factors that influence both the lender and the borrower, and on the 




1.1.3 Benefits of SME Lending 
In order to determine whether SME lending is viable in future, it is important to understand 
the benefits to both parties involved; the lender and the borrowers. A benefit is defined as 
“an advantage that something gives you; a helpful and useful effect that something has” 
(Benefit, n.d.). Most studies on SME lending focus on the benefits that accrue to the 
borrower; largely ignoring the commercial banks who take the initiative to invest in SME 
lending (see Berger & Udell, 1995; Bharath et al., 2005; Cole, 1998; Elsas & Krahnen, 
1998; Harhoff & Körting 1998; Petersen & Rajan, 1994, 1995). Additionally, these studies 
tend to focus on benefits of the use of the relationship lending technology as this method 
is widely suggested as suitable when lending to SMEs. Elsas (2005) and; Greenbaum and 
Thakor (1995) suggest that relationship lending is economically beneficial to both lenders 
and borrowers but the comparatively few studies that focus on lender benefits tend to 
provide only indirect evidence about the value-enhancing effects of lending relationships 
to banks (Holod & Peek, 2013).  
 
Beck, Demirguc-Kunt, and Peria (2008), (2011); Calice et al. (2012) and De la Torre et 
al. (2010) are amongst the first studies to provide a lender perspective of SME lending 
and more so in Sub Saharan Africa. These studies provide evidence of the extent of bank 
lending to SMEs as well as the drivers and obstacles to further SME lending. Overall, 
these studies find that banks perceive the SME segment as large, unsaturated, with good 
prospects and strategically important. Additionally, these studies find that the common 
drivers of bank involvement with SMEs are; perceived profitability, reduction of 
information asymmetry and reverse factoring. Perceived profitability is ranked as a major 
driver of bank involvement in the SME segment (Calice et al., 2012; De la Torre et al., 
2010). Similarly, Ochieng (2010) emphasizes that investment by commercial banks in 
intricate relationships with clients, could lead to growth in their customer base and loan 
book value, which translates into increased profitability.  
 
1.1.4 The Kenyan Banking Sector  
The Kenyan Banking sector is comprised of 43 commercial banks and one mortgage 
financial institution (Central Bank of Kenya (CBK), 2016). These commercial banks are 
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regulated by the Central Bank of Kenya under a set of statutes known as the Banking Act, 
as well as prudential guidelines and regulations issued by the Central Bank pursuant to 
this legislation. Kenya’s financial system is categorized as bank-based (as in Germany and 
Japan) since banks play a leading role in mobilizing funds and providing risk management 
vehicles (Demirguc-Kunt and Levine, 1999). This is in contrast to a market based system 
(such as in England and the United States) where securities markets share a role with 
banks in mobilizing funds, exerting corporate control and easing risk management. 
Compared to other Sub-Saharan and low income countries, Kenya is a developing country 
with a financial system that sees higher deposits in financial institutions and higher levels 
of credit channelled to the private sector (Beck & Fuchs, 2004). Most of the businesses in 
Kenya are SMEs and these provide most of the employment opportunities (Katua, 2014). 
Consequently, the highest contributor to GDP in Kenya is the SMEs and there is 
widespread agreement among financial sector stakeholders that increasing access to 
financial services for SMEs is a key pillar of the Comprehensive Financial Sector Reform 
and Development Strategy (Kenya Treasury, 2011). 
 
Berg and Fuchs (2013) find that bank competition in the SME market segment is strongest 
in Kenya compared to most Sub-Saharan African countries with all banks interested in 
developing their engagement with SMEs regardless of size (small, medium or large) or 
ownership (domestic or foreign). According to a study by FSD (2015), SME finance has 
continued to increase gradually both in absolute terms and relative to the banks’ total 
lending portfolio. In 2009, it represented 19.5 per cent of the total portfolio, in 2011; it 
was 20.9 per cent and 23.4 per cent in 2013. Between 2009 and 2013, SME lending by 
foreign banks increased in absolute terms but decreased relative to domestic banks, 
confirming a growing role played by local players in the SME market. In an earlier study, 
Berg and Fuchs (2013) attributed this trend to innovation in Kenya, compared to other 
Sub-Saharan African countries, that started through a combination of microfinance-rooted 
institutions scaling up to become commercial banks and innovation with lending models 




Similar to the results of Beck et al. (2008; 2010), FSD (2015) shows that commercial 
banks in Kenya tend to differ in terms of lending technologies, customer acquisition 
strategies, and risk management mechanisms. Risk management strategies vary widely 
across banks and may be based on ‘hard information’, ‘soft information’, or a combination 
of the two. Hard information may consist of financial ratios calculated from certified 
audited statements and data assembled by credit bureaus. Soft information consists of non-
financial information about the firm or entrepreneur, such as the sources of revenue or the 
borrower’s historical relationship with the bank. This study concludes that while there 
have been positive developments over the last few years; there is still considerable room 
for product innovation in the SME finance space. 
 
The Kenyan economy is expected to grow by 6–7 per cent in 2015–17 (World Bank, 
2015). Given the pivotal role SMEs play in fuelling innovation and employment-creation, 
understanding the opportunities, gaps and challenges in the SME finance market is crucial 
to maintaining the current growth momentum. The financial sector’s role to channel credit 
affordably and efficiently to these enterprises is therefore very central for inclusive and 
sustained economic development (FSD, 2015). 
 
 
1.2 Problem Statement 
 
The topic SME finance has gained worldwide importance because SMEs are regarded as 
drivers of economies; however, there is still a paucity of studies on why and how banks 
lend to SMEs around the world (Bharath, Dahiyab, Saunders, & Srinivasan, 2005; Calice 
et al., 2012; Holod & Peek, 2013). Even though SMEs tend to be dependent on banks for 
external funds, relatively little research focuses on the supply side of bank finance (Holod 
& Peek, 2013). The World Bank underscores the importance of ongoing efforts to study 
SME financing from a supply side perspective and particularly in Sub-Saharan Africa as 
SMEs in this region are more financially constrained than in any other developing region 
(IFC, 2010). Calice et al., (2012) observe that only 20 percent of SMEs in Sub-Saharan 
Africa have a line of credit from a financial institution compared, for example, with 44 
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percent in Latin America and Caribbean, and only 9 percent of their investments are 
funded by banks versus 23 percent in Eastern Europe and Central Asia. 
 
Literature emphasizes the use of the relationship lending methodology when dealing with 
SMEs but for banks to employ this methodology, sufficient investment is required on their 
side in acquiring information on and monitoring these enterprises (Carbo’ –Valverde et 
al., 2009; Ono & Uesugi, 2009). It is the banks that take the initiative to develop a 
relationship with the borrowers ((Bharath et al., 2005; Carbo’ –Valverde et al., 2009; Ono 
& Uesugi, 2009). Santikian (2014) emphasizes that even though banks are a primary 
source of capital for small, private firms, the inner workings of small firms’ bank 
relationships remain obscure.  
 
Boot (2000) suggests that relationship banking has a distinct role to play and can be a 
value-enhancing intermediation activity. Similarly, Elsas (2005) and Greenbaum and 
Thakor (1995) suggest that relationship lending is economically beneficial to both lenders 
and borrowers yet those studies that focus on benefits do not provide direct evidence of 
the benefit to banks (Holod & Peek, 2013). In an earlier study, Boot (2000) underscores 
that as banking becomes increasingly competitive it is necessary to distinguish between 
the distinct costs and benefits of relationship banking in order to predict its viability and 
scale in the future.    
 
This study sought to determine how and why commercial banks engage in SME lending. 
In determining how banks engage the SME customer, the lending technologies employed 
were examined and specifically whether the highly preferred technology of relationship 
lending is employed. In determining why banks engage in SME lending, the benefits that 
accrue to commercial banks that engage in SME lending were established. As such, in a 
bid to determine the viability of SME lending in the future, the usefulness or advantage it 
gives commercial banks was studied. Further, as most of the previous research on SME 
lending (see Beck, Demirguc-Kunt & Peria, 2008, 2011; Calice et al., 2012 and De la 
Torre et al., 2010) employs a quantitative approach, with the dominant paradigm (or 
theoretical lens) being positivist, a departure from previously used research methods was 
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taken. The positivist lens can only tell us — "the what,” but it cannot tell us “why” and 
“how” SME lending is practiced. Previous studies give more attention to what SME 
lending is, how it is categorised and how it is measured, giving little attention to the 
process surrounding SME lending, that is, “how and why” banks practice SME lending. 
This provides the impetus to conduct this study by use of a qualitative probing approach 
to seek abundant information and deeper knowledge of SME lending in its natural setting 
(Creswell, 1994; Howitt & Cramer, 2005).   
 
 
1.3 Main Objective of the Study 
  
The main objective of the study was to determine the lending technologies employed with 
specific reference to the commonly referred technology of relationship lending in SME 
lending and the benefits that commercial banks gain in financing small and medium 
enterprises. In order to achieve the main objective, it was divided into three specific 
objectives which were subsequently restated as research questions. 
 
1.3.1 Specific Objectives 
1. To examine how soft information about the borrower is acquired, transferred and used 
by a bank to make the SME lending decision.  
2. To investigate the role of transaction lending and relationship lending, more 
specifically, the importance and interplay of the two methods in making the SME 
lending decision.  
3. To establish the benefits generated from engaging in SME lending by commercial 
banks in Kenya. 
 
1.3.2 Research Questions  
1. How is soft information about the borrower acquired, transferred and used by a bank 
to make the SME lending decision? 
2. When making the SME lending decision, what is the role of transaction lending and 
relationship lending, how important is each technology and how do they interplay? 
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3. What benefits do commercial banks in Kenya generate by engaging in SME lending? 
 
 
1.4 Scope and Delimitation of the Study 
 
The scope of this study is limited to commercial banks in Kenya that are prominent in 
SME lending. The commercial banks for the study are selected from an annual survey 
carried out by Think Business Limited which ranks banks in several categories including 
“best SME bank”. The category “best SME bank” is open to all commercial banks that 
focus mainly on SME banking. The survey culminates in the publication of the top three 
banks (Banking Survey, 2013) in each category. Since this information is released to the 
public or can be regarded as public information, the researcher was able to use this 
information to form a database of commercial banks that mainly focus on SME banking. 
All commercial banks that have been ranked top three in the category “best SME bank” 
for the last five years (2010-2014) are included in this study (Banking Survey 2010-2014). 
Additional considerations for inclusion in this study are those banks which are considered 
as competitors in the SME market by the ranked banks and finally, the willingness to 
participate and allow the research to take place in their premises or natural environment. 
The additional banks for the study were identified during the interview process with 
respondents from the ranked banks. As some banks have featured more than once amongst 
the top three in the five years under study, while others when contacted indicated that they 
had shifted focus from the SME market, this resulted in a total of seven commercial banks 
being used for this study 
 
As the SME view (or demand side or borrower view) has been widely researched and 
documented in literature, this is not considered and does not form any part of the current 
study. Literature suggests that commercial banks are the ones that take the initiative to 
invest in the relationship with SMEs yet there is a dearth of studies on how and why these 
banks finance SMEs. This study therefore solely focuses on the supplier side/lender view 




1.5 Significance of the Study 
 
For commercial banks, the results of this study may provide a useful reference point to 
consider the appropriateness of the different lending technologies in different lending 
situations. This information is not only important for loan product innovations for the 
SME sector but may also assist banks make the decision on whether and how to continue 
contracting with the SME segment, in effect determine whether SME financing is viable 
for them in future. 
 
SME owners/managers may find this study useful as it will provide greater knowledge on 
how commercial banks asses the borrower for lending and the requirements thereof which 
should enable the SME be better prepared when seeking finance. This information will 
likely enable SMEs make applications that will most likely be successful and as such 
enhance SME access to credit which is necessary for their growth and success, and which 
should translate to greater economic growth for the country given that these enterprises 
are widely known as drivers of economies. 
 
Regulators and policy makers will be better informed on the methods or technologies that 
are currently being employed in SME lending. This should improve policy making in 
promoting SME lending; for instance through tax incentives, policies that enhance sharing 
of SME credit data among SME lenders to alleviate information asymmetry, formulate 
codes of conduct when lending to SMEs to ensure and enhance timely availability of credit 
and, incentives to lenders that invest in information gathering and take risks in SME 
lending. This should in the long run translate to better access to financial services by 
SMEs, and indeed overall financial development that is crucial to economic growth and 
poverty reduction.  
 
The results of this study may also provide useful information for capital providers such as 
the government and other agencies aimed at promoting access to finance for SMEs. The 
government will find this study useful in the structuring of incentives for banks that lend 
to SMEs such as through the provision of government loan guarantees/credit guarantees.   
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Researchers interested in the area of SME lending will find this study useful as it has 
added to the existing body of knowledge on SME lending by exploring the supply side or 
lender’s perspective in commercial banks in Kenya (a developing country in sub Saharan 
Africa). This study will also make a methodological contribution by using a qualitative 
approach in the study of SME lending methods employed and benefits to commercial 
banks.   
  
 
1.6 Overview of Methodology 
 
A qualitative research approach, which is rarely seen in SME lending literature, was 
employed for this study and within it a multiple case study design was selected to conduct 
the study. A case study design is advocated for when the researcher has little control over 
events and the focus is on a contemporary phenomenon within a real-life context 
(Woodside, 2010; Yin 2012). Using multiple case studies can identify consistent patterns 
of behavior and uncover new and/or divergent themes and also increases the level of 
assurance of the findings making the overall study robust (Herriot & Firestone, 1983; 
Miles & Huberman, 1994; Yin 2004). 
 
Data was collected through semi-structured face to face interviews, lasting from forty five 
minutes to two hours, with bank’s managers/officers in the selected commercial banks. 
The interviews were recorded and transcribed soon after. Data analysis was conducted 
using content analysis which resulted in a series of ‘thick’ narrative descriptions of the 
SME lending process and benefits to commercial banks thereof. More detail of the 
methodology employed to conduct this study is provided in Chapter 3 of this thesis. 
 
 
1.7 Thesis Outline  
 




Chapter one (introduction) provides the background to the study that leads to the 
identification of the research problem. The importance or justification of the research is 
provided and finally, an outline of the thesis is provided. 
 
Chapter two (literature review) provides a detailed review of the theoretical and empirical 
literature relating to SME lending. The primary output of the literature review is the 
identification of two gaps in the existing SME lending literature; the absence of a supplier 
side/lender perspective on how and why commercial banks lend to SMEs around the 
world.  
 
Chapter three (methodology) provides a justification for the research methodology 
adopted for this study. It reviews four research paradigms: i) positivism; ii) post-
positivism; iii) interpretivism/constructivism and iv) pragmatism, and provides a 
justification as to why this study falls under the interpretivism/constructivism paradigm. 
The review is followed by a discussion of the three key research approaches: i) 
quantitative; ii) qualitative and iii) mixed methods, and a rationale provided as to why the 
qualitative approach was most appropriate in resolving the identified research problem. 
The appropriate research design is then discussed including a detailed description of the 
procedure for the conduct of the semi-structured interviews. Finally, issues relating to 
research validity, reliability and ethics are addressed. 
 
Chapter four (data presentation) presents the findings from the semi-structured interviews.  
 
Chapter five (discussion of findings) discusses the findings from the interviews in the 
context of the literature review. The outcomes from these findings are summarised and 
used to develop models of the SME lending process, the SME lending technology decision 
making process and the benefits of SME lending.  
 
Chapter six (conclusions and recommendations) draws conclusions and provides the 
contributions to knowledge of the study, provides the implications of the research, 
limitations of the study and finally makes recommendations for further study.   
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This chapter provides a review of the theoretical and empirical literature relating to SME 
lending. Within the theoretical review is a general review of financial intermediation 
theories that have prompted interest in bank lending followed by a review of relationship 
banking theory. The empirical review of related studies is divided into three sections. The 
first section discusses the state of SME financing around the world. The second section 
discusses SME financing technologies that are employed, soft information acquisition and 
use in SME lending decision making. The third section discusses the benefits of SME 
lending to commercial banks. Finally, a summary of the literature is presented that 
highlights the emerging gaps in knowledge. The primary output of this literature review 
is the identification of three gaps in the SME lending literature; the lack of knowledge 
about, how soft information is collected and transferred within a commercial bank for use 
in the SME lending decision, whether banks use relationship lending or how this method 
interplays with transaction lending to make the SME lending decision and the actual 
benefits for commercial banks that engage in SME lending. 
 
 
2.2 Theoretical Review 
 
This section begins with a general review of the traditional financial intermediation 
theories, followed by the modern literature on financial intermediation which has shifted 
focus to the role of banks as relationship lenders (Boot (2000). A review of small business 
lending technologies is also provided, followed by a more detailed focus on the view of 




2.2.1 Theories of Financial Intermediation 
The existing theories of financial intermediation stress that there is an important role of 
financial intermediaries in reducing informational asymmetries and transaction costs. In 
simple terms, information asymmetry refers to the case where one side of the market has 
better information than the other. In other words, the borrower knows more than the lender 
about his credit worthiness. Information asymmetry can occur “ex ante” or “ex post”. An 
ex-ante information asymmetry problem arises when lenders cannot differentiate between 
borrowers with different credit risks before providing loans and leads to an adverse 
selection problem (Claus & Grimmes, 2003). In other words, it is the immoral behaviour 
that takes advantage of asymmetric information before a transaction. An information 
asymmetry problem occurs ex post when only borrowers, but not lenders, can observe 
actual returns after project completion. In other words, it is the immoral behaviour that 
takes advantage of asymmetric information after a transaction. This leads to a moral 
hazard problem. In the credit markets, moral hazard arises when a borrower engages in 
activities that reduce the likelihood of a loan being repaid.  
 
Akerlof (1970) develops a classical example of adverse selection in his paper, “The 
Market for Lemons”, when he uses a second hand car market in which the seller is the 
only one that truly has complete information about the quality of the car. Sellers of low 
quality cars will try to sell bad cars (lemons) as if they were high quality cars. This will 
cause potential buyers to be suspicious of all cars and thus make it difficult for those sellers 
that are trying to sell good quality second hand cars. Sellers with high quality cars would 
then exit this market, leaving only an adverse selection of low quality cars. Then, a 
distinction of quality will be made within the remaining low-quality cars, which will start 
the process again. In the end, the market of second hand cars will disappear. 
 
Jaffe and Russell (1976) develop a theoretical model that analyses the behaviour of a loan 
market in which borrowers have more information than lenders about the likelihood of 
default. They posit that imperfect information and uncertainty can lead to rationing in loan 
markets, that is, some borrowers do not receive the loan they applied for. They focus on 
the relationship between default proportions and contract sizes and show that there is a 
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minimum loan size at which no default is observed beyond which the proportion of 
borrowers who default increases with the contract size.   
 
Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) in their paper, “Credit Rationing in Markets with Imperfect 
Information”, define a situation similar to the case of Akerlof’s 1970 paper, except in the 
financial markets. They develop a model of credit rationing, where some borrowers 
receive loans and others do not. Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) focus on interest rates charged 
to borrowers and how the interest rate can affect the quality of loans because of an adverse 
selection or moral hazard effect. They explain how raising interest rates will make 
indebted people take higher risks. Adverse selection problems arise when an increase in 
interest rates leaves a more risky pool of borrowers in the market for funds. Borrowers 
with weak repayment prospects could crowd out everyone else from their side of the 
market meaning financial intermediaries are then more likely to be lending to high-risk 
borrowers, because those who are willing to pay high interest rates will, on average, be 
worse risks. Interest rates may act as a screening device, with those willing to pay high 
interest rates being on average worse risks. A change in these interest rates may also lead 
to a moral hazard effect by changing the behaviour of borrowers.  
 
Diamond (1984) argues that the main reason financial intermediaries exist is because of 
diversification within the financial intermediary. Diamond (1984) argues that since the 
outcome from firms investment project is not known ex post to external agents, this leads 
to a moral hazard problem because it provides an incentive for borrowers to default on a 
loan even when the project is successful. Financial intermediaries must therefore gather 
information to assess the outcome and as such, they are delegated the costly task of 
monitoring loan contracts. The information production task delegated to the intermediary 
gives rise to incentive problems for the intermediary which Diamond (1984) refers to as 
delegation costs. In other words, the financial intermediary must choose an incentive 
contract such that it has incentives to monitor the information, make proper use of it, and 
make sufficient payments to depositors to attract deposits. Providing these incentives is 
costly and diversification can reduce these costs. The optimal contract is a debt contract 
(an agreement by the borrower to pay the lender a fixed amount) with a non-pecuniary 
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bankruptcy penalty. Diamond (1984) develops a model in which a financial intermediary 
has a net cost advantage relative to direct lending and borrowing. In other words, an 
intermediary (such as a bank) is delegated the task of costly monitoring of loan contracts 
written with firms who borrow from it but generally at some cost advantage for the 
intermediary (Diamond, 1984). Schumpeter (1939) assigned such a "delegated 
monitoring" role to banks when he stated,  
... the banker must not only know what the transaction is which he is asked to finance and 
how it is likely to turn out but he must also know the customer, his business and even his 
private habits, and get, by frequently "talking things over with him", a clear picture of the 
situation (Schumpeter (1939), p. 116).  
 
Williamson (1986) also develops a model of credit rationing similar to those developed 
by Jaffe and Russel (1976), and Stiglitz and Weiss (1981); and posits that since a borrower 
and lender are asymmetrically informed ex post about the return on the borrower’s 
investment project, the borrower will have an incentive to falsely default on the loan. 
Williamson (1986) suggests that the costly monitoring of borrowers implies that there 
exist increasing returns to scale in lending and borrowing which can be exploited by 
financial intermediaries and that the optimal contract between a lender and a borrower is 
a debt contract. This concurs with Diamond’s (1984) earlier study focusing on the costs 
incurred by the intermediary that engages in monitoring borrowers.  
 
The informational asymmetry theories above underpin the current study because in the 
bank-borrower relationship, the borrower knows more about themselves than the bank 
does (Akerlof, 1970; Jaffe & Russell, 1986; Stiglitz & Weiss, 1981). In this relationship 
the borrower requires funding from the bank and the bank performs its intermediating 
activity by providing funds it has collected from savers. In doing this, the lender needs to 
protect itself from lack of full information about the borrower/borrower behaviour and as 
such a contract has to be put in place (Diamond, 1984). Interestingly Schumpeter (1939), 
in addition to assigning a delegated monitoring task to banks, alludes to the concept of 
relationship lending when he posits that a lender needs to know not only information that 
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is readily available and exchanged when transacting with the borrower but also needs to 
collect soft information.  
 
The financial intermediation theories above focus on the bank and borrower relationship 
and have led to more specific theories that focus on this relationship. In bank lending, one 
can basically distinguish transaction based lending and relationship lending which is a 
sub-set of relationship banking (Berger & Udell, 2006). 
 
2.2.2 Banking Theory 
The concept of relationship banking has been forged in the theory of banking to reflect 
the sharing of private information between a bank and its clients and the benefits of a 
continuing relationship Freixas (2005). Boot (2000) defines relationship banking as the 
provision of financial services by a financial intermediary that invests in obtaining 
customer-specific information, often proprietary in nature; and evaluates the profitability 
of these investments through multiple interactions with the same customer over time 
and/or across products. Boot’s (2000) definition centres around two critical dimensions: 
proprietary information and multiple interactions. The definition emphasizes that 
relationship banking involves borrower specific, often proprietary, information available 
only to the intermediary and the customer. In the context of lending, this information is 
obtained when banks provide screening (Allen, 1990; Ramakrishnan & Thakor, 1984) 
and/or monitoring services (Diamond, 1984; Rajan & Winton, 1995). Moreover, as stated 
in the definition, the information can be used in multiple interactions with the same 
customer, creating an opportunity to benefit from inter temporal information reusability 
(Greenbaum & Thakor, 1995). Freixas (2005) also refers to relationship banking as the 
investment in providing financial services that will allow one to repeatedly deal with the 
same customer. In contrast, transaction-oriented banking focuses on a single transaction 
with a customer, or multiple identical transactions with various customers. What is 
interesting is that this way of looking at relationship banking takes us beyond the 




Relationship banking has its theoretical foundation in the theory proposed by Hodgman 
(1961). Hodgman (1961) hypothesizes that a customer’s deposit relationship with the bank 
influences the availability and cost of credit to that customer and leads to more favourable 
loan conditions for a customer than a non-customer. He posits that this deposit relationship 
arises in response to competition between banks and for banks to survive; they offer 
favourable loan rates to their deposit customers. Since interests earned on deposits are 
capped by regulation, banks cannot increase interests earned by their loyal depositors but 
can compensate loyal depositors by offering lower rates on loans. Strong deposit 
relationships also reduce the variability in loanable funds, which in turn increases the 
return-per unit of risk of the bank's loan portfolio (Kane & Malkiel, 1965). An incumbent 
bank gains an informational advantage over competitors by privately observing the 
payment behaviour of its depositors. This bank is therefore able to offer cheap loans to its 
best depositors driving away competing loan offers because competing banks are unable 
to offer the same loan rates without also attracting unprofitable, poor depositors (Kane & 
Malkiel, 1965). 
 
While Hodgman (1961) focuses on deposit relationships, Wood (1975) proposes that a 
lending relationship may develop independently of a deposit relationship. Wood (1975) 
recognises that banks may want to accommodate prospective borrowers so that they can 
capture these customers for future credit. He proposes that a bank may find it profitable 
to offer easy or low-cost credit in one period in the hope of charging higher rates to a 
customer in the future. In order for the bank to have the ability to charge higher rates in 
the future, some mechanism must lock the customer into the current relationship. This 
gives rise to an informational monopoly to the single informed bank. Wood (1975) 
assumes that there are costs that must prevent the customer from transferring business to 
a competing lender and thus locks in the customer to the bank that provided the initial 
loan. Howorth, Peel and Wilson (2003), clarify this when they find that firms will only be 
informationally captured when the costs of switching banks, including the costs of 





In line with Wood’s (1975) preposition, Sharpe (1990) recognises that since an incumbent 
lender learns more about a borrower’s characteristics than do other banks, this generates 
an asymmetry of information among banks resulting in informed (relationship) banks and 
uninformed (transactional) banks. Rather than take relationships as a given, Sharpe (1990) 
theorizes that customer relationships arise endogenously as a consequence of the 
asymmetric evolution of information sets generated by the history of bank-firm 
interactions. Other researchers reason similarly as there is considerable literature that 
suggests the existence of the concept of relationship lending as is evidenced by the 
complementary definitions which include, “when a firm has close ties to a financial 
institution”, (Petersen & Rajan, 1994); “a long term implicit contract between a bank and 
its debtor”, Elsas (2005); while Ongena and Smith (2000) define it as “the connection 
between a bank and a customer that goes beyond the execution of simple, anonymous 
financial transactions”.  
 
Memmel, Schmieder, and Stein (2008) define relationship lending as simply, “lending 
relationships between firms and banks”. Berger and Udell (2006) provide a more 
comprehensive definition as the lending technology where “decisions are primarily based 
on soft information gathered over the course of a relationship.” Earlier, Berger (1999) 
posits that the financial intermediary gathers confidential information through interaction 
with the borrower over time and usually through the use of multiple financial 
products/services. Similarly, Freixas (2005) emphasizes that the bank is the one that 
makes the necessary investment to obtain borrower-specific (often proprietary) 
information while the borrower has a choice to invest or not. This borrower-specific 
information is obtained when banks provide screening (Ramakrishnan & Thakor, 1984) 
and/or monitoring services (Diamond, 1984). This information which is normally referred 
to as “soft” information is not easily quantified and consists of information gathered over 
time through contact with the firm and its stakeholders (Berger & Udell, 2006).  
 
Petersen (2004) distinguishes soft from hard information as that information which is 
difficult to completely summarize in a numeric score while the latter is easily reduced to 
numbers. Schwarze (2006) suggests that the more qualitative information is used in credit 
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decision making, “the more one can speak of the granting of credit under relationship 
aspects”. Using this information over several interactions can be beneficial to both bank 
and customer (Diamond, 1984; Elsas, 2005; Greenbaum & Thakor, 1995; Ongena & 
Smith, 2000; Rajan, 1997; Schumpeter, 1939). As relationship lending is aimed at 
resolving information asymmetry problems, it is suited to SMEs which are considered as 
informationally opaque enterprises (Carbo’ –Valverde et al., 2009; Ono & Uesugi, 2009).  
 
This study combines Berger and Udell’s (2006) and, Greenbaum and Thakor’s (1995) 
definition to provide a working definition of relationship lending as, “the lending 
technology where decisions are primarily based on soft information gathered over the 
course of a relationship between a lender and borrower and results in mutual economic 
benefit.” This forms the basis of part of the research problem which investigates whether 
and how relationship lending is practised.  
 
 
2.3 Review of the Empirical Research 
 
This section provides empirical evidence on the state of SME financing around the world, 
the SME financing technologies that are employed, soft information acquisition and used 
in SME lending decision making and, the value of SME lending to commercial banks. 
 
2.3.1 The State of SME Financing around the World 
The importance of access to finance for SMEs is a widely recognized subject among 
academics and policymakers. SMEs play a key role in economic development, 
diversification, and employment creation, contributing 49 per cent of GDP on average in 
high-income countries and 29 per cent in low-income countries (Ayyagari et al., 2007 in 
FSD, 2015). However, SMEs are more credit constrained than large firms which severely 
affects their possibilities to grow and innovate (Beck & Demigurc-Kunt, 2006; Beck, 




Based on the significant role of SMEs in economic growth and creation of employment, 
the financial sector’s role of channelling credit affordably and efficiently to SMEs is very 
central for inclusive and sustained economic development. There has been increased 
interest in the small and medium enterprise (SME) sector by commercial banks around 
the world. Previously, in the not so distant past, the SME market was perceived by banks 
as risky, costly and difficult to serve. Commercial banks are now facing significant 
competition in the corporate and retail sectors (Calice, et al., 2012; De la Torre et al., 
2010) and this has shifted their focus downstream to serve the previously underserved 
SME market. In a study commissioned by the World Bank, Berg and Fuchs (2013) survey 
a total of 62 commercial banks in five countries, including Kenya, and find that SME’s 
share of total bank lending ranges between 5% and 17.4% with banks in Kenya, Rwanda, 
and Tanzania being more involved than banks in South Africa and Nigeria.  
 
Banks perceive the SME segment as large, unsaturated and with good prospects, even 
considering this segment as strategically important (Calice et al., 2012). Many banks now 
report that they perceive significant opportunities in the SME sector with survey data from 
multiple studies showing that rather than overlooking or avoiding SMEs, they have begun 
to target SMEs as a profitable segment (IFC, 2010). For instance, Beck et al. (2011) 
provide the first attempt to understand SME financing from the supply side. Based on a 
survey of 91 banks in 45 countries (38 developing and 7 developed), they find that banks 
serve the SME segment through a number of lending technologies and organisational 
setups. They also observe few differences in the extent SMEs are reached out by banks 
based on their ownership structure (i.e. public, private or foreign-owned). However, they 
also find significant differences across banks based in developed and developing 
economies; for instance, a firm’s credit history and owner characteristics are more 
important in developing economies, whereas loan size is the key factor driving small 
business lending in developed economies. Beck et al. (2008; 2011) conclude that the 
enabling environment is more important than the size of the firm or bank ownership in 
shaping bank financing to SMEs. A similar, though a single country study by Stephanou 
and Rodriguez (2008) analyses both the trend and structure of the SME financing market 
in Colombia. Their results reveal that banks in the country regard the SME segment as an 
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attractive business opportunity though their level of sophistication in terms of business 
models and risk management tools remains modest. Similar to Beck et al.’s (2008; 2011) 
conclusion, Stephanou and Rodriguez (2008) also conclude that the market is 
characterized by a number of institutional and policy constraints, which inhibit further 
growth of SME lending. 
 
Also consistent with Beck et al. (2008; 2011), De la Torre et al. (2010) investigate banks 
approaches to SMEs in terms of business models and risk management systems. Based on 
surveys of 48 banks and one leasing company in 12 countries, they find that all banks in 
the sample are interested in serving the SME segment. To do so, almost all have separate 
organizational units and offer a wide range of products, applying different transactional 
technologies such as credit scoring. Additionally, De la Torre et al. (2010) find that most 
banks want to serve SMEs because they find this segment profitable, especially as margins 
in other banking markets narrow due to intensified competition.  
 
According to the IFC (2010), the gap in financial services (referred to the missing middle) 
provided to SMEs, appears to be shrinking the fastest in emerging markets (low- and 
middle-income countries) where this gap has been the widest. More and more emerging 
market banks are developing strategies and creating SME units. Banks are starting to 
understand the particular needs and preferences of SMEs and are developing tailored 
approaches to overcome the historical challenges of high credit risk and cost to serve (IFC, 
2010). Banks have also found that SMEs actually value relationships more than any other 
segment, whereas large corporates take it for granted. SMEs are also willing to pay a 
higher price for this relationship as they do not want to be treated like an account number 
(IFC, 2010). This is confirmed by a KPMG (2013) survey that finds that commercial banks 
are also increasingly realizing that it is easier to retain than acquire customers and now 
substantially invest in customer relationship management. 
 
2.3.2 Soft Information and the SME Lending Decision 
Boot (2000) suggests that in originating loans, banks develop proprietary information and 
subsequent monitoring of borrowers yields additional private information. García-
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Appendini (2007), in a survey of small business finances (SSBF) which targeted US for-
profit firms, finds that hard public information may not be used in loan underwriting when 
banks have a strong relationship with the borrower and that soft information if available 
is the driving determinant in loan underwriting. Puri, Rocholl, and Steffen (2010) concur 
when they find that prior relationships not only allow the bank to produce information that 
goes beyond publicly available information, but also allow it to better assess loan 
applicants’ creditworthiness. 
 
Berger and Udell (2002; 2006) argue that as loan officers have the most frequent and 
personal contact with the firm, its owner, its employees, and the local community, they 
are able to obtain soft as well as hard information about the borrowers. Further, they 
suggest that the loan officer is able to collect relevant information about the firm, its owner 
and business conditions in local market from other local firms and individuals because 
they typically live in the local community. Berger and Udell’s (2002) model is recently 
confirmed at least in part by Hattori, Shintani, and Uchida (2015) who using unique data 
from heterogeneous banks in Japan, find that loan officers (located at the bottom of the 
banks’ hierarchy) collect soft information. This is because they are the person with whom 
a borrower has the initial and most frequent contact among bank staff. Even though 
existing studies find that loan officers indeed play an important role in the production of 
soft information, this does not rule out the possibility of someone else producing soft 
information. At smaller banks where job assignments are more flexible and the collection 
of information is not routinized by strict internal rules, decision makers might also directly 
acquire soft information through their own personal contact with borrowers while at large 
banks, loan officers might be the sole producers of borrower information (Agarwal & 
Hauswald, 2011; Liberti & Mian, 2009). Hattori et al. (2015) also find that especially at 
smaller banks, branch managers who have direct contact with the borrowers also collect 
soft information, although less frequently. Further, other bank employees in the branch 
apart from the account loan officers also have direct and frequent contact with borrowers. 
 
Berger and Udell (2002; 2006) suggest that additional information may also be gathered 
through contact with other members of the local community, such as suppliers and 
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customers, who may give specific information about the firm and owner or general 
information about the business environment in which they operate. Similarly, Schwarze 
(2006) gives examples of soft information which may be collected from the SME owner 
or other sources as; the character and reliability of the SME’s owner, communication with 
customers of the SME or neighbouring businesses. 
 
Soft information is transferred through direct personal interaction and communication 
between loan officers and credit decision makers. Soft information is hardened (that is, 
quantified or digitized) so that it can be transmitted to a higher level (Agarwal & 
Hauswald, 2011; Liberti & Mian, 2009). 
 
Moreover, while the soft information produced by loan officers is often coded into 
hardened soft information and transmitted (with loss) to an upper level for decision 
making, it does not rule out the possibility that soft information is communicated and used 
in other forms. Further sharing of soft information can occur during the decisions making 
process by loan committees that consist of multiple bank employees. Paravisini and 
Schoar (2012) conduct research with BancaMia, a for-profit bank in Colombia specialized 
in loans to small enterprises and find that loan officers upload borrower information and 
the bank's management information system compiles in a single application file all the 
available borrower information for review by a credit committee. This information 
includes: the first-hand information collected by the loan officer, the borrower's past credit 
history in BancaMia and any available third-party information (e.g., the borrower's credit 
score from a private credit bureau). Similarly, Nemoto, Ogura, and Watanabe (2011) 
provide evidence from Japan and show that in small and medium sized banks, any 
information collected by employees in the branch is filed in a loan proposal, which even 
includes a record of casual conversations held with borrowers. This loan proposal is 
circulated within the branch with every staff of the branch having access to it resulting in 





Mocetti, Pagnini, and Sette (2010) find that investment in information and communication 
technologies has made it easier to share documentation and to combine information stored 
in different database. Hattori et al. (2015) find that at least for smaller banks, it is the 
branch managers (who are likely to be decision makers) who are the most important 
repository of soft information. This is inconsistent with the conventional view that loan 
officers are the sole repository of soft information (Berger & Udell, 2002; 2006; Scott, 
2006). Scott (2006) provides a different perspective of looking at how loan officers may 
be the repository of soft information. Using data on SME lending from a survey of small 
businesses conducted by the National Federation of Independent Business (NFIB) in the 
U.S., Scott (2006) finds that greater loan officer turnover has a more adverse effect on the 
availability of credit for borrowers suggesting the importance of loan officers in the 
collection and transfer of soft information or alternatively that the repository of this 
information is the loan officer. 
 
Hattori et al., (2015) conclude their study by suggesting that there are many important 
issues that remain untested concerning the collection, processing, and use of soft 
information within heterogeneous bank organizations.  
 
2.3.3 Transaction and Relationship Lending in SME Lending   
Uchida, Udell, and Yamori (2006) suggest that among others, two main lending 
technologies are used to finance small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs) and the two 
can be primarily distinguished by the type of information that a bank uses in granting and 
monitoring the loan. This concurs with Berger and Udell’s (2006) classification of SMEs 
lending technologies. While most studies argue that small banks are more likely to engage 
in SME financing using relationship lending (see Berger & Udell, 1995; Berger & Udell, 
2002; Strahan & Weston, 1996) recent evidence questions this traditional view  and 
suggests that larger banks can have a comparative advantage at financing SMEs through 
transactional lending technologies (Berger & Udell 2006; De la Torre et al., 2010).   
 
Uchida et al., (2006) use data from a unique survey in Japan to investigate the different 
lending technologies and find that although financial statement lending is the most 
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commonly used technology, multiple lending technologies are usually used at the same 
time; suggesting the existence of complementarity among lending technologies. Similarly, 
De la Torre et al. (2010) suggest that relationship lending is not the only way in which 
banks can extend financing to SMEs as banks are increasingly applying different 
transactional technologies. This is also confirmed by Albareto, Benvenuti, Mocetti, 
Pagnini, and Rossi (2008) when in a survey on Italian banks, they find that medium and 
large banks do use soft information (like qualitative information on the firm’s governance) 
in their credit scoring models. Another study by Columba, Gambacorta, and Mistrulli 
(2010) and Bartoli, Ferri, Murro, and Rotondi (2012) suggests that banks, especially large 
ones, appreciate group lending technology in order to lend to SMEs. They find that group 
lending Mutual Guarantee Institutions (MGIs), through peer monitoring and joint 
responsibility, help banks to mitigate SMEs’ asymmetric information problems. Finally 
and more recently, Bartoli, Ferri, Murro, and Rotondi (2013) investigate SME financing 
in Italy and find that banks lend to SMEs by using both transaction and relationship 
lending, independent of the size and proximity of borrowers. These results not only 
provide a test of the importance of the various lending technologies proposed by Berger 
and Udell (2006) they also support the earlier views of Berger and Udell (2006) and 
Uchida et al. (2006) that lending technologies can be complementary.  
 
Those studies that provide evidence of the use of relationship lending through application 
of the different measures that proxy relationship lending (duration, scope and 
concentration of borrowing) include; Berger and Udell (1995) who examine the role of 
relationship lending in small firm finance and find that borrowers with longer banking 
relationships pay lower interest rates and are less likely to pledge collateral.  Overall, the 
analysis on a U.S. National Survey of Small Business Finances by Berger and Udell 
(1995) shows that the longer the relationship between the banker and the borrower, the 
easier the loan terms are for the borrower. Similarly, Boot (2000) finds that apart from a 
fall in interest rates and collateral requirements over the life of the relationship, duration 
positively affects the availability of credit, concurring also with the earlier findings of 
Petersen and Rajan (1994) and Cole (1998) who find that in the US, a lender is less likely 
to grant credit to a firm if the customer relationship has lasted for one year or less. 
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Contrasting evidence is provided by Degryse and Van Cayseele (2000) in a study of 
Belgian enterprises on the impact of relationship banking when they find that borrowing 
rates increase as the bank-firm relationship lengthens, while borrowing rates decrease 
when the scope of the bank-firm relationship increases. Using a sample of small- and 
medium-sized corporate borrowers of five major German universal banks, Elsas (2005) 
also finds that the duration of the bank-borrower relationship is not related to Hausbank 
status but as a bank’s share of debt financing or its share of payment transactions increases, 
it is more likely to be a Hausbank.  
 
On the effect of multiple bank relationships, Cole (1998) finds that a lender is less likely 
to grant credit to a firm if the firm deals with other financial counterparts. Similarly, 
Bharath, Dahiyab, Saunders, and Srinivasan (2007) find that the existence of a prior 
relationship is important and banks favour firms with pre-existing banking relationships 
at the time of loan renewal and approval. This prior relationship is favourable for a loan 
applicant because it provides more information about the applicant for the bank. 
Additionally, this prior loan relationship gives the bank additional information about the 
applicant and small banks rely more heavily on it as it provides insights into the character 
of a borrower (Cole, Goldberg, & White, 2004). Elsas (2005) concurs when he also finds 
that as a bank’s share of debt financing or its share of payment transactions increases, it is 
more likely to be a Hausbank (Hausbank often serves as a prime example of relationship 
lending). Elsas (2005) finds a negative correlation between the number of banks and 
Hausbank status but clarifies that Hausbank status is not equivalent to exclusivity as on 
average, borrowers in the study with a Hausbank relationship had 5 bank relationships 
with a median of 4.3. Hernandez-Cánovas & Martinez-Solano (2006) in a study of small 
Spanish firms find that SMEs that work with fewer financial intermediaries obtain debt at 
a lower cost. 
 
Houston and James (1999) explain the existence of multiple bank relationships by 
focusing on the anticipated funding needs and show that the desirability of multiple bank 
relationships crucially depends on the size of the funding needs. Their empirical evidence 
indicates that firms with a single bank are at a disadvantage (“cash flow constrained”) 
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only when large funding needs are anticipated. In the case of more modest funding needs, 
single bank firms are less cash flow constrained than firms with multiple bank relations 
are. 
 
In their conclusion, Bharath et al. (2007) report significant benefits of borrowing from 
relationship lenders that include; lowering pricing of loans (10 to 17 bps lowering of loan 
spreads), relationship loans are significantly less likely to be secured by collateral and 
relationship borrowers also obtain larger loans (scaled by the borrower’s asset size or 
long-term debt) compared to non-relationship borrowers.  
 
2.3.4 Benefits of SME Lending to Commercial Banks  
Empirical evidence on the benefits of SME lending tends to focus on the benefits that 
accrue to the borrower and obviously so as prior studies focused on the lack of credit for 
SMEs and why SMEs needed finance (Berger & Udell, 1995; Bharath et al., 2007; Cole, 
1998; Elsas & Krahnen, 1998; Harhoff & Körting, 1998; Petersen & Rajan, 1994, 1995). 
A few of the recent studies relating to the subject of value of SME lending to commercial 
banks are highlighted here. Many studies have posited that in order to engage the SME 
sector, relationship lending is the preferred technology and as such, a number of these 
studies tend to refer to the benefits to commercial banks that employ the relationship 
lending technology (for instance, Holod and Peek, 2013). While cross-country evidence 
on the drivers of bank financing for SMEs is extensive, detailed information for Sub-
Saharan Africa remains limited (IFC, 2010). 
 
In their survey of 91 banks in 45 countries, Beck et al. (2011) find that banks perceive the 
SME segment as highly profitable. Similarly, Calice et al. (2012) study the extent of bank 
lending to SMEs in Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania and Zambia and find that banks perceive 
the SME segment as large, unsaturated, with good prospects and strategically important. 
Like De la Torre et al. (2010) who use data from bank surveys for a total of 48 banks (plus 
one leasing company) in 12 countries, Calice et al. (2012) also find that the common 
drivers of bank involvement with SMEs are, perceived profitability, reduction of 




Perceived profitability is cited as a major driver of bank involvement with the SME 
segment (Calice et al., 2012; De la Torre et al., 2010) which concurs with the earlier 
findings of Bharath et al. (2005). Calice et al. (2012) find that sixty-three percent of the 
banks they interviewed (in Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania and Zambia) expect high profits 
from working with SMEs. In Kenya, specifically, fifty percent of banks were motivated 
to participate in the SME market in view of its profitability. De la Torre et al. (2010) find 
that a majority of banks consider that the SME segment’s profitability will more than 
compensate for the higher costs and risks of the segment. Furthermore, De la Torre et al. 
(2010) find that many banks perceive the SME segment to be more profitable than 
corporate banking. They explain this by the fact that spreads on corporate lending are near 
zero (due to high competition) and as such banks are looking for new markets to diversify 
their income sources. The perceived profitability of working with SMEs not only derives 
from lending products, but also from the potential for cross-selling other products. Once 
a bank has established a relationship with the borrowing SME, the bank may offer a 
variety of other services and obtain revenues from the fees they charge for these services 
(De la Torre et al., 2010). This coincides with the later findings of Holod and Peek (2013) 
that banks may profit from relatively inexpensive core deposits placed with the bank by 
their relationship borrowers in addition to the earlier findings of Boot (2000) that rate-
insensitive core deposits allow for intertemporal smoothing in lending rates. This suggests 
a complementarity between deposit taking and lending. More recently, Fredriksson and 
Moro (2014) analyse 4285 firm-year observations from Finnish banks and find that the 
length and scope of a relationship, and the loan dimensions, are important in explaining 
the risk-adjusted profitability of banks. 
 
The development of lender-borrower relationships should also reduce information 
asymmetry especially where borrowers are considered information opaque as in the case 
of SMEs (Holod & Peek, 2013). This perceived benefit concurs with the basic premise of 
the theories of financial intermediation (Diamond, 1984; Diamond, 1991; Fama, 1985; 
Leland & Pyle, 1977; McNulty, 2002; Ramakrishnan & Thakor, 1984). Boot (2000) 
suggests that relationship banking can facilitate a Pareto-improving exchange of 
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information between the bank and the borrower, where a borrower might be inclined to 
reveal more information than in a transaction-oriented interaction and the lender might 
have stronger incentives to invest in producing information. The continuous contact 
between borrower and lender in the provision of various financial services can produce 
valuable information which the lender can use in making decisions. These decisions 
include; whether to extend credit or not, how to price loans, whether to require collateral 
and whether to attach other conditions to the loan (Elyasiani & Goldberg, 2004). Puri, 
Rocholl, and Steffen (2010) concur and find that relationships provide value to banks in 
the screening process of loan applications by retail customers as well as in the monitoring 
process even after the improvement in the initial screening process. This agrees with the 
earlier studies of Boot (2000) and Rajan (1996). Boot (2000) concludes that relationship 
lending can pave the way for more informative credit contracting decisions based on a 
better exchange of information and also increase the availability of credit to information-
sensitive borrowers. Rajan (1996) suggests that the benefits of a relationship may include 
the transfer of proprietary information, a commitment to continue doing business together 
through financially tough times, or the offer and delivery of services at prices different 
from costs.  
 
On the contrary, Von Thadden (2004) suggests that even though a relationship may lead 
to one bank having a monopoly of information over other banks, this would be 
unfavourable for the borrower. In an earlier study, Boot (2000) highlights this monopoly 
problem when he proposes that relationships are the primary cause of an incumbent bank’s 
comparative advantage over new lenders. Garriga (2006) refers to this as the “dark side” 
of relationship lending where one bank may end up having a monopoly of information 
over other lenders and thus be able to extract more interest income from borrowers. 
Lehmann and Neuberger (2001) and, Hernandez-Cánovas and Martinez-Solano (2006) 
confirm this when they find evidence of this higher cost of credit. Holod and Peek (2013) 
explain that this higher cost of credit though higher than is justified by the level of credit 
risk perceived by an informed lender, is lower than the interest rate that would be charged 
by other potential lenders to the firm due to the higher risk premium required to 
compensate them for the added risk associated with being less informed about the firm. 
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Thus, the firm does not have an incentive to defect from the relationship and begin a new 
relationship with another lender because it is costly and time consuming to establish new 
lending relationships. Therefore, firms are subject to a “lock-in” effect with their current 
relationship lender (Holod & Peek, 2013). This concurs with the earlier findings of 
Howorth, Peel, and Wilson (2003) that firms will only be informationally captured when 
the costs of switching banks, including the costs of conveying an accurate picture of their 
performance to prospective bankers, outweigh the benefits.  
 
Greenbaum, Kanatas, and Venezia (1989), Rajan (1992) and Sharpe (1990) provide 
another explanation for the higher cost of credit charged by banks who have established a 
relationship when they predict that interest rates increase as the relationship lengthens 
because lenders subsidize the borrowers initially but are reimbursed with higher rates 
later. Bharath et al. (2007) find contrasting evidence that lenders do not extract monopoly 
rents through higher interest rates and fees (spreads) on loans to their relationship 
borrowers. Similarly, Petersen and Rajan (1994) find higher credit costs related to firms’ 
simultaneous multiple bank relationships in contrast to the view that this higher cost of 
credit occurs when a bank has a monopoly of information, or is the main/sole bank. 
 
Bharath et al. (2007) find that a lender that has a strong relationship with a borrower is 
able to lend more and has a greater probability of providing future loans compared to a 
lender lacking such a relationship. Many bankers view the generation of additional 
business as the principal reason for engaging in relationship lending. Holod and Peek 
(2013) concur and add that additional sources of value for the relationship lender would 
arise through the opportunities for cross selling additional products and services to its 
relationship borrowers. Such value would reflect not only the profitability from current 
business with the firm, but the profits that might accrue to the bank from future 
opportunities to continue and expand the menu of products and services provided to the 
firm as the firm expands, both in terms of size and activities. Santikian (2014), in a study 
of the small business loan portfolio of a mid-sized bank in the United States, finds that the 
source of value in relationships in banking is not limited to enhanced monitoring but 
relationships also enable banks to sell borrowers a variety of other profitable financial 
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services, as well as gain access to additional borrowers to whom they can sell these 
services. These findings are similar to Bharath et al. (2007) and Holod and Peek (2013). 
 
Holod and Peek (2013) provide direct evidence on the value of relationship lending to 
banks. By using data from a small business loan survey in U.S., they find that small 
commercial and industrial loans do, in fact, add value for smaller banking organizations, 
both in absolute terms and relative to the value contributed by larger commercial and 
industrial loans. Interestingly, the value-enhancing effect emanates primarily from the 
smallest loans, those with original values of $100,000 or less. On the other hand, small 
commercial real estate loans, being transactional rather than relationship in nature, do not 
contribute additional value to banking organizations relative to larger commercial real 
estate loans (Holod & Peek, 2013). 
 
The need to seek out SME relationships from existing large corporate clients (reverse 
factoring) is also cited as another driver of bank involvement in the SME segment. This 
is reported by almost 70% of the banks in Argentina and 25% of the banks in Chile (De 
la Torre et al., 2010); and 50 percent of banks in Kenya (Calice et al., 2012). Banks 
systematically ask large clients for references on their best clients and suppliers which in 
many cases are SMEs. With a list of potential clients, banks contact these companies and 
try to on board them by offering services or lending products, depending on the banks’ 
strategy. The benefit banks reap from this is not only that banks obtain an assessment of 
the quality of these SMEs from large clients, but also that these SMEs are supported by 
operating with these large corporations, who in some cases also provide guarantees 
(Elyasiani & Goldberg, 2004). McNulty (2002) concurs and adds that these banks are also 
able to monitor borrowers and diversify their risk by contracting with a large number of 
borrowers. Thus, banks gain very useful information and reduce the risk of seeking new 
clients and in this way, exploit the synergies of working with different types of clients. 
 
More recently, Fredriksson and Moro (2014) state that one of the major shortcomings of 
previous research on bank profitability is that it tends to look for the determinants of the 
overall profitability, whereas overall profitability depends on the profitability that a bank 
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can extract from its financial relationship with each individual customer. After analysing 
4285 firm-year observations from Finnish banks, Fredriksson and Moro (2014) find that 
the major factor in explaining the risk-adjusted profitability of banks is the quality of a 
SME’s performance although the length and scope of a relationship and the loan 
dimensions also play an important role.   
 
What emerges from the empirical studies above is that SME lending is carried out (see 
Calice et al., 2012; De la Torre et al., 2010), which implies that the question on whether 
SME lending is carried out is answered. What remains is to answer the questions, “how” 
and “why” SME lending is carried out. The empirical studies above resulted in perceived 
or potential benefits that lenders could enjoy by engaging in SME lending. Boot (2000) 
concludes that there is still much more work required to determine the precise sources of 
value of SME lending, because existing work falls short in measuring the precise sources 
of the added value of relationship banking (see also Boot, 1991 & Boot, 2002). This 
conclusion is also later echoed by Calice et al. (2012) when they point out that relatively 
little research exists on whether, why and how banks finance SMEs around the world.  
 
 
2.4 Research Gaps 
 
The theoretical literature suggests that financial intermediaries play an important role in 
credit markets because they reduce information asymmetries between borrowers and 
lenders. Resulting from information asymmetry, banks are able to mitigate adverse 
selection by screening applicants for loans, and do the same for moral hazard by 
monitoring borrowers (Diamond, 1991; Miwa & Ramseyer, 2005; Rajan & Winton, 
1995). The resulting bank borrower relationships have led to increased interest in the area 
of relationship lending. The empirical literature shows that banks have become 
increasingly interested in engaging the SME sector and suggests that banks prefer to 
employ relationship lending when dealing with SMEs. The empirical literature on the 
benefits of SME lending has tended to emphasise benefits that accrue to borrowers. Those 
studies that focus on SME financing from the supply side have only provided results about 
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the status of SME financing and what the perceived benefits would be (Beck et al., 2008; 
2010; Calice et al., 2012; De la Torre et al., 2010). Earlier, Boot (2000) suggests that in 
this increasingly competitive environment of banking, the differentiation of distinct costs 
and benefits (and the empirical verification of it) is crucial in order to predict the viability 
and scale of relationship banking in the future. Boot (2000) concludes that much more 
research is needed, as existing work falls short in that it has not measured the precise 
sources of the added value of relationship banking (see also Boot, 1991 & Boot, 2002). 
This conclusion is later echoed by Calice et al. (2012) when they point out that relatively 
little research exists on whether, why and how banks finance SMEs around the world. 
This results in the two knowledge gaps which emerge from the review of literature and 
motivate this study. The two knowledge gaps are detailed below.  
 
There is an absence of detailed descriptions of how banks are engaging the SME sector. 
In literature, the lending technology of relationship lending is regarded as the most 
appropriate technology of lending to SMEs but as Calice et al. (2012) underscore, 
relatively little research exists on how banks finance SMEs around the world. Further,   
there has been very little empirical research on how soft information which forms the basis 
of relationship lending, is produced/acquired, transmitted and used in making the SME 
lending decision. As Hattori et al. (2015) conclude there are many important issues that 
remain untested concerning the collection, processing and use of soft information within 
heterogeneous bank organizations. This motivates the question; how do banks employ 
relationship lending in the financing of SMEs and what role do each of the lending 
technologies, that is relationship and transaction lending, play in the SME lending 
decision? In the Kenyan context, it is not clear to what extent banks make use of 
relationship lending to increase lending to SMEs. 
 
There is a dearth of studies on the specific benefits enjoyed by banks that have ventured 
into SME lending. Previous research (see Bharath et al., 2005; Calice et al., 2012; De la 
Torre et al., 2010; Fredriksson & Moro, 2014) has tended to look at the determinants of 
the overall profitability of a bank instead of the profitability that a bank can extract from 
its financial relationship with each individual customer. A differentiation of the specific 
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components of profitability is necessary. Additionally, even though relationship lending 
is based on the premise of mutual benefit between the bank and borrower (see Elsas, 2005; 
Greenbaum & Thakor, 1995), most studies have mainly concentrated on the demand side 
of finance or borrower benefits (Bharath et. al., 2007). On the other hand banks, which 
form the supply side of finance and who take the initiative to invest in the relationship 
with the borrowers, have not received much attention (Bharath et al., 2007). Calice et al. 
(2012) echo Boot’s (2000) earlier conclusion that much more research is needed to 
determine the precise sources of the added value of relationship banking in order to predict 
the viability and scale of relationship banking in the future.  
 
This study therefore sought to explore the use of the preferred relationship lending 
technology in SME lending and to determine the benefits of SME lending to commercial 
banks in Kenya. Further, as the gaps highlighted above were experienced from studies that 
employed a quantitative approach (see Beck, Demirguc-Kunt, & Peria, 2008, 2011; Calice 
et al., 2012 and De la Torre et al., 2010), this study opted to employ a qualitative approach 
to gather rich, in-depth information about how SME lending transpires and the benefits 
that lenders gain.  
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CHAPTER THREE: RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
 
 
3.1 Introduction  
 
Chapter three begins with a discussion of research paradigms in section 3.2 which 
provides a justification for the research paradigm used to conduct this study. This is 
followed by a discussion on the different research approaches in section 3.3 providing also 
a justification for the chosen research approach. Section 3.4 presents a general discussion 
on research designs followed by a detailed discussion of the specific research design suited 
to this study. The next section, 3.5 presents the data collection methods followed by a 
discussion of how data was analysed in section 3.6. In section 3.7, measures of validity, 
reliability and objectivity are discussed under research quality in and section 3.8 discusses 
the ethical considerations of the study.  Finally, to conclude the chapter, section 3.9 
provides a summary of the chapter.  
 
 
3.2 Research Paradigm 
 
A paradigm or world view is a conceptual framework comprising a basic set of beliefs or 
assumptions that act as a guide to the researcher (Creswell 1994; Guba & Lincoln, 1994; 
Healy & Perry, 2000; Lincoln & Guba, 2000; Mertens, 1998). These beliefs might be 
called philosophical assumptions, epistemologies and ontologies (Crotty, 1998); or 
broadly conceived research methodologies (Neuman, 2000). Deciding on a research 
paradigm to be applied in conducting research is important as it substantially influences 
how one undertakes a social study (Berry & Otley, 2004; Creswell, 2009; Neuman, 2011; 
Saunders, Lewis, & Thornhill, 2009). Guba and Lincoln (1994) break down paradigms 
into three aspects; ontology, epistemology and methodology.  
 
Ontology is an assumption about the form and nature of reality, for instance, is there a 
"real" objective world out there, or is reality constructed through human relationships? 
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Epistemology is a set of assumptions about the relationship between the knower and what 
can be known, for instance, does the knower need to be "objective" and affect the outcome 
as little as possible, or does the knower actively co-construct knowledge with others? It is 
important to note that ontology and epistemology overlap and are sometimes impossible 
to divide. Many who talk about an "epistemology" may be referring to both together. 
Finally, methodology is the set of assumptions about how the inquirer can go about finding 
out whatever he or she believes can be known.  
 
The paradigm dialogue, that became a worldwide phenomenon by the 1990s, continues to 
play an important part in educational and management research today with differences in 
terminology used to describe paradigms and also debate as to the number of paradigms 
that exist.  
 
3.2.1 Positivists 
Positivists assume that there is a real objective reality that is knowable. Within the 
positivist paradigm, questions and/or hypotheses are proposed by the researcher and 
subjected to empirical testing within a controlled environment that ensures the research 
outcomes are not influenced (Guba & Lincoln 1994). Creswell (2009) explains that 
positivists believe that different researchers observing the same factual problem will 
generate a similar result by carefully using statistical tests and applying a similar research 
process in investigating a large sample. Positivists believe that research needs to be carried 
out in a scientific nature, following a strict set of guidelines and should be carried out by 
appropriately trained scientists. The carrying out of this research is usually based on a 
deductive approach, moving from theory to observation (Wilson, 2013). Their common 
belief is the existence of a universal generalisation that can be applied across contexts, 
which is now called naïve realism. The research methodology is primarily quantitative 
and consists of controlled experiments and surveys conducted on representative samples 
of a population 
 
The positivist research paradigm was not considered an appropriate paradigm within 
which to conduct this research for three reasons. First, the research question was not posed 
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in terms of verification of hypotheses. Secondly, in relation to the research question, the 
research methodology that was considered suitable was qualitative and not quantitative 
which consists of controlled experiments and surveys conducted on representative 
samples of a population. Third, the researcher assumed that reality is subjective and not 
objective and as such did not believe in the existence of a universal generalisation that 
could be applied across contexts.  
  
3.2.2 Post-positivists/Realism 
Post-positivists challenge the positivist belief of absolute truth (Phillips & Burbules, 2000 
in Creswell, 2009), especially in relation to studying human behaviour in social science. 
This is called the critical realist stance, which means that understanding social reality 
needs to be framed in a certain context of relevant law or dynamic social structures which 
have created the observable phenomena within social world. Post-positivists hold a 
deterministic philosophy in which causes probably determine effects or outcomes. Thus, 
the problems studied by post-positivists reflect the need to identify and assess the causes 
that influence outcomes, such as found in experiments (Creswell, 2009). Post-positivism 
is also reductionist in that the intent is to reduce the ideas into a small, discrete set of ideas 
to test, such as the variables that comprise hypotheses and research questions and as such 
would be suited to a quantitative study. Thus, the accepted approach to research by post-
positivists is that an individual begins with a theory, collects data that either supports or 
refutes the theory, and then makes necessary revisions before additional tests are made. 
Realists recognise all research methods as inherently imperfect and therefore believe a 
combination of both qualitative and quantitative research methods is required to generate 
and test theory (Patton, 2002). 
 
This research did challenge the existence of an absolute truth especially as it was aimed 
at studying a social phenomenon. As this research attempted to understand the lending 
practices of banks within a single economic system (banking), realism was considered an 
appropriate paradigm within which to conduct this research. However, this research did 
not seek to reduce ideas into a small, discrete set of ideas to test, such as the variables that 
comprise hypotheses and research questions. The aim of this research was to get an insider 
44 
 
perspective of a business phenomenon; which this and the relatively small population of 
commercial banks engaged in SME lending did not lend itself to quantitative research, 
which is also an appropriate methodology within the realist paradigm, particularly for 
purposes of triangulation. Therefore it was concluded that the realist paradigm was not an 
optimal paradigm within which to conduct research of this nature.  
 
3.2.3 Interpretivism/Social Constructivism 
Interpretivists assume that individuals seek understanding of the world in which they live 
and work; and believe that reality is constructed by social actors and people’s perceptions 
of it. Therefore, in contrast to the post positivist’s belief, interpretivists reject the concept 
of objectivism and a single truth. To understand the social world from the experiences and 
subjective meanings that people attach to it, interpretivist researchers favour to interact 
and to have a dialogue with the studied participants. As opposed to generalisation or the 
nomothetic approach adopted by post-positivist researchers, interpretivists use a narrative 
form of analysis to describe specifics and highly detailed accounts of a particular social 
reality being studied, which is termed as the idiographic approach (Neuman, 2011). They 
also prefer to work with qualitative data which provides rich descriptions of social 
constructs. The goal of the research is to rely as much as possible on the participants’ 
views of the situation being studied. The questions become broad and general so that the 
participants can construct the meaning of a situation, typically forged in discussions or 
interactions with other persons. The more open-ended the questioning, the better, as the 
researcher listens carefully to what people say or do in their life settings (Creswell, 2009). 
Thus, qualitative researchers seek to understand the context or setting of the participants 
through visiting this context and gathering information personally, focusing on the full 
complexity of human sense making as the situation emerges (Kaplan & Maxwell, 1994). 
Wilson (2013) observes that rather than starting with a theory (as in post-positivism), 
inquirers generate or inductively develop a theory or pattern of meaning. The basic 
generation of meaning is always social, arising in and out of interaction with a human 
community. The experiences and values of both research participants and researchers 
substantially influence the collection of data and its analysis. Positivist scholars believe in 
the power of replication research. Interpretivist researchers vote a study that uncovers 
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inside perspectives or real meanings of social phenomena from its study participants as a 
good social knowledge. 
 
As the aim of the study was to establish the meaning and process of a business 
phenomenon (SME lending) from the perspective of the participants (SME bank 
managers) involved in their natural setting (bank premises), it adopted a subjective stance 
as opposed to an objective one as proposed by positivists. The researcher sought to interact 
and have a dialogue with the study participants so as to get a detailed account about the 
process of SME lending. This interaction and dialogue led to the construction of 
knowledge about SME lending. The knowledge was generated inductively as opposed to 
starting with a theory and the aim was to get rich descriptions of the social reality that was 
being studied. The method employed was qualitative making it well suited to the 
qualitative methodological focus of the interpretivism/constructivism paradigm. 
Interpretivism/constructivism was therefore considered the most appropriate paradigm 
within which to conduct this research. 
 
3.2.4 The Pragmatic Worldview 
Cherryholmes (1992) explains that pragmatism derives from the works of Peirce (1905) 
and James (1907), amongst others and proponents of this worldview include Patton 
(1990). Pragmatism is not committed to any one system of philosophy and reality. 
Pragmatists do not see the world as an absolute unity. This applies to mixed methods 
research in that inquirers draw liberally from both quantitative and qualitative assumptions 
looking to many approaches for collecting and analysing data rather than subscribing to 
only one way. Truth is what works at the given time. It is not based in a duality between 
reality, independent of the mind or within the mind. Pragmatists focus on practical applied 
research integrating different perspectives to help interpret the data. Thus, in mixed 
methods research, investigators use both quantitative and qualitative data because they 
work to provide the best understanding of a research problem. The pragmatist researchers 
look to the “what” and “how” to research, based on the intended consequences—where 
they want to go with it. Mixed methods researchers need to establish a purpose for their 
mixing, a rationale for the reasons why quantitative and qualitative data need to be mixed 
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in the first place. Pragmatists agree that research always occurs in social, historical, 
political, and other contexts. In this way, mixed methods studies may include a 
postmodern turn, a theoretical lens that is reflective of social justice and political aims. 
 
As this research was committed to one system of philosophy, which is to interpret the 
research problem from the social actors’ perspective, it was not amenable to the 
pragmatists’ philosophy. 
 
Table 3.1 below presents the paradigms discussed above and the three aspects of each.  
Table 3.1 Research Paradigms 
Paradigm Aspects 
Positivism   
Ontology: Naïve Realism. External, objective and 
independent of social actors. 
Epistemology: Dualist/ Objectivist.  Focus on 
causality and law like generalisations, reducing 
phenomena to simplest elements. Findings true. 
Methods: Highly structured, large samples, 
measurement, experimental, verification of 




Ontology: Critical Realism.  Is objective. Exists 
independently of human thoughts and beliefs or 
knowledge of their existence (realist), but is 
interpreted through social conditioning (critical 
realist).  
Epistemology: Modified Dualist/Objectivist. 
Findings are "probably" true. 
Methods: Modified experimental. Theory 
verification. Methods chosen must fit the subject 
matter, quantitative or qualitative. 
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Created from the work of Guba and Lincoln (1994, pp. 109 & 112), Creswell (2009) and 
Saunders et al. (2009, p.119). 
 
3.2.5 Paradigm for this Study 
As researchers, we come to our inquiry with particular beliefs about what knowledge is, 
what is knowable, and how we can go about gaining knowledge. This leads to the selection 
of a framework within which to conduct research. The interpretivism/constructivism 
paradigm was deemed as the most appropriate framework for conducting this research as 
it was concerned with understanding the meanings behind social actions from the 
subjective experiences of individuals. Additionally, the study sought to use meaning 
(versus measurement) oriented methodologies without predefining dependent and 
independent variables, focusing on the full complexity of human sense making as the 
Constructivism/Interpretivism 
Ontology: Relativist. Multiple participant 
meanings.   Socially constructed, subjective, may 
change. 
Epistemology: Subjectivist/transactional, created 
findings.  Focus upon the details of situation, the 
reality behind these details. 
Methods:  Small samples, in-depth investigations, 
Qualitative. Theory generation. 
Pragmatism 
Ontology:  External, multiple, view chosen to best 
enable answering of research question.  
Epistemology:  Focus on practical applied research, 
integrating different perspectives to help interpret 
the data. Pluralistic. 
Methods: Problem centered. Real-world practice 
oriented by whatever methods are most appropriate, 
and tends toward changes in practice.   Mixed or 




situation emerged (Kaplan & Maxwell, 1994). The interpretive approach can generate new 
knowledge and provide valuable information for future work and practice.  
 
Having selected the interpretivism/constructivism paradigm as the most appropriate 
framework for this research, it was necessary to choose an approach with which to conduct 
the research.  
 
 
3.3 Research Approaches 
 
Research approaches can be classified as quantitative, qualitative and mixed methodology 
(Creswell, 2009). In selecting an approach, researchers must consider the research 
approaches that are suitable for their particular research problem. Evered and Louis (1981) 
clarify the assumptions that ground each by distinguishing two research stances: “inquiry 
from the outside”, often implemented via quantitative studies and “inquiry from the 
inside” via qualitative studies. 
 
3.3.1 Qualitative research 
Qualitative research is a form of systematic empirical inquiry into meaning (Shank, 2002 
p. 5). Systematic refers to “planned, ordered and public” that is, following rules agreed 
upon by members of the qualitative research community. Empirical, means that the type 
of inquiry is grounded in the world of experience. Inquiry into meaning, says researchers 
try to understand how others make sense of their experience. Similarly, Denzin and 
Lincoln (2000) claim that qualitative research involves an interpretive and naturalistic 
approach: “This means that qualitative researchers study things in their natural settings, 
attempting to make sense of, or to interpret, phenomena in terms of the meanings people 
bring to them” (Denzin & Lincoln, 2000 p. 3). A qualitative research approach is used to 
acquire knowledge and have an in-depth understanding of a problem in its natural setting 
(Creswell, 1994; Howitt & Cramer, 2005). It is therefore a means for exploring and 
understanding the meaning individuals or groups ascribe to a social or human problem. 
This approach investigates the why and how of decision making, not just what, where and 
49 
 
when with the researcher’s role being that of an active learner who can tell the story from 
the participants' view rather than as an "expert" who passes judgment on participants.  
 
The process of research involves emerging questions and procedures, collection of 
participant meanings, data typically collected in the participant’s setting, data analysis 
inductively building from particulars to general themes, and the researcher making 
interpretations of the meaning of the data. The final written report has a flexible structure. 
Those who engage in this form of inquiry support a way of looking at research that 
honours an inductive style, a focus on individual meaning, and the importance of 
rendering the complexity of a situation (adapted from Creswell, 2007).  
 
An inductive approach involves collecting data and developing theory as a result of data 
analysis, in other words, it is ‘a theory-building process”. The qualitative approach is more 
interested in gaining a large amount of information from a small number of people or 
organisations (utilising qualitative data gathering techniques such as one-on-one 
interviews) than gathering a small amount of data from a large sample of people or 
organisations (utilising quantitative data gathering techniques such as phone surveys) 
(Ticehurst & Veal, 2000). Hence, smaller but focused samples are more often needed than 
large samples. This approach “is based on the belief that a full and rounded understanding 
of the organisational experiences and situations of a few individuals, however 
unrepresentative they may be, is of more value than a limited understanding of a large 
representative group” (Ticehurst & Veal, 2000, p. 21).  
 
3.3.2 Quantitative research 
Quantitative research is a means for testing objective theories by examining the 
relationship among variables. A quantitative approach is one in which the researcher 
primarily uses postpositive claims for developing knowledge (i.e., cause and effect 
thinking, reduction to specific variables and hypotheses and questions, use of 
measurement and observation, and the test of theories) (Creswell, 2008). These variables, 
in turn, can be measured, typically on instruments, so that numbered data can be analysed 




Those who engage in this form of inquiry have assumptions about testing theories 
deductively, which are concerned with developing a hypothesis (or hypotheses) based on 
existing theory, and then designing a research strategy to test the hypothesis. It also 
involves building in protections against bias, controlling for alternative explanations, and 
being able to generalize and replicate the findings. In a nut shell, quantitative research 
seeks to establish a comparison of groups or relationships between variables, with the 
intent of establishing an association, relationship, or cause and effect with the aim of a 
generalisation (Creswell, 1998). A deductive approach ‘begins with and applies a well-
known theory’ and this type of approach is often associated with the quantitative type of 
research’ (Ghauri & Grøhaug, 2005: 15). This type of research uses standards of validity 
and reliability (Creswell, 2008). A potential weakness of quantitative research is “the 
reduction of what are essentially human processes in business to numbers may miss 
identifying the real forces at work surrounding the research problem”, (Cavaye et al., 
2002, p. 7-1). This weakness can be addressed by adopting a qualitative approach to data 
gathering. 
 
3.3.3 Mixed methods research 
This approach to inquiry combines both qualitative and quantitative forms. It involves 
more than simply collecting and analysing both kinds of data but uses both approaches in 
tandem so that the overall strength of a study is greater than either qualitative or 
quantitative research (Creswell & Plano Clark, 2007). The mixed methods approach is 
used when the researcher wants both generalisation and a detailed view of the meaning of 
phenomenon or concept for individuals (Creswell, 2008). The three approaches are 




Table 3.2 Qualitative, Quantitative and Mixed Method Approaches 










assumptions   
Post-positivist, 
Constructivist,     
Positivist, post-
positivist   























Both open- and closed-
ended questions, both 
emerging and 
predetermined 
approaches, and both 
quantitative and 
qualitative data and 
analysis 
Source: Creswell (2008, p. 17) 
 
3.3.4 Conclusion 
This study was best suited to a qualitative research approach as it sought to acquire 
knowledge and have an in-depth understanding of a problem in its natural setting 
(Creswell, 1994; Howitt & Cramer, 2005).  
 
Qualitative research was also suitable for this study because firstly, the research question 
sought to answer “how” and “why” questions. Secondly, the researcher’s role was that of 
an active learner who can tell the story from the participants' view rather than as an 
"expert" who passes judgment on participants. Finally, as most previous studies on this 
topic have been quantitative in nature and have resulted in contrasting and inconclusive 
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results, the researcher felt the need to present a detailed view of the topic which a 
qualitative study would provide.  
 
Quantitative research seeks to establish a comparison of groups or relationships between 
variables, with the intent of establishing an association, relationship, or cause and effect 
with the aim of a generalisation (Creswell, 1998). As this study sought to get a detailed 
view of the phenomenon under study as opposed to a generalisation, a quantitative 
approach was not considered appropriate.  
 
Mixed methods research was also rejected as a research approach because it had been 
established that quantitative research, which is a significant component of mixed methods 
research, is unsuited to this research. The mixed methods approach is used when the 
researcher wants both generalisation and a detailed view of the meaning of a phenomenon. 
  
 
3.4 Research Design  
 
Apart from selecting an approach to a study, a researcher also decides on the strategy of 
inquiry or research design to employ within the approach chosen (Creswell, 2008). A 
research design is a plan or proposal to conduct research which spans the decisions from 
broad assumptions to detailed methods of data collection and analysis (Creswell, 2008). 
In planning a study, researchers need to think through the philosophical worldview 
assumptions that they bring to the study, the strategy of inquiry that is related to this 
worldview, and the specific methods or procedures of research that translate the approach 
into practice. In literature, the term design is sometimes used to refer to strategies of 
inquiry (Denzin & Lincoln, 2011), approaches to inquiry (Creswell, 2007) and research 
methodologies (Mertens, 1998). Within the qualitative research approach, there are five 
specific types of research design: phenomenology, ethnography, case study, grounded 
theory and historical research. The key ideas of each of these is provided and a detailed 
discussion of the research design chosen for this study.    
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Phenomenology involves an attempt to understand how one or more individuals 
experience a phenomenon. It is the study of the subjective experiences of others. It 
researches the world through the eyes of another person by discovering how they interpret 
their experiences. The researcher’s goal is to enter the inner world of each participant to 
understand his or her perspectives and experiences.  
 
Ethnography literally means “writing about people.” Ethnography is the study of human 
interaction and communities through direct participation and observation within the 
community you wish to study. Ethnographers are interested in describing the culture of a 
group of people and learning what it is like to be a member of the group from the 
perspective of the members of that group and as such document things like the shared 
attitudes, values, norms and practices. Ethnographers try to use holistic descriptions; that 
is, they try to describe how the members of a group interact and how they come together 
to make up the group as a whole. In other words, the group is more than just the sum of 
its parts.  
 
Grounded theory research is a qualitative approach to generating and developing a theory 
from the data you collect in a research study. Historical research is about people, places, 
and events in the past. This type of research is sometimes called narrative research because 
it studies “the text of history,” and it often presents its results through stories or narratives.  
 
In case study research, the researcher provides a detailed account of one or more cases. 
Although case study research usually relies on qualitative data, multiple methods are also 
used. Case study research can be used to address exploratory, descriptive, and explanatory 
research questions (Stake, 1995; Yin, 1994). Case study research is more varied than 
phenomenology, which focuses on individuals’ experience of some phenomenon; 
ethnography, which focuses on some aspect of culture; historical research which focuses 
on events in the past; or grounded theory, which focuses on developing an explanatory 
theory. What all pure case studies do have in common, however, is a focus on each case 




3.4.1 Case Study  
Consistent with the constructivist research paradigm and qualitative research approach, a 
case study design was employed for this study. Case studies are used when a researcher 
wishes to explore in depth a program, an event, an activity, a process, or one or more 
individuals. In the current study the researcher wished to explore in depth the SME lending 
process and allow alternative findings to be found; which is a key difference from the 
hypothetico-deductive approach that guides quantitative research. In trying to verify 
hypotheses, quantitative researchers have finite ideas, prior to starting research, about the 
scope and aims of their projects. Qualitative researchers, working in the context of 
discovery, are more open-ended, and often follow emergent empirical and conceptual 
findings in unexpected ways. Both research strategies offer possibilities for generalization, 
but about different things, and both approaches are theoretically valuable (Adler & Adler 
in Baker & Edwards, 2012).  
  
Yin (2009) advocates that a case study design should be considered when the research 
question is in the form of “why” or “how”, the researcher has little control over events 
and the focus is on a contemporary phenomenon within a real-life context. A case study 
provides a deep investigation of a real-life contemporary phenomenon in its natural 
context (Woodside, 2010; Yin 2012) and gives an emic or insider’s view of the practices 
of the case organizations (Sarantakos, 2005). The case study design also suited the current 
study as the research question was in the form of “why” or “how”, the researcher had little 
control over events and the focus was on the SME lending process. Further, the study was 
carried in the natural context of the SME lending process, the bank premises. Yin (2004) 
and Stake (1995) describe a variety of case studies by using different terms. Yin (2004) 
categorizes case studies as explanatory, exploratory, or descriptive. He also differentiates 
between single, holistic case studies and multiple-case studies. Stake (1995) identifies 
case studies as intrinsic, instrumental, or collective. These types of case studies and their 




Table 3.3 Types of Case Studies 
Case Study Type  Suitability 
Explanatory This type of case study would be used if you were seeking 
to answer a question that sought to explain the presumed 
causal links in real-life interventions that are too complex 
for the survey or experimental strategies. In evaluation 
language, the explanations would link program 
implementation with program effects. 
Exploratory This type of case study is used to explore those situations 
in which the intervention being evaluated has no clear, 
single set of outcomes. 
Descriptive This type of case study is used to describe an intervention 
or phenomenon and the real-life context in which it 
occurred. 
Multiple-case studies A multiple case study enables the researcher to explore 
differences within and between cases. The goal is to 
replicate findings across cases and because comparisons 
will be drawn, it is imperative that the cases are chosen 
carefully so that the researcher can predict similar results 
across cases, or predict contrasting results based on a 
theory.  
Intrinsic Researchers who have a genuine interest in the case should 
use this approach when the intent is to better understand 
the case. It is not undertaken primarily because the case 
represents other cases or because it illustrates a particular 
trait or problem, but because in all its particularity and 
ordinariness, the case itself is of interest. The purpose is 
NOT to come to understand some abstract construct or 
generic phenomenon. The purpose is NOT to build theory 
(although that is an option).  
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Instrumental Is used to accomplish something other than understanding 
a particular situation. It provides insight into an issue or 
helps to refine a theory. The case is of secondary interest; 
it plays a supportive role, facilitating our understanding of 
something else. The case is often looked at in depth, its 
contexts scrutinized, its ordinary activities detailed, and 
because it helps the researcher pursue the external interest. 
The case may or may not be seen as typical of other cases. 
Collective Collective case studies are similar in nature and 
description to multiple case studies. 
Adopted from Baxter and Jack (2008) 
 
A multiple case study was selected to conduct this study so as to explore differences within 
and between cases in order to obtain a more comprehensive understanding of the 
phenomenon under study (Wahyuni, 2012). The goal was to replicate findings across cases 
and because comparisons were to be drawn, it was imperative that the cases were chosen 
carefully so that the researcher could predict similar results across cases, or predict 
contrasting results based on a theory (Yin, 2004). Using multiple case studies can identify 
consistent patterns of behavior and uncover new and/or divergent themes. Apart from 
enabling the researcher to see the differences and similarities among the cases, it will also 
increase the level of assurance of the findings. Miles and Huberman (1994) argue that 
evidence from multiple cases adds “confidence” to the research findings while (Herriot & 
Firestone, 1983; Yin 2004) add that the evidence from multiple cases is often more 
compelling and the overall study is therefore considered more robust. 
 
The benefits of using a multiple case study design are firstly, it can identify consistent 
patterns of behaviour and uncover new and/or divergent themes. Secondly, it enables the 
researcher to see the differences and similarities among the cases and increases the level 
of assurance of the findings. Thirdly, even though the purpose of a case study is not to 




Finally, a cross sectional multiple case study was employed as data was collected from 
each case at one point in time.   
 
 
3.5 Data Collection Procedure  
 
3.5.1 Case Sites  
Case study research is not sampling research (Yin, 1994). However, selecting cases must 
be done so as to maximize what can be learned in the period of time available for the study 
(Tellis, 1997). 
 
The focus of this study was commercial banks in Kenya that are involved in SME lending. 
As there is no public database of commercial banks in Kenya that are engaged in SME 
lending, the study used an annual survey of commercial banks in Kenya that includes a 
category of banks whose main focus is SMEs. This annual survey, which is carried out by 
Think Business Limited, ranks banks based on their significance in the Kenyan SME 
market. Think Business Limited is a leading strategic business intelligence, research and 
publishing company in Kenya that specializes in the financial sector. Their objective is to 
encourage prudence and stability in the banking sector by recognizing, awarding and 
celebrating exemplary performers and successes of the sector, consequently encouraging 
competition. Think Business Limited also publishes “Banking Survey”, which has been 
in publication annually for fourteen years (Banking Survey, 2013).  
 
Commercial banks are ranked in various categories with Think Business publishing the 
top three banks in each of these categories. The category “Best Bank in SME Banking” is 
open to all banks whose focus is mainly on SME banking. First, they are assessed on the 
basis of their financial soundness using eight key financial ratios which measure asset 
quality, liquidity and earnings. These eight parameters are return on average assets, return 
on average core capital, cost of funds, efficiency ratio (cost income ratio), total non-
performing loans to total advances, non-performing loans provision to operating income, 
core capital to total deposits and quick assets to total liabilities. The judges then subject a 
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shortlist of the top ten, to further scrutiny based on the following weighted scores: 
customer numbers, average loan size, product offering to SME segment, ICT application, 
customer satisfaction and tariff rates to SME customers (Banking Survey, 2013).  
 
Commercial banks that have for the last five years (2010-2014) ranked top three in the 
category “Best SME Bank” were considered for this study (Banking Survey, 2010-2014).  
However, as there was no ranking for 2010 because of a lack of entries for that category, 
the year 2009 was incorporated in the study. As some banks have consistently been ranked 
amongst the top three in the five years under study, this resulted in a total of eight 
commercial banks for this study. Apart from the banks ranked as a result of this survey, 
additional considerations for inclusion in this study were those banks that were considered 
as competitors in the SME market by the ranked banks and finally, their willingness to 
participate and allow the research to take place in their natural environment. These 
additional banks were identified during the interview process with respondents from the 
ranked banks. This resulted in an additional one bank for inclusion in the study as 
respondents also stated some of the already ranked banks as their competitors.  In 
consideration of all of the above, one bank out of those ranked had been closed by the 
Central Bank of Kenya and one bank was not willing to participate in the study, therefore 
these two banks were excluded from the study. As such the final tally for inclusion in the 
study was seven commercial banks.           
 
3.5.2 Unit of Analysis 
The unit of analysis is a critical factor in the case study. It is typically a system of action 
rather than an individual or group of individuals. Case studies tend to be selective, 
focusing on one or two issues that are fundamental to understanding the system being 
examined (Tellis, 1997). 
 
The unit of analysis was the SME lending process from beginning (introduction of SME 
client) to the end (disbursement of loan). 
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3.5.3 Participants/Respondents of the Study  
SME bank managers were the preferred participants/respondents and in order to access 
these participants, the researcher used snowball purposive sampling which is an approach 
for locating information-rich key informants or critical cases (Patton, 1990). This involved 
initially seeking a known banker to recommend and refer an SME bank manager in one 
of the case sites. 
 
The number of interviews required to ensure a credible research picture has been the 
subject of much debate and comment within literature. De Ruyter and Scholl (1998) 
suggest a range of 15 to 40 interview participants, which agrees with Bertaux's (1981) 
earlier guideline of 15 being the smallest number of participants for a qualitative study 
irrespective of the methodology; while Ritchie, Lewis, & Elam (2003) suggest that 
samples should "lie under 50". Mason (2010) carry out a content analysis to identify the 
number of interview participants in PhD studies which used qualitative (i.e. structured; 
semi-structured or unstructured) interviews as a method of data collection. They use a 
comprehensive published listing of 532,646 British theses accepted annually for higher 
degrees by some of the most prestigious educational institutions in the world; the 
Universities of Great Britain and Ireland. The results indicated that eighty per cent of the 
total proportion of qualitative studies met Bertaux's (1981) guideline of 15 being the 
smallest number of participants, while 45% met Charmaz's (2006) guideline of up to 25 
participants being "adequate" (p.114). A third of the studies (33%) used sample sizes of 
20 or under (Green & Thorogood, 2009) while 85% met Ritchie et al.'s (2003) assertion 
that qualitative samples "often lie under 50" (p.84).  
 
Further, to resolve the numbers debate, Patton (1990) suggests that as qualitative inquiry 
is rife with ambiguities, there are no rules for sample size and it depends on “what you 
want to know, the purpose of the inquiry, what's at stake, what will be useful, what will 
have credibility, and what can be done with available time and resources” (Patton, 1990, 
p. 244). It is in this line that Lincoln and Guba (1985) and, Green and Thorogood (2009) 
recommend sampling to the point of redundancy. Green and Thorogood (2009) find that 
the experience of most qualitative researchers is that they find little new information after 
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interviewing 20 or so people. Similarly, Mason (2010) posits that although a number of 
issues can affect the sample size in qualitative research, the guiding principle should be 
the concept of saturation. 
 
In order to reach a consensus on participant numbers, this study gave strong consideration 
to Patton’s (1990) and Mason’s (2010) recommendations. While carrying out the 
interviews for this study, the point of redundancy or saturation began to be felt during the 
12th interview, as there was little new information emerging. Interestingly, this number is 
deemed sufficient by Guest, Bunce, and Johnson (2006) who argue that twelve interviews 
suffice for most researchers when they aim to discern themes concerning common views 
and experiences among relatively homogeneous people.   However, so as to keep in line 
with the minimum number of interviews recommended in literature for such a study, the 
researcher undertook four more interviews and carried out sixteen interviews in total 
which was in agreement with the recommendations of Bertaux's (1981), De Ruyter and 
Scholl (1998) and Ritchie et al. (2003).   
 
3.5.4 The Research Instrument 
According to Yin (2004), interviews are one of the most important sources of evidence 
and defines it as a two- way conversation that gives the interviewer the opportunity to 
participate actively in the interview and allows the participant to interpret and describe the 
phenomenon in their own way.  The semi-structured interview, often referred to as 
‘qualitative research interview’ (King, 2004), is ‘non standardised’ in the sense that 
researcher will have a list of themes and questions to be covered, although these may vary 
from interview to interview. This means that some questions may be omitted in particular 
interviews, given a specific organisational context that is encountered in relation to the 
research topic. The order of questions may also vary depending on the flow of the 
conversation. Further, additional questions may be required to explore your research 
question and objectives given the nature. This quality of semi structured interviews is an 
advantage that allows the researcher to explore interesting insights as they arise. Another 
advantage of semi-structured interviews is that they provide the researcher with an 
opportunity to ‘probe’ answers, where you want your interviewees to explain, or build on 
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their responses. This is important when adopting an interpretivist epistemology, where 
your concern is to understand the meanings that participants ascribe to various 
phenomena. The disadvantage is that there may be concerns about confidentiality by 
respondents and a reluctance to share sensitive information regarding the research topic. 
 
Guided by the gaps in literature, the researcher compiled a set of semi structured interview 
questions and selected the participants. Pilot interviews were then conducted in order to 
validate the qualitative interview approach, to test the usability of the interview guide and 
to test the level of understanding of the interview questions by the interviewees (Ghauri 
et al., 1995). The outcome of this process was the preparation of the final interview guide 
(see Appendix 4). The process the researcher went through in preparing the interview 
guide is illustrated below: 
 




Source: Researcher’s own 
 
3.5.5 Data Collection 
Primary data was collected through in-depth semi structured interviews with SME bank 
managers in the selected commercial banks. The interviews were pre-arranged through an 
email and/or telephone call to confirm the date and time and were conducted over a period 
of eight months between January 2015 and August 2015. The interviews were all 
conducted in English and held at the respective bank offices to preserve the business 
atmosphere and maintain the language of banking. The researcher first thanked the 
participant for according the time to hold the interview and then started off the interview 
with a brief explanation of the aim of the study and why the interview method of data 
collection was preferred while emphasising the confidentiality, anonymity and the 
voluntary nature of the study. The researcher also explained why the interview needed to 
be recorded and then proceeded to request to record interviewee. The participant was then 








given a consent form which was signed off by both respondent and the researcher. Besides 
recording the interview, the researcher also took notes during and soon after each 
interview to record salient information in the form of research memos. Where audio 
recording was not permitted, the interviewer took substantial notes. The duration of the 
interviews was between forty five to one hundred and twenty minutes (two hours). After 
each interview, a debriefing was performed during which the participants were given the 
opportunity to ask questions, make comments or add any information that was not 
discussed during the interview and may be relevant to the discussion held (Wahyuni, 
2012). Triangulation, through further interviews with at least two other SME bank 
managers in the same bank, provided verification of the key findings (Miles and 
Huberman, 1994).  
 
 
3.6 Data Analysis   
 
The nature of the qualitative data has implications for its analysis. The non-standardised 
and complex nature of the data that is collected means that it needs to be condensed 
(summarised), grouped (categorised) or restructured as a narrative to support meaningful 
analysis; otherwise the most that may result may be an impressionistic view of what they 
mean. Table 3.4 below highlights three distinct differences between quantitative and 
qualitative data.  
Table 3.4 Differences between Quantitative and Qualitative Data 
Quantitative Qualitative 
Based on meanings derived from 
numbers 
Based on meanings expressed through 
words 
Collection of results in numerical 
and standardised data 
Collection of results in non-standardised 
data requiring classification into 
categories 
Analysis conducted through the use 
of diagrams and statistics 
Analysis conducted through the use of 
conceptualisation 
Developed from Dey (1993) and Healey and Rawlinson (1994).  
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Qualitative data analysis begins at the same time as data is collected and continues 
afterwards (Kvale, 1996). All interviews were first transcribed verbatim. At this stage the 
researcher also used two research assistants to assist with the transcription of the 
interviews. The researcher read through all the transcripts while listening to the recorded 
interviews to ensure they were correctly transcribed. The transcripts were then sent to the 
respondents/participants for validation. None of the participants expressed concern with 
the content of the transcription and therefore no changes were made to the transcripts. 
Upon validation of the transcripts, further data analysis proceeded. This process is 
illustrated in figure 3.2 below.  
 








         
Source: Researcher’s own 
 
Miles and Huberman (1994) explained qualitative data analysis as consisting of three 
concurrent flows of activity: data reduction, data display and conclusion drawing and 
verification. Data reduction refers to the process of selecting, focusing, simplifying, 
abstracting and transforming the data that appear in written-up field notes or transcription. 
Data display refers to assembling organised information into immediately accessible, 
compact form so that the analyst can see what things mean (Miles & Huberman, 1994, 
p.11). Conclusion drawing and verification is where the qualitative analyst begins to 
decide what things mean; noting regularities, patterns, explanations, possible 
configurations, causal flows and propositions (Miles & Huberman, 1994, p.11). Another 
important process after conclusions are made is to verify them. According to Miles & 
Conduct Interview  Transcribe Interview  
Validate Transcription 




Huberman (1994. p.11) “The meanings emerging from the data have to be tested for their 
plausibility, their sturdiness, and their “conformability”-that is their validity.” They 
further pointed out that there are two types of data analysis: within case analysis and cross-
case analysis. The within case analysis is carried out when collected data in a single case 
is compared with the theory included in the frame of reference to identify the differences 
and similarities. In the cross-case analysis where several cases are involved, the objective 
is not only to compare those cases with each other but also to be able to generalize. The 
study employed Miles and Huberman’s (1194) three concurrent flows of activity: data 
reduction, data display and conclusion drawing and verification and further carried out a 
cross case analyses as several cases were involved. The first step of analysis involved a 
within case analysis to identify differences and similarities between respondents and also 
as a way of validating the data collected for each case (bank). The second step was the 
cross-case analysis which involved comparing data between the cases so as to further 
reduce the data and also compare the resulting data with the theory included in the frame 
of reference to identify the differences and similarities. 
 
Content analysis was the preferred method for analysing the interview data collected for 
this study. Julien (2008) defines content analysis as the intellectual process of categorizing 
qualitative textual data into clusters of similar entities, or conceptual categories, to identify 
consistent patterns and relationships between variables or themes. This definition places 
content analysis in the scope of the interpretative research paradigm. Further Mayring 
(2000) in Wahyuni (2012) specifies that qualitative content analysis is an approach of 
empirical, methodological controlled analysis of texts within their context of 
communication, following the step by step content analysis rules. Content analysis is a 
method that is independent of theoretical perspective or framework (e.g., grounded theory, 
phenomenology) but has its beginnings as a quantitative method. Where quantitative 
content analysis is helpful in answering “what” questions, qualitative content analysis can 
be helpful in answering “why” questions and analyzing perceptions. Qualitative content 
analysis concentrates on portraying reality by discovering meanings from the textual data 
(Silverman, 2011 in Wahyuni, 2012). 
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When analyzing qualitative data such as interview transcripts, analyses across the whole 
set of data typically produce clusters or codes that translate into “themes.” Themes may 
have been identified a priori, so that the researcher seeks evidence for participants’ 
expressions relating to those themes, or may simply emerge from the analysis of the 
transcripts (Julien, 2008). The level at which content analysis occurs varies widely, from 
obvious surface-level groups of similar responses to a particular interview question to 
deeper inductive insights inferred from more sustained, iterative, and recursive interaction 
with textual data. For example, the varying connotations associated with particular words 
used by participants, or the degrees of enthusiasm expressed about an issue, are open to 
content analysis. Regardless of the level at which analysis occurs, the fundamental 
principle is that content is recognized. In the case of the written word, that content is often 
subject related (i.e., analyses refer to the “aboutness” of text). Thus, content analysis is 
useful for identifying both conscious and unconscious messages communicated by text 
(i.e., what is stated explicitly as well as what is implied or revealed by the manner in which 
content is expressed). This is typical with the inductive style or nature of the qualitative 
approach; to begin with deep close reading of text and attempt to uncover the less obvious 
contextual or latent content therein. The results of a content analysis may reveal recurrent 
instances of “items” or themes, or they may reveal broader discourses. The “categories” 
or clusters of data identified may represent discrete instances (i.e., something is apparent 
or not), or they may be represented as degrees of attributes, such as direction and intensity, 
or qualities (i.e., a quality such as joy is evident to some degree rather than simply present 
or absent). Identifying themes or categories is usually an iterative process, so the 
researcher spends time revisiting categories identified previously and combining or 
dividing them, resolving contradictions, as the text is analyzed over and over.   
 
Sarantakos (1998) suggests a five step qualitative data analysis methodology which is 
consistent with the approaches espoused by Miles and Huberman (1994), yet is designed 
specifically for the analysis of qualitative interview data. These five steps are 
transcription, checking and editing, analysis and interpretation, generalisation and, 
verification. Marshall and Rossman (1999, p. 152) outlined a six step qualitative data 
analysis model: i) organising the data; ii) generating categories, themes, and patterns; iii) 
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coding the data iv) testing the emergent understandings; v) searching for alternate 
explanations; and vi) writing the report. 
 
Incorporating the approaches proposed above, the content analysis for this study 
proceeded as follows: first, the researcher begun by a deep reading of the text followed by 
a search for similar words or phrases that were stated by the interviewees. Second, the 
similar words and phrases were put into categories/themes. The generation of themes was 
twofold; some themes had been identified a priori and the researcher sought evidence for 
participants’ expressions relating to those themes, additionally the researcher also allowed 
new themes to emerge from the analysis of the transcripts. The third step in the analysis 
involved the assignment of codes representing the core topic of each category. The 
assignment of codes was followed by the fourth step which involved the reduction of data 
by condensing it into summaries/paraphrases. Finally, the resulting data was displayed in 
rich verbatim text in tables and from these tables, data was further analyzed to produce 
summaries that enabled conclusions to be drawn. The steps described above, which were 
followed in the analysis of the content from the interview transcripts, are diagrammatically 





























3.7 Research Quality-Validity, Reliability and Objectivity of Research 
 
The traditional concepts of validity and reliability fit well in the quantitative research 
landscape whose results aim at replicability and generalizability. Qualitative research 
operates in a completely different domain as it seeks to produce credible knowledge of 
interpretations on organisation with an emphasis on uniqueness and context (Parker, 
Looking for similar words/ phrases 
Putting the similar words into 
categories/themes 









2012). As such, the rigour of qualitative research has been the subject of continuous 
discussion in literature (Denzin & Lincoln 2005). Lincoln and Guba (1985) and, Guba and 
Lincoln (1989) developed four criteria for judging the soundness of qualitative research; 
credibility, transferability, dependability and confirmability. They felt that these criteria 
better reflected the underlying assumptions involved in much qualitative research and 
explicitly offered these as an alternative to more traditional quantitatively-oriented 
criteria. The proposed criteria and the "analogous" quantitative criteria are listed in the 
table below. 
 
Table 3.5 Traditional and Alternative Criteria for Judging Qualitative Research 
Traditional Criteria for Judging 
Quantitative Research 
Alternative Criteria for Judging  
Qualitative Research 
Internal Validity Credibility 
External Validity Transferability 
Reliability Dependability 
Objectivity Confirmability 
Source: Lincoln and Guba (1985) 
 
3.7.1 Research Validity 
Validity refers to the extent to which the results of a study reflect the social phenomena 
being observed and is reflected by the credibility and transferability of the study (Bryman, 
2012; Kalof, Dan, & Dietz, 2008). Credibility parallels internal validity while 
transferability resembles external validity. Credibility deals with the accuracy of data to 
reflect the observed social phenomena, in other words, whether the study actually 
measures or tests what it is intended. The careful selection of case organisations is 
considered as the first practical step towards credibility in case study research. The cases 
selected for this study were those that voluntarily participated in an annual banking survey 
of banks that included a category of banks that deal with SMEs. Bryman (2012) suggests 
that in subsequent meetings with participants, the interim results from the previous 
interview can be discussed as a method of respondent validation. The transcribed 
interview was sent to the interviewee for validation before continuing with the data 
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analysis process. Further, the triangulation approaches of data triangulation, method 
triangulation and evaluator triangulation enhance the credibility of research findings. 
Evaluator triangulation, also known as peer debriefing, is not only useful at the data 
analysis stage to check the consistency of data coding but also in identifying other 
perspectives which may have been overlooked by the researcher. The researcher attempted 
to carry out three interviews in each case site with three different respondents to enhance 
evaluator triangulation. The table below illustrates the strategies that were used to enhance 
credibility of the study.  
 
3.7.1.1 Credibility 
Table 3.6 Credibility 
Strategy Description 
Selection of case banks Ranked top three in the category “Best SME Bank” in 
annual banking survey 
Respondent 
review/validation  
Ask each respondent to review researcher's synthesis of 
all interviews for accuracy of representation 
Evaluator Triangulation Carry out further interviews with at least two other 
respondents in the same institution 
Adapted from: McMillan and Schumacher (1997) 
 
3.7.1.2 Transferability 
Transferability refers to the level of applicability into other settings or situations. Lincoln 
and Guba (1985) suggest that a rich and thick explanation of research sites and 
characteristics of case organisations should be provided to enhance transferability. While 
it is certain that the data from a qualitative study is not reproducible, it is not impossible 
to apply a qualitative study in a different setting. In line with McMillan and Schumacher 
(1997), the strategies that were used to enhance transferability of this study were 
maintaining a field log containing a log of dates, time, places, persons and activities 
carried out to obtain access to informants for each data set collected. 
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3.7.2 Reliability and Confirmability 
Reliability refers to the consistency of measures used. The traditional quantitative view of 
reliability is based on the assumption of replicability or repeatability. Essentially, it is 
concerned with whether we would obtain the same results if we could observe the same 
thing twice. But we cannot actually measure the same thing twice as by definition if we 
are measuring twice, we are measuring two different things. In order to estimate reliability, 
quantitative researchers construct various hypothetical notions (e.g., true score theory) to 
try to get around this fact. Qualitative research requires a more refined elucidation of 
reliability. Terms such as “rigour”, “trustworthiness”, “defensibility” and “dependability” 
may better describe the pursuit of reliability in qualitative studies (Golafshani, 2003; 
Wahyuni, 2012).  
 
The idea of dependability, on the other hand, concerns taking into account all the changes 
that occur in a setting and how these affect the way research is being conducted. 
Dependability can be achieved by a detailed explanation of the research design and 
process to enable future researchers to follow a similar research framework. It should be 
noted that the application of the research model by a future researcher is not necessarily 
targeted at getting a similar result. Dependability was first assured by offering a detailed 
explanation of the research design and process so that future researchers could follow a 
similar research framework. Secondly, dependability was assured by using an accurate 
research instrument that had been pretested in a pilot study, and refinements and 
clarifications made, prior to using it for the final interviewees at the selected commercial 
banks.   
 
Confirmability refers to the extent to which others can confirm or corroborate the findings 
in order to ensure that the results reflect the understandings and experiences from observed 
participants, rather than the researcher’s own preferences. In addition to triangulation 
methods, Lincoln and Guba (1985, p.317) suggest using an ‘inquiry audit’ to enhance 
confirmability. Documentation on data and progress of research therefore should be 
carefully kept in the form of research memos and interim summaries as parts of the 
research working book. This research record serves to provide an audit trail which enables 
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an examination of both the research process and research outputs by tracing out the step-
by-step course of the research. Peer assistance to cross check the coding development and 
application can also be aimed at confirmability. To ensure confirmability, the researcher 
kept a research record of the research process. Peer cross check during the research process 
was also carried out during the supervision process by both supervisors of the researcher. 
 
 
3.8 Ethical Considerations 
 
Participants were well informed about the study, most importantly; who the researcher 
was, the purpose of the research and what the research was about. The researcher also 
informed the participants of the potential benefits of participating in the study which 
encouraged the free flow of information without fear of negative consequences.  
Participants were also informed that data needed to be collected using the interview 
method, preferably in the respondent’s business premises. They were assured of 
confidentiality through a letter from the university, given to them, providing assurance 
that the results of the research would be used for no other purpose than for the said 
research.  Finally, they were requested to give an informed consent that allowed the 
researcher to use the data collected after verification of the same. 
 
The following procedures were also used to help reduce risk and maximize confidentiality: 
Firstly, raw and processed data was kept under lock and key and if in soft form, it was 
password protected. Secondly, after transcription of each interview and validation of the 
same, the interview data was displayed in rich text with an identification given that cannot 
be traced back to the actual bank or participant. Thirdly, data was reported in an aggregate 
manner without disclosing the position of an individual bank. Lastly, data was only shared 





3.9 Chapter Summary  
 
This chapter provided a justification for the research paradigm within which this study 
was considered. Having selected the interpretivist research paradigm, an appropriate 
research approach, and research design within this approach, was selected. As the research 
sought to explore whether relationships do matter in the SME lending process and to 
determine the benefits that banks gain from lending to SMEs, the case study methodology 
was found to be the most suitable design to conduct this study using a qualitative approach 
within the interpretivist research paradigm. The research instrument found most suitable 
to conduct this study was the semi structured interview as a two- way conversation gave 
the interviewer the opportunity to participate actively in the interview and allowed the 
participant to interpret and describe the phenomenon in their own way. Finally, data was 
analysed by way of content analysis. The chapter concluded with a discussion on research 











This chapter presents data collected from sixteen respondents representing the seven 
banks in the study and follows the data analysis process prescribed by Miles and 
Huberman (1994) in section 3.6 of this thesis. Miles and Huberman (1994) explain 
qualitative data analysis as consisting of three concurrent flows of activity: data reduction, 
data display and conclusion drawing and verification. This chapter comprises of the first 
two flows of activity, data reduction and data display where the output of the semi-
structured interviews is reduced and displayed in accordance to their relevance to the three 
research questions of the study. Data is presented in this section as follows: section 4.2 
presents data on the background of the respondents and 4.3 the SME lending process.  
Sections 4.4 through to 4.6 present data relevant to the three research questions as follows; 
4.4 examines how borrower knowledge is acquired, transferred and used by a bank to 
make the SME lending decision, 4.5 investigates the role of transaction lending and 
relationship lending and the interplay of the two methods in making the SME lending 
decision and 4.6 establishes the value generated from engaging in SME lending by 
commercial banks in Kenya. In presenting the data, any identifiers of the bank or 
respondent that is words or phrases, are replaced (for instance actual bank name is replaced 
with “our bank”) or completely omitted in a way that does not alter the results. The 
findings are then discussed in chapter five. 
 
 
4.2 Background Information 
 
All the respondents interviewed were first asked to provide a brief background of their 
career including their designation, years in SME lending and current responsibilities. This 
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information would confirm the suitability of the respondent as a participant in this study. 
The responses are summarised below. 
 
4.2.1 Respondent Designation and Years in SME Banking 
 
Figure 4.1 Respondent Designation 
 
 
The table above shows that the respondents interviewed represented eight different 
designations with the most prevalent designation being Relationship Manager-SME. Nine 
out of the sixteen respondents have a designation which specifically assigns them the SME 
which implies that they specialise in dealing with the SME customer and as such were 
suitable respondents for the study. The other respondents have various designations but 
all work in or closely with the department within the bank that deals with SMEs which 















referring to the above respondents/participants in general, the term SME bank manager(s) 
shall be used. 
 
Figure 4.2 Respondent Years in SME Banking 
 
 
From figure 4.2 above, twelve out of the sixteen respondents have been dealing with SMEs 
for over six years with two having been in the role for over ten years. This indicates 
significant experience in dealing with the SME customer and further confirms the 
respondents’ suitability as participants in this study. 
 
4.2.2 Respondent Responsibilities 




                                                          
1The following key is used to identify responses from each bank and specific respondents: 
Key: 
B1: Bank One; 
B1a: Respondent “a” (or first respondent) from Bank One; 
B1b: Respondent “b” (or second respondent) from Bank One;  













1-5 years 6-10 years 10 years and
above





Table 4.1 Respondent Responsibilities 
Area of 
Responsibility 






 Managerial, managing a team of 
relationship officers (RO) (B1a) 
 Head credit for the bank (B1c) 
 Strategy direction for SME (B6a) 
 Managing (B6b) 
 Management of the branch-
administrative, overseeing the operation 
side and of course management (B7a) 




 Maintaining the loan book, deposit book, 
(B1a) 
 Manage the book; end to end process, 
from getting the client to managing the 
client (B1b) 
 Customer acquisition and satisfaction 
(B3a) 
 Drive the business (B4a) 
 Manage portfolios and they are a mix of 
asset and liability customers i.e. 
borrowing and just people who run 
regular current accounts or place 
deposits and other investments (B5a) 
 Growing the SME book both assets and 
liabilities (B5b) 
 Business development for existing and 
new business clients, my key focus is on 




 Business development - grow the book 
(B6c) 
 SME banking (B7a) 
 Business development (B7b) 
3. Profitability  Ensuring profitable relationships 
between the bank and customers, 
increasing transactional income, 
ensuring profitability for the sector 
(B1b) 
 In terms of day to day - what kind of 
prices should we charge (B6a) 
 Profitability … the bottom line (B7a) 
 We are supposed to increase revenue in 





 Go between the client and the bank so 
anything you need as a client comes to 
your relationship manager. Nurturing the 
business, overseeing how customers are 
managed so as to retain and get value and 
shift from a product based to a need 
based service (B1b) 
 Relationship management (B2a) 
 A typical day would be first of all you 
monitor your relationship portfolio; it’s 
a relationship banking sort of module. 
We are hands on with our customers’ 
queries, we are like trusted advisers to 
our customers, we keep them informed 




if they have any query they refer it to us 
(B5a) 
 Relationship management, value 
addition to our SMEs. Ensuring that they 
get our best services and also enjoy a 
variety of our products to make sure that 
the relationship is not just transaction, 
you have to of course add the human 
aspect to it. See the customer beyond 
what he is giving us. Contact person 
between clients and the bank (B6b) 




 Overseeing how customers are managed 
so as to retain and get value and shift 
from a product based to a need based 
service (B1b) 
 Research, tailor make products for SME 
business (B3b) 
 In terms of day to day - products we offer 
to SME, what kind of service should we 
give them (B6a) 
3 3 
 












Figure 4.3 Area of Responsibility 
 
 
The data collected on the responsibilities of the respondents resulted in five areas as 
follows; operations/management, business development, relationship management, 
profitability and, product/service development. The consensus is that the SME manager’s 
role mainly involves business development which was indicated by ten respondents from 
six banks. Other interspersing roles are, operations or management of other officers in the 
SME department, ensuring profitable relationships between the bank and customers and 
tailor making products or services to meet the SME needs.  
 
 
4.3 The SME Lending Process 
 
The SME lending process was initially not indicated as a research issue, but as the data 
collection and analysis process progressed it emerged as an important aspect as it is the 
process within which two of the research objectives occur, specifically the objective of 

















employed by commercial banks. As such, the SME lending process is presented here as a 
research issue that emerged as a result of the analysis of the data. 
 
4.3.1 Source of Customer 
The following table presents the various sources of the SME customer. 
 




B1a An SME client is sought and brought by a RO or RM. The client could also 
just be a walk in or a referral by another client/relative. 
B1b Walk-in client, poached client. 
B2a A client is introduced or through cold calling. 
B3a, B3b Customers are usually from one of three sources; walk-ins, value chain 
referrals from a key customer or, a segment campaign, for instance an import 
facility targeted finance. 
B5a They walk in 
B5b 
 
There is the marketing bit where we go look for the customers or the customers 
come looking for us.  
B5c Walk-in 
B6a, B6b You come in or we come and find you because we do both outside marketing 
or there will be clients who walk in to us. 
B6c Walk-in 
B7a They can walk in, we also approach them. You can just see a good business 
and go out and direct them and market what we have as a bank, you talk to 
them and maybe they will tell you then what they need. Then through referrals 
also, sometimes we have events where we go and get to meet different people 
and they will talk to you and tell you I am thinking about this.  
B7b Walk in, a referral or we go out looking for business. 
B7c The branch manager, he’s the boss, he looks out… 
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From table 4.2a, we find evidence of corroboration amongst respondents in the same bank 
of the various ways of sourcing for customers. The various ways of sourcing for a 
borrowing customer as indicated by the respondents are summarised in the table 4.2b 
below. 
 
Table 4.2b Summary Source of Customer  




Referral B1a, B2a, B3a, B3b, B7a, B7b 6 4 
Walk-in B1a, B1b, B3a, B3b, B5a, B5b, B5c, 
B6a, B6b, B6c, B7a, B7b 
12 5 
Cold calling B1a, B2a, B7a, B7b, B7c 5 3 
Marketing B3a, B3b, B5b, B6a, B6b, B7a 6 4 
Poaching B1b 1 1 
 
The top two sources of potential borrowing customers are; a walk-in as indicated by 
twelve respondents from five banks, followed by referrals from existing customers and 
marketing campaigns held by the bank. This was closely followed poaching and the least 
popular source of customer, which is mentioned by only one respondent, is poaching.   
 
4.3.2 Initial Discussion and Business Visits 
After sourcing for the customers, banks interviewed indicated that they need to have an 
initial discussion with customers and also make a business visit(s).  




B1a Visit of the business by the relationship officer to establish is there 
really a business, see the need, establish whether there really is a need, 




B1b Vet –visit the client, what does the client deal in…know your customer 
(KYC)  
 
B1c Then, sometimes the bank can determine the need to visit the 
customer…today with growth in everything; there are customers you 
don’t need to visit. There are some you will not even have to see. Their 
visit to the bank could be enough. But there are customers we must visit 
–depending on how much they have borrowed and the nature of 
business, and how well we - how comfortable we are. We are 
encouraged to call –know your customer: the physical identity of that 
person or that entity; and determining where the entity resides or where 
that person resides…that done, there is that information in the bank so 
you do not have to keep on visiting the business premises to determine 
whether you want to lend or not. 
 
B3a, B3b In carrying out our business checks, someone known to the customer 
would visit the premises at an agreed date and time. Additionally, an 
independent verification is done by someone unknown to the customer 
on an unknown date and time, an ad hoc visit. 
 
B5a They walk in, we discuss, they show us their need because one thing 
we do, we don’t pull products out of a bag and say this what you need 
we have to fully understand their business and their business cycle … 
you may find when they initially came for an overdraft it may end up 
being…. it could invoice discounting. 
We visit the customer premise because SMEs fear banks and get closed 
in, so sometimes they tell you what you want to hear, but when you 
meet them at their premise you will still get a lot of information that 
would be helpful to meet their need…I need to ascertain that he’s based 
somewhere and he’s doing what he’s saying he’s doing because 
sometimes we’ve found we have briefcase SMEs and their business is 
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in their car, where would I find him if he defaulted, you need to know 
he’s established somewhere. 
 
B5b And once you identify the customer then you go into identifying what 
is their need; that is the credit appraisal process. 
 
B5c Then I would be required to visit their business premises to get to know 
them much more than the interface of the interviews I conducted at the 
branch. That would then lead me to do what we call a call report. I 
arrange a visit to their premises to be comfortable that actually I am 
lending to a business that is existing. 
 
B6a So when you come in at that time you will come with the information 
that you have…based on the information we then have, we are then able 
to analyze and see if it is a business we would want to finance 
depending again on what is your need…the banker is expected of 
course to have done a site visit to be able to assess whether what the 
customer said he is doing is actually what he is doing on the ground. 
 
B6b You have to have a discussion with them first, you will determine the 
need and then you sort out the need. 
 
B6c An SME will come and you will have a discussion…they will come in 
and tell you I want loan for this purpose, I want this amount… so you 
calculate the amount and tell them the repayment per month, then they 
tell you I can afford it but I look at their bank statements and I realize 
no…and now based on that sometimes, at that point you might not be 
able to lend them what they wanted… You tell them now because I 
cannot be able to lend you but we can work on building a relationship 




B7a Of course they meet the customer they agree discuss whatever it is they 
want based on that discussion and negotiations, the customer applies 
for the facility So in the process of getting to know what the purpose is 
of course they will also give a background of what they do and now 
why do they need this money… so they really have to have a specific 
need, then you will be able to know how to structure that facility and to 
advice accordingly.  
 
B7b So I go out, meet a client. I will discuss with the client, the client will 
give me this information, I will do them a term sheet –you know that is 
quite important –a term sheet simply shows what the bank can offer to 
the customer. Yeah, I have sat with you, I have listened to you, I think 
you need one, two, three and I will price what you need. Before I 
proceed with it, the customer has to be agreeable to the terms in that 
term sheet and tell you if you agree to this term sheet, I will need you 
also to provide me with the following. So now the customer comes back 
to provide you with all the information that you need to prepare the 
credit paper.  
 
B7c Understand the need help them structure it. 
 
 
From the table above, the results from the different respondents in each individual bank 
corroborate. These results above are summarised in the table 4.3b below. 
Table 4.3b Initial Discussion and Business Visit 




Discussion to establish 
need  
B1a, B1c, B5a, B5b, B6a, B6b, B6c 
(ability to pay), B7a, , B7b, B7c 
10 4 
Visit to check for 
existence 
B1a, B1b, B1c (not always), B3a, 




Visit to confirm need B1a, B1c (not always), B3a, B3b, 
B5a, B5c, B6a 
7 4 
Visit to cross check by 
another staff member 
B3a, B3b 3 1 
 
Respondents in four out of the seven banks in the study indicated that after the banks 
source for the customers, they have an initial discussion with the potential borrowing 
customer to establish the customer’s need; B6c also adds that this discussion is also held 
to determine ability to pay. This is followed by a visit to the business premises to confirm 
that a business does actually exist and also confirm the need as indicated by four banks. 
However, B1c states that they do not need to visit all customers and that the visit is 
dependent on the amount borrowed, nature of business and how comfortable the bank is; 
to note is that the respondent B1c is a senior manager. Further B3a, B3b add that apart 
from the business visit to confirm the existence of the business and also confirm the need, 
an independent verification is also carried out by someone unknown to the customer on 
an unknown date and time in other words, an ad hoc visit. 
The determination of the “need” appears very important for banks as this is a subject of 
the initial discussion held with the customer as indicated by ten respondents and also a 
reason for the business visits as indicated by seven respondents, all from five banks in 
total. This determination of need assists the bank in structuring the appropriate 
solution/product for the customer as indicated by B5a, B6a, B6b, B7a, B7b and B7c. A 
look at the earlier results on responsibilities reveals that B6a indicated that they do develop 
products or services for their SME customers indicating some consistency. 
 
4.3.3 Bank Requirements 
After the initial discussion with the customer and assessment of a need which the bank 
can meet, banks emphasized the need to provide certain documents and proof of minimum 








B1a Requires statements from other banks. 
 
B1b Must have banked with us for 3 months. 
 
B2a Financial statements and collateral. 
 
B3a, B3b Must have banked with us for at least 3 months. Required - financial 
statements, registration documents (i.e. registered name to verify 
existence of business). 
 
B4a You’ll apply for the loan we’ll do the vetting we’ll say we’re giving 
you this much but the condition of this disbursement is you open an 
account with us so at the point of applying for the loan you don’t have 
to have the account. 
 
B5a Guarantees of the directors, security ... contracts depending on whether 
it’s based on contracts that they have, financial information, statements 
if they’re not banking with us, sometimes you ask for 12 months but if 
it’s an Mpesa agent there’s no way you’re asking for 12 you just have 
a general idea because it would be too long.  
 
B5b …we still consider the other banks statements as proof of 
transactions…so once they meet the requirements, you do the credit 
application. 
 
B5c The bank statements for twelve months…yes for a non-customer, but if 
you have been banking with us, 6 months would be ideal then we 
annualize it. Any asset or any facility proposal provided by an SME we 
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require it to be backed by a security. For our SMEs we don’t really 
commit them to filling in a loan application form. All they need to do 
is just draft a letter signed, indicating the type of facility they would 
want to take. 
 
B6a …we assess you based on your six months’ bank statements…a loan 
application form which you will fill in. 
 
B6b For a new customer of course either you bank with us for six months or 





B7a Months but depending on the amount …if it is a larger amount we 
would want one year, we take up to one year  
 
B7b Three years financials to compare the trend. We need projections, 
mostly if it is a term loan, like if they give me a term for three years I 
will need projections for three years. The others are KYC (Know Your 
Customer) documents. 
 
B7c We lend them on a checklist. I have a document which says; date of 
incorporation, have you been in business for more than three years, do 
you have the memorandum of articles…it’s about governance, do you 
have an organization that’s in existence, do you have some experience 
in what you’re doing? … then you look at compliance- tax compliance, 
can I see your PIN (Personal Identification Number), can I see your ID 






The bank requirements are summarised below: 
 
Table 4.4b Summary Bank Requirements 








B1b, B3a, B3b, B4a, B5c, 
B6b 
 
B1b, B3a; B3b 
B5c, B6b 
6 5 






B1a, B2a, B3a, B3b, B5a, 




B5a, B5c and B7a 
B7b 
12 6 
Provide security then 
lend 
B2a, B5a, B5c, B6b 4 3 
KYC documents B3a,B3b,B7b, B7c 4 2 
 
The above table indicates that the most popular bank requirement is the provision of bank 
statements whether from bank customers or non-customers. Ten respondents from five 
banks indicate that banks prefer a borrowing customer to provide bank statements before 
they can consider financing them while six respondents, also from four banks indicate that 
they prefer a borrowing customer to first bank with them. In addition to bank statements, 
the requirement of security was indicated by three banks and KYC documents by one. 
Interestingly, one respondent (B5c) indicates that they do not require an applicant to fill a 
form but only to draft a letter indicating the type of facility they require which is 




The results however, show some differences within and between banks as to whether 
banks prefer a borrowing customer to first bank with them before they can consider 
financing them and also as to the required period of the bank statements for both existing 
and non-customers which ranges from three months to three years (for the customer, read 
– number of months of banking with the bank). B1b, B5c and B6b indicate that one needs 
to first bank with them before they can consider financing them while B1a, B5a, B5b, B5c 
and B6c indicate that the bank can finance non-customers that provide bank statements. 
For the existing customer, B1b, B3a and B3b state that they need bank statements for a 
minimum of three months while B5c and B6b require six months. To consider lending to 
the non-customer, B6a requires three months’ statements which although consistent with 
B6c, is inconsistent with B6b’s indication that to be financed one needs to be an existing 
customer), B5a, B5c and B7a require twelve months’ statements while B7b indicates a 
requirement of three years’ statements (inconsistent with B7a’s requirement). 
 
Business duration or how long a business needs to have been in existence was also a 
consideration that was analysed and the results are presented in table 4.5a below: 
 




B1a The bank does not lend to start ups. The enterprise has to have been in 
operation for six months and one year in registration. However if these 
start-ups do not meet the two requirements but have a seasoned 
businessman as the promoter then the bank may reconsider their 
decision and lend to such an enterprise. 
 
B3a, B3b If the COO (chief operating officer) of an established company that 
banks with us starts his own small outfit and would like a facility, he is 
likely to get it without say meeting the 3 month account requirement 
because we say “a business is as good as the owners.” We can say we 
know the owner of the business from the experience he has and what 
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he has achieved by working in the established company that banks with 
us. 
 
B5b Incidentally we don’t deal with start-ups…you must have been in 
business for at least two years. 
 
B5c At least your business should have been in operation for at minimum 
one year to be safe. Start-ups are a bit tricky…It is very tricky to lend 
to start-ups because of the probability of that loan performing in the 
long run. Reason being, the bank would be making a decision to lend 
or not to lend based on past incomes. Because you can only judge 
performance of a business when you do a trend analysis on the income 
that has been received in the past…but we don’t say we don’t lend to 
start-ups…if you have a security that the bank may consider and other 
sources of income that you are currently earning, that the bank could 
actually then appreciate by way of looking at the receivables on a bank 
statement.  
 
B6a Most likely you need at least not to be a start-up business, if you’re a 
start-up business you need a very high percentage of your own 
contribution, we want you to come in when you already know what you 
want to do …. At least about 50% is your commitment in the business 
and also along with that we’ve got to see that you’ve got the 
management experience to run the business. 
 
B7a However even with the six months statement the business should not 
only have been operational for six months, ideally it should be two 
years…why I am saying ideally is…at some point I said we can be 
flexible on a number of things so it doesn’t have to be two years but 
three months is really too short to have gone through the ups and downs 
of a business cycle. 
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B7c The first question you ask, how many years have you been in business, 
have you been in business for more than three years? 
 
 
The business duration is summarised in the table below: 
 
Table 4.5b Business Duration 
Business Duration Respondents No. of respondents No. of 
Banks 
No Start-up B5b, B7a, B7c 3 2 
Start-up with 
exception 
B1a, B3a, B3b, B5c, B6a 5 4 
 
The data above shows that there is some discrepancy amongst respondents in the same 
bank as regards to the duration of time a business needs to have been in existence to qualify 
for lending. This discrepancy is evident between banks 5 and 7. B5b states that they don’t 
lend to start-ups yet B5c gives an exception when they do. B7a presents the ideal duration 
as two years and also qualifies that this can be reconsidered although the business should 
not be a start-up, while B7c places the ideal duration as three years. Instances when a bank 
may reconsider the no start –up rule are: if the business is being run by a seasoned 
businessman as stated by B1a; B3a and B3b; if the business provides security for the loan 
(B5c); if the business provides other sources of income (B5c); and at least about 50% is 
the owner’s commitment in the business and; management experience (B6a). However 
even B7a; states that the ideal would be a business that has been operational for two years 
but could be flexible on that term though three months would be too short, however still 
adhering to the no start-up rule. 
 
4.3.4 Loan Approval Process 
The loan approval process was also discussed to appreciate how customer information 









B1a Branch managers and RM analyse application and may restructure 
facility. Credit of up to Ksh.100Million does not require a credit 
committee. Loan goes through the 1st, 2nd and, 3rd and final approver. 
If ok, credit is granted but it can also be declined at any point. Any 
application above Ksh.100Million goes to a board committee after the 
3rd approver. The board committee is comprised of at least 2 directors 
of the bank, may give conditions to be adopted before approval of the 
loan.  
 
B1b Credit analyst officer sits in all branches. Credit questions; upload on 
analysis to manager-department for asset finance-branch manager. 
Credit department section, credit approvers at each stage must return 
within 48 hours. There are 3 of them depending on approval amounts. 
Credit administration-offer letters (documentation) back to 
Relationship Manager.   
 
B1c ...to take a decision to lend…there are credit managers or approvers.  
 
B2a Loan amounts up to Sh.5Million are approved by Head of Credit and 
the CEO, amounts above Sh.5Million up to Sh.100Million are approved 
by in addition a management credit committee and amounts above 
Sh.100Million need the additional board approval. 
 
B3a, B3b. Decision making is centralized. 
 
B5a Analyst assesses...can go back to RM for review who can question the 
analyst’s assessment as analyst may have misrepresented the RM’s 
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position. RM then sends it to the approvers depending on level of 
facility…there’s a limit so either Level 1 or 2, amounts over Sh40M go 
to a committee approver. At this stage approved – letter of offer (LO) 
or returned for rework with certain conditions or clarification sought or 
questioning the structure- sent back to analyst because he is the one who 
prepares it. 
 
B5b Once you do the credit application, you go through the appraisal 
process and then the approval finally. 
 
B5c The call report would then now enable the analyst to see the person in 
totality.  
 
B6a …our credit analyst who will then check to see whether that proposal 
is valid, if it is valid from thereon then they can recommend for 
approval but they also have some limits or then they will recommend 
to the head of credit or SME who will then approve depending on the 
limits that he also has. So it goes through the chain. 
 
B6b But mostly ours are approvals. You know before the customer applies 
you are sure of what you are doing…don’t mislead the customer that 
you can qualify, apply, then you give the customer a decline. First based 
on the discussions, let that customer understand what’s on the table 
(Researcher note: implying that the loan manager only allows the 
customer to go ahead and apply when they are sure that the application 
will get approved. 
 
B6c There is an analyst and there is an approver and it goes to both. 
Decisioning in a bank at least is not one person, it is not one level. So 




B7a We have a system whereby now as the initiator maybe the branch 
manager, the relationship officer… you key in the details of the 
application, attach the supporting documents… we do it on a soft 
system. Then from the branch it will go to the regional branch manager 
who will either recommend or not… if there are any questions, they 
will send it back to you and if there is any information you need you 
can still go back to the customer and get the information to fill in the 
gaps and everything. From there, head of retail then to the credit 
department where it will be analysed based on the amount (as much as 
it is a credit department which will say approve or decline we are the 
first level) different people have different limits above 30 million 
there’s a credit committee, then beyond 55 million we send that to our 
head office to give a final approval. 
 
B7b … we call it a credit file, I will come and prepare. So it will be held 
with my boss and everything, and we present to the credit 
committee…the credit committee is a risk mitigant, for the bank. So if 
the credit committee approves it, then we are good to go. I will go back 
to the customers and tell them, this was approved, and this was not 
approve and if it was approved, it was approved with some conditions 
I will tell the customer the conditions.  
 
 
A summary of the loan approval strategies is provided in the table below. 
 
Table 4.6b Summary Loan Approval Process 
Step 
No. 




1 Relationship Manager B1a, B1b, B5a, B5b, B6b, 
B6c, B7a, B7b 
8 4 
2 Branch manager B1a, B1b, B7a 3 2 
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3 Regional branch manager B7a 1 1 
4 Analyst B1b, B5a, B5c, B6a, B6c 5 3 
5 Head of Credit/SME/Retail or 
Centralised decision/Head 
office 




6 Management credit 
committee/ credit committee  
B1a, B2a, B7a, B7b 4 3 
7 Different approval level 
depending on amount 
B1a, B1b, B1c, B5b, B6c 5 3 
8 Board committee B1a, B1b, B2a 3 2 
 
The results of the loan approval process yielded about eight distinct steps. To note is that 
some of the steps although termed differently, might to refer to the same step in another 
bank the difference perhaps being due to bank organisation structures. 
 
The most common step is the beginning of the approval process where 8 respondents from 
4 banks indicate that the approval process begins with the Relationship Manager. The next 
common step is “Head of Credit/SME/Retail or Centralised decision/Head office” which 
is indicated by 6 respondents from 5 banks. In addition, at least two banks in each case 
indicate that the loan approval process involves the following: Branch Manager, Analyst, 
Credit Committee, Different approving authorities depending on the amount and the 
Board Committee.   
 
Once all the necessary information is keyed into a system and forwarded to the analysts, 
there could be a back and forth process until the analyst is satisfied enough to forward the 
application to the approvers. B5a qualifies that the approvers may return the application 
to the analyst as he is the one who prepares it, for rework with certain conditions or 
clarification. This concurs with B7a’s approval process where the regional branch 
manager can recommend, or not and send back an application to the relationship manager 
for additional information who in turn may need to go back to the customer to get the 
information to fill in the gaps. This indicates an iterative approval process. Finally a 
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decision is made on whether to approve, approve with conditions or decline an application 
(B1a, B5a, B7a & B7b). What is clearly evident is that the commercial banks studied 
typically follow a formal lending application and approval process. 
 
4.3.5 Summary 
In summary, all banks were found to have a structured loan application and approval 
process that begins from sourcing and initial discussion with the potential credit customer, 
followed by business visits, after which the customer completes and submits the required 
documentation. This package of documents is then put through an analysis process that 
involves a credit analyst and finally an approval process where a decision is made on 
whether to approve or decline the application. Generally the results reveal corroboration 
amongst respondents in the same bank about the different stages of the SME lending 
process. The exception to this is the data on the duration of time a business needs to have 
been in existence to qualify for lending which indicates some discrepancy amongst 
respondents in two banks.  
 
The first stage in the SME lending process is sourcing for customers where the consensus 
from most banks is that the main source of a potential borrowing customer is a walk-in 
with the least popular source being poaching. The second stage is the initial discussion 
where respondents in four out of the seven banks in the study indicated that after the banks 
source for the customers, they have an initial discussion with the potential borrowing 
customer to establish the customer’s need. In most cases this is followed by a visit to the 
business premises to confirm that a business does actually exist and also confirm the need; 
one bank however states that they do not need to visit all customers with such a visit 
dependent on the amount borrowed, nature of business and how comfortable the bank is. 
This determination of need assists the bank in structuring the appropriate solution/product 
for the customer. To be considered during the second and third stage is the meeting of 
bank requirements by the potential credit customer. Most banks prefer a borrowing 
customer to first bank with them before they can consider financing them. The exceptions 
to this are banks that are willing to consider a non-customer who meets certain specific 
bank requirements such as bank statements for a certain given duration and security. The 
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results however, show differences between banks as to the required period of the bank 
statements for both existing and non-customers which ranges from three months to one 
year (for the customer, read – number of months of banking with the bank). The results 
also indicate some discrepancy amongst respondents in two of the banks as regards to the 
duration of time a business needs to have been in existence to qualify for lending.  
 
After having gone through the first and second stage and consideration of the bank 
requirements, the package of documents is then put through the loan approval process. 
Most banks indicate that this process starts with the relationship manager and involves a 
good number of the following approving authorities; Head of Credit/SME/Retail or 
Centralised Decision, Analyst, Different Approvers depending on the amount, Credit 
Committee and a Board Committee. The application may move back and forth within the 
approval chain for instance approvers may return the application to the analyst for rework 
with certain conditions or clarification, or to the relationship manager for additional 
information who in turn may need to go back to the customer to get the information to fill 
in the gaps. As such the loan approval process is also an iterative process (B5a, B7a). 
Finally a decision is made on whether to approve, approve with conditions or decline an 
application (B1a, B5a, B7a & B7b). It was evident that the commercial banks studied 
typically follow a formal lending process to assess a loan application. 
 
 
4.4 Borrower Knowledge Acquisition, Processing and Transfer   
 
This research objective was aimed at determining how soft information is collected from 
borrowers, how it is processed and the bank structure within which it is transferred for use 
in making the SME lending decision. Additionally, information is also gathered on how 
this soft information is stored and whether there are any social ties between loan managers 




4.4.1 Borrower Knowledge Acquisition 
Research sub-issue: What are the sources of soft information and how 
formal/informal is the collection process (i.e. do you pay attention to rumours about 
the borrower or use only very reliable and sound sources even if they provide soft 
information)? 
 




B1a SMEs lack data. You have to make the books yourself because if you 
cannot make them then you will have a very bad book, search the credit 
reference bureau (CRB) for company and directors credit history, 
character – this can be determined if for instance these are people 
known in the society. Politically exposed persons (PEPs) are also easy 
to determine. Caution countries – this is a confidential list for banks 
that has countries that the bank may not deal with or persons associated 
with those countries. 
 
B1b If the client can actually prove that they are actually in business as much 
as it is not registered…you tell them…bring the invoices, a shop will 
always have a certificate for City Council, or let us see your electricity 
bills. Even if it’s a kibanda (a makeshift shop), there is a fee that they 
will pay… even in the market they pay. You can even use their Mpesa 
(M for mobile, pesa is Swahili for money) transaction statements. 
 
B1c Credit application forms-getting them to answer those questions 
provided on an application form. When we visit the customer, there are 
specific reports that are done. What I am trying to say is the character 
is critical; it is the most important thing, because bad character is what 
makes them not pay. No...No...there is no room for rumours and hence 
the need for a standardized information profile - Who are you? What 
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do you do? How much do you earn? Where do you rent? Have you ever 
paid a loan? Do you have your own house? There is no room for 
rumours. Because some of these people you may have rumours about –
they are good people. 
 
B2a Do CRB checks of character of the owners. Personal information 
matters as the SME and owner are treated as one. 
 
B3a, B3b In carrying out our business checks, someone known to the customer 
would visit the premises at an agreed date and time. Additionally, an 
independent verification is done by someone unknown to the customer 
on an unknown date and time, an ad hoc visit. SME lending is intuitive 
based i.e. manual intervention is required and depends on the person 
the client first interacts with to establish the need. Soft information is 
collected by the relationship manager assigned to the customer. We are 
able to collect information even in informal sectors for instance in 
Gikomba market that deals with second hand goods. In the rare cases 
where there has been a rumour, we use private investigators to verify 
the same. We can extract the information required through other means 
e.g. Mpesa statements to verify transactions’ history. 
 
B4a Yes there’s a provision, there’s a provision actually on this application 
form once you’re done if you have any extra information that might be 
material. 
 
B5a A call report, a document that records information from the first, second 
interview and includes profiling of the customer, where their premises 
are, my (the RMs) view of the business; they get that soft information. 
Call report-who are your customers and what are the credit terms you 
have given them, who are your suppliers and what are the credit terms, 
who are your top five and what are the challenges you are facing.  
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B5b I will also pay you a visit at your business premises just to collect that 
rather soft information which is not documented…We do the customer 
visits. We visit the business premises and have a discussion with the 
business manager and with the employees of the business…there is also 
the observation where if it’s a factory you can tell a factory that is busy 
and one that is not really busy. We also would look at customers 
walking in, that is if they depend more on the walk-in customers and 
we are with them for three or four hours, then we are able to observe 
how the traffic to the business is. So you are able to know whether it is 
a busy business or not very busy. 
 
B5c Then (RM) would be required to visit their business premises to get to 
know them much more than the interface of the interviews I conducted 
at the branch. That would then lead me to do what we call a call report, 
because the call report would then now enable the analyst to see the 
person in totality. The call report will basically breakdown the 
background of this particular SME. I mean background touching on 
qualification, how long the business has been in existence, their main 
bankers, economic outlook for that particular industry where particular 
that SME operates in, then basically to touch on the licenses this SME 
currently has, because we wouldn’t be interested to lend to someone 
who is not within the law bit. 
 
B6a The banker is expected of course to have done a site visit to be able to 
assess whether what the customer said he is doing is actually what he 
is doing on the ground also you try and get some references if you’ve 
gone to the site maybe from the person who is next to them just to see 
whether what they said they’re doing is actually because you could find 
it’s some briefcase guys who just pose for you with good pictures which 
is, an SME is trying to survive so there are some good ones, there are 
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some who are out to defraud so of course key thing is make sure that 
you find a customer who is willing to pay. 
 
B6b We use Mpesa but as additional not the primary because of the CBK 
rules… because of CBK limitations, Mpesa is not a main stream 
banking… but we use them as additional ... The traders in Gikomba are 
using Mpesa… so it is an additional to the already main stream account 
they have.  
 
B6c I run a CRB on the company and run a CRB on all the 
directors…character in a bank is very important; it is not easy to 
quantify, but it becomes very important in lending. Let’s say for 
example, you could see a guy that has been, I mean it has been in the 
papers, they have been arraigned in court because it has been several 
times or you see another bank has sued another bank because of a debt 
which is in contention, but you see it is evidence that I have seen. It is 
not a rumour. We try to avoid working with rumours because 
everything you do in the bank, you have to be able to prove it, it has to 
be verifiable. So for as long as there is information and especially if this 
information is going to be communicated to the customer, if you don’t 
have evidence for it, it becomes very hard to make a final decision on 
it. You can’t rely on media especially because some of it is incorrect… 
I mean we have seen media houses apologizing after. 
 
B7a The instinct is very important and being relational; so that when 
someone is talking to you they don’t just talk to you about figures you 
get more information when you have a discussion with them… even if 
you go personal and you know there are so many personal things which 
affect business or sometimes someone is doing the business with their 
wife but they don’t get along. You ask them questions which are not 
necessarily related to what they are borrowing… for example how did 
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you get into this business, so why did you decide, were you employed 
before? You always get more information which always helps you 
make a decision or gives you information which you can use to advise 
the client. 
Sometimes in some places, you can even talk to their former 
banker…of course depending with your relationship with them…in 
some places that information is public like maybe in a small town, 
everyone knows this person borrows, this one doesn’t pay. Sometimes 
you would definitely ask why they are not getting from their bank, as 
much as I want business… and based on that answer then you can do 
your own further investigations as an RM to help make a decision 
whether you want to proceed with that or not. So sometimes there is 
some soft information like you said which might not be on paper but it 
will definitely help you make a decision. I have had such experiences 
before, where you would rather not take up that person as a client based 
on the soft information that you get to hear …even as a bank sometimes 
at some point we stop lending to or we slow down lending to maybe 
employees of a certain institution because we know they are having 
these challenges or there is retrenchment that is going to come in... you 
know some public information. Sometimes you have even done the 
application and you read somewhere that or somebody in credit has 
information that you don’t have then they tell go slow on this or ask the 
client. 
 
B7b A credit quest… will capture all the information. So this one, you get 
to this after you have done everything with the client. I discuss with the 
client– maybe something I left out –I will discuss with the client, the 
client will give me this information. Some of these are what we do 
internally here –the customer doesn’t, actually the customer is not even 
allowed to even see this, what I am doing because it is quite candid and 
quite open and what I think of a customer, of which the customer may 
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not be agreeable to…that is what I have observed and been able to 
collect from the documents. For example if you meet a client in their 
offices, there are some other things you look in terms of are they 
organized, in most cases. You talk to them like this – are they people 
you can trust? Can you trust their word for it? 
 
 
Even though the discussion was centred on sources of soft information, some of the 
respondents provided sources of hard information. The table below provides a summary 
of these sources and categorises them into four knowledge acquisition strategies. 
 
Table 4.7b Summary Sources of Soft Information 
Knowledge Acquisition Strategy  
(F-Formal/ I- Informal) 
Respondents Frequency No. of 
Banks 
1) Externally Generated Hard 
Information   
 Certificate for city council/evidence of 
fee paid for shop (F) 
 Electricity bills (F) 
 Mpesa statements (F) 
 Invoices (F) 
 Credit reference bureau (CRB) for 
company credit history (F) 
 Credit reference bureau (CRB) for 
directors credit history (F) 
 Politically exposed persons (PEP) List 
(F) 
















































2) Externally Generated Soft 
Information   
 Rumours (verified) (I) 
 Information in the Public Domain (F/I) 
 Credit reference bureau (CRB) for 




B3a, B3b, B7b 
B7a 














3) Internally Generated Hard 
Information   
 Make books (F) 
















4) Internally Generated Soft 
Information   
 Instinct (I) 
 Credit application form/standardized 
information profile (F) 
 Former banker (F) 
 Other bank staff (I) 
Business visit summary frequencies 
 Business visit report/ Call report from 
business visit (F/I) 
 Observation during business visit (I) 
 Discussion with employees of 
business (I) 
 During business visit, discussion with 
person operating neighbouring 
business (I) 























































The enquiry on the sources of soft information for banks resulted in the identification of 
four main categories; externally generated hard information, externally generated soft 
information, internally generated hard information and internally generated soft 
information. Within these categories, information could be collected formally or 
informally, the distinction being that informal collection is primarily that which results 
from the personal evaluation of the loan manager. 
 
As the interest of the enquiry was to determine how soft information is collected, the 
results reveal that internally generated soft information is the most preferred strategy for 
collecting soft information having garnered sixteen responses, compared to eight for 
externally generated soft information. The sixteen responses were received from 
respondents in six out of the seven banks, the only bank missing, B2a, had earlier indicated 
that they do not employ  relationship lending which relies on soft information and as such 
this was a consistent result. The consensus therefore is that banks prefer internally 
generated soft information or that which is primarily generated by the RO/RM, as opposed 
to soft information generated or collected by parties external to the bank. Further, of the 
sixteen responses, the most frequent source of internally generated soft information is 
business visits which had ten responses. This shows that banks gather more soft 
information from the business visits made to their clients’ premises than any other 
internally generated source. Further this also indicates that the primary collector of soft 
information is the SME bank manager who makes the visit to the customer’s business 
premises. The methods cited for collecting soft information during the business visits are; 
observation during business visit(s), discussion with employees of the business, 
discussion with the person operating the neighbouring business and other people in the 
small town (B1c, B3a, B3b, B5a, B5b, B5c, B6a, B7a & B7b). To note is that four 
respondents representing four banks; B1a, B5a, B5c and B6a, had earlier indicated that 
during the business visits they have an opportunity to collect more information about the 
client that would not be evident during the customer call to the bank. B5a, B5c and Ba 
remain consistent as they also indicate in this section that they collect soft information 




Other sources of internally generated soft information cited are; instinct, credit application 
form/standardized information profile, former banker and other bank staff while 
externally generated sources are; verified rumours, information in the public domain and 
CRB check for directors’ character.   
    
4.4.2 Soft information Processing and Transfer  
Research sub-issue: How is the soft information processed? How does the loan 
manager transfer her/his opinion and personal evaluation based on the soft 
information to the next level? Does s/he formalize this soft information in some way 
or is the repository the loan manager?  
 
This section gathered data on how the soft information which is collected is transformed 
to a form that can be conveyed or transmitted in loan process. Additionally it gathered 
evidence on how this information is then transferred to be used for making the SME 
lending decision. 
 




B1b For business continuity, we have shadows (Researcher note: this is the use 
of another RM/RO to verify information).  
 
B1c Ultimately when the application comes here, to determine whether you want 
to do it or not, you will have to re-verify what they have given, sometimes 
some of the information can be verified by looking at the financial 
information. Let me give an example. If the customer visited says he has a 
block of flats, the rental income should be shown in the documents; the 
audited accounts should show he has an asset. So you don’t look at one 




B3a, B3b We are able to collect information even in informal sectors for instance in 
Gikomba market that deals with second hand goods…We compile 
information about such markets; more specifically product based by 
collecting figures/information from a random sample of the market and we 
have experts who actually know the workings in these sectors. With this 
information we are able to calculate averages and variances. In the rare cases 
where there has been a rumour, we use private investigators to verify the 
same. In carrying out our business checks, an independent verification is done 
by someone unknown to the customer on an unknown date and time, an ad 
hoc visit.  
 
B5a A call report is a document that records information from the first, second 
interview includes profiling of the customer, where their premises are, my 
view of the business, the bank gets that soft information. Those are the 
probing questions you ask which then read actually into responding to the 
financials so that if your debtors are talking of 120 days which could be 
alarming, I have as an RM, having prompted those questions I do understand, 
it may be 120 days however they are supplying to high end corporates so 
payment is still assured though delayed. You see those are the mitigating facts 
so I tend to come with the information for mitigation. 
 
B5b Yeah we have a questionnaire that we walk with...that has some specific 
information which we deem vital for an application. Then there is also a call 
visit report we shall file…that report is about me giving a report of whatever 
discussions we had, whatever observations I had and all that.   
 
B6c Or somebody walks into the bank and says, this person owes me money and 
they have never paid it or other subsequent people that probably write and 
say you owe them money. At that point we will call you because you have to 
still confirm that it is true so that it is not based on rumour. There are other 
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ways quantifiable that we are able to pick character issues, unpaid items, 
bouncing cheques. 
In the bank also there is a way the bank treats different people. There are 
sectors that the bank would rate or risk profile as high risk. Politically exposed 
persons, they probably do further more due diligence before lending, public 
figures. So there is already a very defined way … either pricing or guarantee 
or even level of approval. 
Decisioning in a bank at least is not one person. It is not one level. So as an 
RM you will put and say… remember I said analyst, credit, approver and 
sometimes it goes through different approval levels. All we try in the whole 
process is to avoid in as much as possible subjectivity. Because we don’t want 
somebody to walk in and they qualify and based on everything else they 
qualify, the only reason you have told them no is based on a statement or 
based on a rumour… and that is why sometimes we will still lend.  I mean 
look at Uchumi (a local supermarket chain).  It is down and there is a lot of 
press. If we were to rely on what's going out in the press we would not lend 
to them… but we have more data that gives us more information in terms of 
where Uchumi is going and how. First you look at the customer’s interest but 
you also have to protect the bank’s interest and the question you ask yourself 
is… is for the bank?  Are we doing anything that is against the bank’s values 
or against the bank’s policies or is it a perceived risk or it is an inherent risk 
or is it an actual risk? And each of those risks there is away the bank has 
advised on how to treat, so you know. 
 
B7a Though sometimes, like I said…we can discuss with our colleagues… you 
can discuss with the more experienced people like your boss. You can even 





B7b For example me I come and look for a client, I will come discuss with my 





Table 4.8b Summary Soft Information Processing and Transfer Strategies 
Processing and Transfer Strategies 
 




Visit by shadow or other bank staff B1b,B3a,B3b, 
B7b 
4 3 
1) Cross check with financial data B1c , B5a, B6c 3 3 
2) Verification of rumours by private 
Investigator 
B3a, B3b 2 1 
Multiple visits by RO/RM B5a 1 1 
Call report/questionnaire B5a, B5b 2 1 
6) Cross check with politically exposed 
persons (PEP) list 
B6c 1 1 
Consult with other bank staff B6c, B7a, B7b 3 2 
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The enquiry on how soft information is processed and transferred yields seven strategies 
as shown in the table above. The results indicate that soft information is processed by way 
of verifying it and transferred through the channels in the formal application process. The 
most common strategy of processing soft information is the visit by a shadow and other 
bank staff which is indicated by four respondents from three of the banks in the study. 
This strategy is closely followed by the cross check with the formal information, in this 
case the financial data of the SME, which is indicated by three respondents from three 
banks as well. Ranking third is the consultation with other bank staff which is also 
indicated by three respondents but from two banks in the study.  A closer look at the 
respondents listed under each strategy reveals that a bank may employ multiple strategies 
to verify soft information, for example, B6c indicates the use of three strategies; the cross 
check with financial data, the cross check with politically exposed persons (PEP) list and 
consultation with other bank staff. Similarly respondents in the same indicate the use of 
different strategies, for instance, B1b indicates the verification by a visit by shadow or 
other bank staff while, B1c indicates a cross check with financial data. 
 
These top three strategies indicated by 5 banks in total go to show that banks again prefer 
to rely on their own internal mechanisms to process/verify soft information collected. 
Further, to note is that these processes of verification also allow for the transfer of such 
information. Additional means of transfer is through the call report and questionnaire (B5a 
and B5b) which capture information collected during the visit to the customer’s premises. 
Interestingly Bank 5’s verification by making multiple visits by the RO/RM suggests that 
even though loan managers do not make the final lending decision  they transfer a lot of 
information (formal and informal) and as such may have a lot of power to indirectly 





4.4.3 Soft Information Storage 




B1b The customer files are in a common system, accessible to all.  
 
B1c Previously, before technology was employed, we had physical files. If 
you want to know about this person, you go pull out his file. Today, 
there are systems to do support like that.  
 
B3a, B3b This information is collected and stored for reference so that anyone 
dealing with the client has access to it. The repository is not the SME 
loan manager.  
B5b The call report is in a shared… we post that information is a shared 
system and everyone has access to that system. If it is about the credit 
information, the financial data and everything, the credit analyst will 
capture that information in that system. 
B7b …this is called a CQ – by CQ I mean a credit quest, I mean it is like 
process flow, say like a system, I will analyse the financials, I will do 
everything, so I will capture all the information. It is like a pre-done 
system where I will just input things, input information. 
 
Table 4.9b Summary Repository of Soft Information 
Repository Respondents No. of respondents No. of 
Banks 




There is agreement that the soft information collected and processed is stored in a common 
system that is accessible by all authorized bank staff. This is the same system that records 
information from the application form and the call report and as such any soft information 
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captured, especially in the call report, is also stored in this system. This system also 
captures credit information prepared by the credit analyst. The repository of soft 
information is therefore not the RM that is close to the customer but a system which is 
accessible by all authorized bank staff. 
 
4.4.4 Social Ties 
Research sub-issue: What are the social ties in which the lender-borrower 
relationship is embedded? Is there a link between the local loan manager and the 
local community? Does he/she live there? 
 
The purpose of this sub issue was to determine if the lender-borrower relationship was 
embedded in any social ties. Whether there was any link between a local loan manager 
and customer in terms of whether the local loan managers could deal with only customers 
in his area of whether the loan manger was equipped to deal with customers from any 
area.  
 




B1c There are categories of SME customers. There is what we call small 
enterprises, we have middle sized enterprises and we have large sized 
enterprises. For the small end enterprises, you may not be effective as 
an institution if you assign each of them a relationship manager. An 
assigned relationship manager is an expensive resource. And this is 
where the two sectors come –medium sized enterprise require a 
relationship manager to help service them and to help advise them. For 
the larger ones, they need more decisions managers. Why? Because too 
many things depend on the managers understanding - whether that is 
the right thing to do or not. Plus their service requirements are 






The customer is assigned a loan manager that is in close proximity to 
the customer’s location however, if a particular loan manager prefers 
certain customers even though his branch is not located close to the 
customer they would still be able to serve the customer. Also if a 
customer prefers a certain loan manager who may not be in close 
proximity this is still possible. The preference is two way…this 
assignment is also dependent on the competence of loan officer and 
specialization –asset finance, working capital, trade finance, invoice 
discounting etc.  
 
B5c I can deal with any sector. It happens you get scenarios where an 
application, let me say it is a bit complicated in terms of the proposal 
being presented vis a vis the business backing the proposal. So if I am 
not comfortable as an RM to walk the customer from end to end, I 
would then look for someone who is more experienced, someone who 
has been in the team longer than I have. Then the other option would 
then be for me to pick another RM who we are with, in the same team 
who is at least more versed than me to rope them in or sometimes we 
even walk in to get a credit analyst to understand the client.  
 
B6a No, I don’t think so because what happens is as long as you’re in a 
particular area like for example the branch manager, he’s in touch with 
all the local leaders and they know what’s going in that market that is 
around them, they know what’s going on in their area, for example if I 
was to call a forum each branch conducts a business forum for their 
own branch so they know who are the players. 
 
B6b How we equip our resources at the branch, they are able to of course 
they understand all our products. So someone in Gikomba is able to sell 
even bank guarantees… our trade finance product. The same, same 
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person in Gikomba and the same, same person in Masai Mara branch 
underwent the same training. 
 
B6c No for as long as there is an SME banker in the branch, they should be 
able to manage and that is how the business is segmented. Per branch 
you will find there is a mortgage banker, there’s an SME banker… 
because again all these are specialists in it… but you find that within 
the SME, there is a unit that takes care of the SME just the same way 
there is a unit here that is taking care of the mortgage.  
 
B7a It should be any because; well at the end of the day you might not 
always be in Gikomba. But based on the place you are, you learn from 
the customers, you learn from the business that is there, and then you 
can become strong in that sector … we are basically all equipped 
because we all go for the same training but then again everyone has 
different experiences. Maybe where you used to work before you had 




Yeah, you can serve from wherever, just the other day we funded a 
customer from Embu. We have a branch there, but they approached us 
from here and we were able to. 
 
 
The table below summarises the loan manager assignment strategies generated from the 
interview responses above: 
 
Table   4.10b Summary Link between Local Loan Manager and Local Community 
Loan Manager Assignment 
Strategies 




Based on size of SME B1c 1 1 
Based on proximity B3a, B3b 2 1 
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Based on customer preference B3a, B3b 2 1 
Based on loan manager 
competence and specialisation 
B3a, B3b 2 1 




The table above shows that the highest numbers of respondents indicate that there is no 
link between the local loan manager and local community and as such all SME managers 
at a bank branch are equipped to handle any SME issue or query. This is indicated by six 
respondents from 3 banks. Interestingly, the results also show corroboration within banks 
as indicated by respondents in banks 3 and 6. However, three respondents from two banks 
indicate that there is a link between the local loan manager and local community and give 
these instances as based on; proximity, customer preference, loan manager competence 
and specialisation (B3a, B3b) and, based on SME size (B1c).   
 
4.4.3 Summary 
This section presented the responses to the research question on how commercial banks 
collect, process, transfer and store soft information and whether there is any link between 
the loan manager and the local community. The results reveal that banks prefer to use soft 
information that they have primarily generated and more so from the business visits made 
to their clients’ premises. The onus of collecting soft information lies with the SME bank 
manager assigned to the customer and this information is collected when the customer 
calls on the bank and also during the business visit(s) made by the RM or RO to the 
customer’s business premises.   
 
The enquiry on how soft information is processed and transferred reveals that soft 
information is processed by way of verifying it and is transferred through the channels in 
the formal loan approval process. The most common strategy of processing soft 
information is the verification through the visit to the customer’s business premises by a 
shadow or other bank staff. As regards transfer of soft information it was noted that even 
though loan managers do not make the final lending decision, they transfer a lot of 
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information (formal and informal) and as such may have a lot of power to indirectly 
influence the decision. As regards how soft information is stored, the results indicate a 
consensus among all banks that the soft information collected and processed is stored in a 
common system that is accessible by all authorized bank staff and as such, the repository 
of soft information is not the loan manager.   
 
Finally, most respondents indicate that all SME managers at a bank branch are equipped 
to handle any SME issue or query and as such there is no link between the local loan 
manager and the local community. 
 
 
4.5 Role of Transaction Lending (TL) and Relationship Lending (RL) in 
SME Lending 
 
The determination of whether a bank uses or employs transaction lending (TL) or 
relationship lending (RL) is mainly linked to the type of information used (hard versus 
soft/formal versus informal), how information is processed, transferred and stored (loan 
manager versus centralised system) and the role of personal ties (formal versus informal). 
As such the previous section on soft information collection, transfer and storage greatly 
informs the type of lending methodology that is employed and this should be evident in 
the lending methodology that banks indicate they employ in this section. This section 
presents data on how commercial banks make a decision on which lending methodology 
or technology to use when dealing with the SME customer and especially whether 
relationship lending, the preferred technology found in literature, is employed. 
 
4.5.1 Lending Methodologies Employed 
Research sub-issue: What lending methodologies are employed by your bank when 
dealing with SMEs and how do you make a decision on when to use each? 
According to literature, commercial banks employ either of two lending methodologies or 
technologies; transactions lending or relationship lending. This section endeavours to 
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identify the lending technologies employed by the commercial banks interviewed when 
dealing with SMEs. 
 




B1a Relationship lending is employed for existing clients. Cash flow 
lending is employed for new businesses referred by a key client. 
Relationship lending is based on relationship management. How well 
do you know the customer, before we even give out the money? We 
move from softer factors to hard. We look at the character of the 
directors, cash flows, is it in business, business knowledge of the 
customer, does the client chase for tenders, how many tenders have they 
won, is he passionate about the business? These facts are looked at 
before the bank considers what the security is, is it corporate guarantees 
that the bank can fall back on. When there is no RL, in the first 5 
minutes of meeting with the client there is mention of security. 
 
B1b Actually we use both… that is the reason why in most times you will 
find cases where, if a new client was to come walking in…, it would be 
harder for me to give someone who is a walk in client than someone 
who has been banking with us.  
B2a The bank does not engage much in relationship lending, relies on 
transaction lending. Transactions lending methodologies which include 
asset based lending, credit scoring which is done by checking the 
character and borrowing history, for instance if the borrower has 
delayed in making payment, and industry you are in. SMEs need to 
provide financial statements and collateral. 
 
B3a, B3b We have about 14 loan products including asset financing, invoice 
discounting, loan overdraft, trade finance, working capital, insurance 
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premium financing, among others. We establish what suits your need. 
There is no rule of thumb, we can proceed from soft to hard information 
or hard to soft information, this depends on the level of comfort.  
 
B4a Mainly what we do we structure their products to fall within a loan or 
O/D (overdraft). 
 
B5a A loan is a loan I may call it whatever name, but the main fact it’s a 
loan. So when you say you have 15 products or 20 really they are either 
loans or contingent like LCs (letters of credit) or guarantees. Basically, 
we have generic loans like construction loans, business mortgages, term 
loans both short term and long term, stock financing, post import 
finance. 
 
B5b We use a combination…because we do the transaction we look at the 
transactions in the bank statements and that is why we ask for the bank 
statements, the transactions. If it is about the credit scoring we also do 
credit scoring, if it is relationship we also do because once you give me 
the statements for transactional lending then I will also pay you a visit 
at your business premises just to collect that rather soft information 
which is not documented. So that is why I said it is a combination of 
all. 
 
B5c If for example I receive the financial statement…I mean, the bank 
statements and I sight very many unpaid cheques, at the end of the day 
when I am making a lending decision, I would be basically be making 
a lending decision based on monies coming into the account. But if the 
expected monies coming into the account are questionable based on… 
there is a character element at the back of it then I would be very 
cautious to lend to such a person. So on that aspect of relationship then 
there are key…it is not really something you have to sit down and in a 
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classroom to be taught. Financial statements you actually have to get 
some knowledge background on how to analyse them… but the 
relationship bit of it…it is something you can feel and see based on 
what you hear at that particular interview table.  
 
B6a We have behavioural scoring more for short term facilities like up to 
three months we can be able to score you and say ok fine you qualify 
for this…behaviour it’s how many unpaid cheques do you have in your 
account are you consistent in your banking then if there’s a consistent 
turnover in your account in terms of because there you won’t get 
management it’s really most of what you bank, what’s your behaviour, 
how much do you leave in your account at the end of the month so that 
gives you some scores that we use internally for knowing how much to 
lend to you…. Other than that we then also use just the normal analysis 
of a business. We put through the statements in the system then we’re 
able to see what’s the highest and the lowest we get averages and then 
we’re able to see what’s the turnover for the business based on that then 
we’re able to know how much is it that we can lend so we use those two 
types, we do paper analysis of their papers or we can use behavioral 
scoring. We have asset based which is really asset finance but then 
again we also take collateral. 
 
B6b We are doing both. Because you know we are serving even customers 
who are not banking with us. For instance asset based finance loans 
…where we buy you a vehicle …You don’t have to have been a 
customer with us. You don’t have to bank with us. 
 
B6c It is arm’s length because they have provided you with the 
documentations and all that you need but again based on the 
relationship that you have because it is repeat business, you know 
them… then there are some concessions. For example we don’t give… 
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you can’t come to us with land that you have and ask us to give you 
money against it… but if we helped you buy that land then we can 
consider.  
 
B7a I think we employ a combination, but bottom line… I would say 
transaction. Relationship lending am assuming is based on relationship 
with the client…there is relationship with the client but that cannot be 
standalone reason for you to lend. Let me say we use a combination of 
that, a mix of them. Some clients may not have some of these 
documentation… they may not have financials, maybe if you don’t 
have financials, we look at your account transactions, we look at your 
relationships, we look at your account conduct…I think I would say it 
is a combination. 
 
B7c I think a small SME doesn’t have time for relationship lending, they 
want advice, they want quick advice, I don’t need a relationship lending 
there, there a need is transaction based so SME tends to be transactional 
especially the small ones it tends to be transactional based until they 
grow to a certain point. That means they want to have a contact point, 
I’ve got this transaction, remember their objective, remember a typical 
SME has a transaction in their hand and they want money, they don’t 
have time for relationship. It’s later on when they get two or three 
transactions or two or three contracts which they’re running 
simultaneously, that’s when they now need to reorganize themselves. 
So relationship lending will come later. When you grow to a certain 
point where you have multiple transactions is when now you need 
someone to guide you, to help you, talk about your facilities, 
optimization of borrowing because that’s what the relationship lending 
is all about. The relationship lending comes in by introducing 
transactional products to help him pay his tax on time, to pay suppliers 
on time, efficiently from his desk, cashless solutions, reducing his risk, 
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that’s where relationship management…but before if you rewind to two 
years ago where he was just supplying tomatoes to one supplier, and all 
he needed was to pay one supplier and then load one truck and have one 
end buyer, he did not need a relationship. All he needed was can I 
borrow when I need it? 
 
 
A summary of the discussions above on lending methodology employed is provided in the 
table below: 
 
Table 4.11b Summary Lending Methodologies Employed 




Transaction Lending (TL) 
 
B1a, B1b, B2a, B4a, 
B5a, B6b, B6c, B7c 
8 6 
Relationship Lending (RL) B1a, B1b, B2a, B6b 4 3 
Combination of TL and RL B3a, B3b, B5b, B5c, 
B6a, B6c, B7a, B7c 
8 4 
 
The summary of the results shows evidence of the use of transaction lending, relationship 
lending and a combination of both lending technologies within the banks in the study. A 
detailed look at the summary shows evidence of the sole use of transactions lending (B4a), 
the use of both technologies (B1a, B1b, B2a, B6b) and a combination of both technologies 
which elicited 8 responses. An observation from the results is that one bank can apply 
different technologies; for instance B1a indicates that they can apply TL and RL, while 
B6c can apply TL or a combination of TL+RL. Additionally two banks indicate the use 
of both hard and soft factors (B1a, B3a, B3b) suggesting the use of both transaction and 
relationship lending. To note is that those banks that indicate the use of relationship 
lending were banks that had, in the previous section, indicated that they gather soft 
information. Two banks (B2a and B4a) that indicate the sole use of transaction lending 
had also not indicated the use of soft information in the previous section on soft 
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information collection which is consistent with the use of transaction lending. 
Interestingly, one respondent (B2a) out rightly states that they do not use relationship 
lending but alludes to the use of relationship lending when they later state that they check 
the character and behaviour of the borrower when making the lending decision and as 
such this respondent has been also been tallied as a user of relationship lending in the table 
above.  
 
The use of transaction lending is the most common lending technology which elicited 8 
responses from 6 banks. The least common methodology is the sole use of relationship 
lending which elicited 4 responses from 3 banks. The transaction lending technologies 
cited by respondents in this study include; asset financing, invoice discounting, LCs, loans 
and overdrafts. Additionally some the banks in the study state they used both hard and 
soft factors (B1a, B3a, B3b) suggesting the use of both transaction and relationship 
lending. Examples of soft factors cited are; character of the directors, cash flows, is it in 
business, business knowledge of the owner, does the client chase for tenders, how many 
tenders have they won, is he passionate about the business, behaviour, account 
transactions, relationships and conduct. However, as indicated above, those banks that 
indicate the use of relationship lending also use the transaction lending methodology. 
Further, when these banks give examples of when they do employ each methodology, it 
is evident that when they employ relationship lending, it is usually together with 
transaction lending and relationship lending is only considered after meeting requirements 
under transaction lending. This is also evident in banks that indicate the use of a 
combination of both methods. For instance, B7a qualifies that relationship lending cannot 
be used exclusively, similarly B3a and B3b state that they move from soft to hard factors 
or vice versa within loan products that fall under transaction lending suggesting that they 
consider soft factors but only within transactions lending.   
 
4.5.2 Measures of Relationship Lending 
According to literature, relationship lending is difficult to measure and as such is proxied 
by several aspects or measures the most common being; duration, scope and concentration 
of borrowing. Duration is the length of time that the bank and the borrower have known 
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each other, scope is breadth of the relationship, that is, the number of different services or 
interaction over multiple services between the bank and the customer and; concentration 
of borrowing is the number of bank relationships that a borrower maintains. 
 
4.5.2.1 Duration 
Research sub-issue: How does Duration (length of time that the bank and the 
borrower have known each other) impact lending decisions? 
 




B1a Positive impact – if there are two different applications, of course the 
one we know gets approved.  
 
B1b It is going to affect how much that you’re going to qualify for, and how 
long as in the duration of time. For someone who has been banking with 
us for more than five or six years and they have always borrowed and 
repaid and for someone who walks in and banked here for one year and 
someone who walks in… all of them will be treated differently. 
Chances are the person who has banked with us for six years has the 
highest of all the rest to be given that money…so you see you have 
actually studied the client and seen how well the capacity of them to 
pay hence now why the bank will be more comfortable when the next 
time, the person comes to borrow…the amount is higher and the tenure 
is more increased and the rate is even less. 
 
B1c Customers, who have had an account with an institution for a long 





B3a, B3b The activity in your account matters; this is looked at together with 
duration because duration alone does not necessarily tell us about the 
activity on the account. You may have had an account for a longer 
period than another customer but with less activity. An example of how 
duration impacts lending decisions is; if your dad has been banking with 
us and you want a facility and have not met the 3 month account 
operation period requirement, we can look at you favourably. What we 
simply do is draw up a guarantee with a call option in case you default.  
 
B5a You know I could have had a ten year, high maintenance, not good 
performer. I have the comfort of the information, the information is 
available to me so this one who is my insider cannot tell me otherwise 
I can tell by their trading but in terms of the way they operate the 
account, they’ve not been writing bouncing cheques there is an 
advantage of the credit history. The easiest people to lend are those 
already in your database because it’s not just what they say but it’s also 
what you see. 
 
B5c It is a catch 22, reason …the guy of five years could be doing very good 
turnovers compared to the guy of 12 years and the client of 12 years 
can be doing very good turnovers in their account compared to the guy 
of 5 years. So in terms of lending you would only lend based on the 
amount being sought for and your decision is based on the turnovers 
presented on the both accounts…I would do a profitability report for 
this 5 year guy and the profitability report for the 12 year guy… to try 
and see who is more profitable to the bank than the other. Profitability 
here is how much income are you giving to the bank based on the 
transactions you are doing on your account with us. 
 
B6b Slightly. Concessions, one has bargaining power than the other… 
exactly on the interest. Ok they both enjoy the same terms, same 
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treatment… everything the same. They both have of course bargaining 
powers but someone who has banked with you for 15 years has more 
bargaining powers than someone who has been with you for 2 years. 
So, of course that applies to either mostly on interest rates or fees. So if 
we’re lending at maybe 19%, this person can negotiate for even 17% or 
16%.  
 
B6c Repeat business always attracts better pricing, even when an analyst is 
making a decision they make a faster decision. Even in terms of what 
they need to provide is less than the person that is coming in new 
because you already have a history. You probably already have some 
of the key things. Yes, so we don’t ask you again for as long as your 
record has been good. Your record determines… a longer term, even 
discounts on fees that we charge. In fact for most products, there is a 
discount for repeat business on what you are charge on appraisal fee. 
 
B7a Maybe slightly, not so much… not that much. 
 
B7b ..  the operations will ask us to advice they pay or they don’t 
pay…because the customers don’t have sufficient cash in the accounts. 
So depending on what I know, how I know the customer, and how long 
we have been with the customer and our relationship, I will just say, 
pay those cheques. So that is still part of our relationship. But this is 
based on what – I know them, I have interacted with them, we have 




The results on how duration impacts lending decisions are summarized in the table below: 
 
Table 4.12b Summary Duration Effects 
Duration Effect 
Borrower benefit (B) 
Lender benefit (L) 










Approval (B) B1a, B5a (with 
activity), B5b (with 
activity), B6c  (with 
activity), B7b (with 
activity) 
1 4 5 
Loan amount (B) B1b 1 0 1 
Loan term (B) B1b, B6c (with 
activity) 
1 1 2 
Lower rate (B) B1b, B6b, B6c 
(with activity) 
2 1 3 
Information (L) B1c, B5a (with 
activity) 
1 1 2 
Waiver on start-up  (B) B3a, B3b (with 
activity) 
0 2 2 
Lower fees (B) B6b, B6c (with 
activity) 
1 1 2 
Lower requirements (B) B6c (with activity) 0 1 1 
Slight effect (B) B7a 1 0 1 
Totals  8 11 19 
 
The summary of the interviews show that duration, or the length of time that the bank and 
the borrower have known each other, is a consideration in making the SME lending 
decision for banks as it is considered by five out of the seven banks in the study. However 
duration is not considered in isolation, the banks stipulate that the activity in the account 
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(indicated as with activity – WA) is what matters more and this is indicated by 11 out of 
the total 19 responses received regarding the impact of duration on the SME lending 
decision. The activity in the account is more important than duration because as B3a and 
B3b put it, “duration alone does not necessarily tell us about the activity on the account, 
you may have had an account for a longer period than another customer but with less 
activity.” 
 
The results also reveal that there are benefits of duration for both banks and for customers 
and more so benefits customers as only one benefit is indicated for lenders. The most 
common benefit of duration, indicated by five respondents, is that it impacts approval of 
the loan.  Four of these respondents qualify that duration is not considered in isolation in 
fact activity is what matters and this is then looked at together with duration. Of all the 19 
responses received, 18 indicate that duration is important with only one loan manager 
arguing that duration is only slightly important. The benefits for customers in order of 
preference are; lower rates (3 respondents from 2 banks), longer tenure (2 respondents 
from 2 banks), lower fees (2 respondents from 1 bank) and waiver on start-ups (2 
respondents from 1 bank). The only benefit of using duration for banks is information as 
indicated by two respondents from 2 banks. 
 
Duration is one of the measures of relationship lending and as such banks that do not 
practice relationship lending, as seen from the earlier results on lending methods 
employed, would not be expected to indicate an impact of duration on their lending 
decisions. Two banks (B2a and B4a) do not indicate an impact of duration on lending 
decisions which is consistent with the earlier results where B2a state they do not use 
relationship lending and B4a indicates the use of only transaction lending.   
 
4.5.2.2 Scope 
Research sub-issue: How does Scope (breadth of the relationship, that is, number of 
different services or interaction over multiple services between the bank and the 








B1a This is defined by the products the customer uses for instance credit 
cards, debit cards, internet banking, cheque books, loans, salary 
processing and so on. The relationship is deepened by the scope of 
products that you use. The bank has a holistic approach to the business; 
it does not look at the amounts but seeks to understand the business.  
 
B1b The more products you have the more intake or activity…at the end of 
the day it depends with which product that you hold. Mostly the 
products that are more of credit will be an added advantage when it 
comes to borrowing.   
 
B1c When you are making a lending decision, it is not about other services 
the customer is enjoying. It is more about whether he qualifies and if he 
has serviced a similar amount in the past. You see a customer could be 
having very many other products, but those products do not necessarily 
make him to be able to demonstrate … be able to pay.  
 
B2 These do not impact as the bank relies on transaction lending. 
 
B4a Yes, it would probably boost your chances, it’s a plus for you as long 
as you have a number of products and they’re all performing well, then 
it’s definitely a plus for you. 
 
B5a Yep, this one has a better position…a better position even in terms of 
pricing of their facilities, because what we do is that the bank makes 
quite some revenue in terms of non-funded income which comes from 
fees and commissions than from interest income because interest 
income is funded and it has a cost implication to it because probably 
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you’re taking deposits to feed into the need for the lending but non-
funded income is it’s just easy income you’re making much more. 
When am pricing a facility we have pricing tools, one of the major 
components of that pricing tool is non-funded income even if it’s a loan 
we take non-funded income for that year 1 what about year 2, 3,4and 5 
even for a non-customer if I factor in fees and commissions assuming 
this business will move to me am able to move pricing downwards so 
they’re just entrenching themselves. 
 
B5b In terms of approving or not approving they will not have an 
advantage… but in terms of now pricing it will be different. A person 
who is taking more than one product can get a lower interest rate then 
a person who is just taking one product, simply because the bank will 
be earning more from this person who is giving us more products than 
a person who is just giving us one product. 
 
B5c Yeah a product can really come in to confirm… the product no…not 
really the product itself but based on the business that each and every 
one of them has given to us. There is much more in terms of income 
that we would benefit and that actually can also inform a lending 
decision…duration we’d still stick to the same… it is just the price 
component that would be affected. 
 
B6c We look at the wallet… the basket… what have you invested yourself 
with in the bank. So if you are an SME and you are doing all your LCs 
with me, you are doing all your forex with me, all your borrowings with 
me. Your employees’ salaries come to me… I am able to give you 
concessions. 
 
B7a Yeah they might get a cheaper loan… maybe based on the business that 
you are already getting from them. They might be already quite 
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profitable to you. Maybe it is a company that has staff who are banking 
with you. Yeah sometimes there is the commitment or the attachment 
of the client to the bank is really evident so then you are able to make a 
better decision or give them discounts or something like that. They have 
their personal accounts here, they have this other business, this other 
business… so really you are not like scared that this guy will just up 
and go. 
 
B7b In most cases, because a customer can come like yesterday and they 
take all the products the bank can offer, and then today they want 
something like this, I think I will be hesitant... I would say in terms of 
product it is more on a relationship; it’s more of our past experiences 
with this client. 
 
 
The results on how scope impacts lending decisions are summarized in the table below: 
Table 4.13b Summary Scope Effects 
Scope Effect  
Borrower benefit (B) 
Lender benefit (L) 









(B & L) 
B1a 1 0 1 
Borrowing advantage 
(B) 
B1b (with activity 
and type of product), 
B4a (activity) 
0 2 2 
No effect  B1c, B7b 2 0 2 
Lower pricing(B) B5a, B5b, B5c, B7a 4 0 4 
Concessions (B) B6c 1 0 1 




The results reveal that eight respondents, from five out of seven banks in the study, 
indicate that scope does have an impact on the SME lending decision. However in two of 
these banks, two respondents state that scope does not impact the lending decision. 
Additionally, similar to the duration measure, scope is also qualified by some respondents. 
Two respondents from 2 banks, qualify that scope is considered together with the activity 
in the accounts, while one respondent from 1 bank, qualifies that it is not only scope that 
matters but also the type of products, preferring loan products.  
The results also show that there are benefits of scope for the bank and for the borrower; 
however benefits for the borrower are more prevalent as only one out of the total ten 
responses indicates a benefit for the bank. The most common benefit for borrowers is that 
scope leads to lower pricing. This is explained earlier that since scope of products may 
lead to higher earnings for the bank, from the array of products that the customer is already 
enjoying, this determines the bank’s decision to consider lowering the price of loans or 
offering some concessions. Other benefits are borrowing advantage, concessions and a 
deeper relationship (which is seen as an advantage for both borrower and bank due to the 
additional benefits that may be gained due to such a relationship). 
 
4.5.2.3 Concentration of Borrowing 
Research sub-issue: How does Concentration of borrowing (number of bank 
relationships that a borrower maintains) impact lending decisions? 
 




B1a Being multi banked is a negative. Banks that have had clients that are 
multi banked have ended up with non-performing loans (NPLs) because 
these customers can over borrow from the various banks. Being multi 
banked means there is no control of borrowing, when you do not repay, 
the bank sells your assets and this strangles the company and tarnishes 
the relationship with the bank. Businesses will never build a turnover 
in more than one bank.  
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B1b It automatically boils down to your turnovers. You see you can be multi 
banked but the statements at the end of the day and your turnovers are 
the basic thing that the credit approver will look at. You have to check 
case to case, because you see if you look at the multi nationals, we 
already know you are multi banked but it is an advantage to us that you 
are actually here …so why shouldn’t I not take over and later on we can 
have discussions about taking over the facility in the other bank so that 
you combine it as one.  
 
B1c If they are fully banking with you, you can be able to tell what their 
business is and what it is not but you would not do it for a customer 
who doesn’t have a relationship with you, you can’t. Today you cannot 
stop multi-banking because customers are in it for different reasons. 
The first one is there are customers who have businesses in places 
where preferred bankers don’t have branches, so they will have to trade 
by banking there. There are other products that a bank will offer, certain 
banks do not offer, so a customer will ask to open an account with the 
other bank. So with banking, it is sometimes a high risk indicator, but 
it is not a determinant to whether the customer is able to service a debt 
or not. 
 
B3a, B3b We use the term “share of wallet” in banking to imply that for us to 
consider you as seriously banking with us; you need to do a minimum 
of 50% of your banking with us. The bank statements you provide can 
indicate to us what share we have. We can also tell whether you are 
doing this by checking your financials/transactions and establishing 
your turnover and income. 
 
B4a Yes, because if your facility is not performing at another bank even if 
you’re qualifying at here why should I take the risk because I might not 
be sure why you’ve not been performing because maybe you’ve moved 
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banking here, cosmetic banking to cover up ABCD and two or three 
banks are chasing you for collections you’ve not been listed formally 
yet but yeah. 
 
B5a 50% of business needs to come through us. When you get statements 
even from someone who doesn’t bank with us you can tell who is their 
main banking by running statements. 
 
B5b They will not be running the account as per our requirements because 
they will not be banking with us 100%...It is one of the 
recommendations. 
 
B5c If one is multi banked… that is again when relationship management 
comes into play. Part of my conditions to ensure that I on-board you, I 
would ensure that you do 80% of your banking with us. You have to 
move… for us to give you the entire amount.... So that you only have 
one point of repaying your loan…and then we also ensure that we get 
more business from you other than what you have been giving us. 
 
B6a All of them are multi banked, I haven’t found one, not unless you’re 
starting, 10% maybe, very few. It doesn’t factor, the only thing we’ll 
do if we then give you flexibility we’ll want you to move more banking 
to us so we’ll give you a condition for 70% must be with us.  
 
B6b Treatment is same, treatment is same … because you know this may 
vary they are not both maybe having the same income or same cash 
flow. Yes you can have your customer who is faithful to you, who has 
never banked elsewhere and is just banking his salary from 
employment. You can have one person who is multi banked but has a 
cash flow of maybe 200 million a month. So when it comes to how you 
relate to them… these are people in different business of course earning 
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their genuine incomes separately... treatment will be the same. We 
cannot stop these people from banking elsewhere especially in the 
current business world, they are all multi banked, just to get 
solutions.… a better solution all over… that is why you mostly insist 
on the relationship thing…This one customer why is he multi banked? 
What are we not giving him? Can we give this person everything we 
have? Because we have all the solutions, once he enjoys all the 
solutions from us, then of course he will be more comfortable banking 
at one place.  
 
B6c SMEs build loyalty. One, they feel you can meet their needs then that 
loyalty is built and they will still continue to be multi banked but they 
will have you as their main bank. An SME will never, part of it is from 
the experience they have learnt that they have lost tenders just because 
the bank delayed. So they always have another bank that they can look 
at… they have a plan B, C, D and E … and you see each bank has built 
a niche. SMEs would want to try this bank,…this bank,…this bank 
because they say this one is strong in this one, this one isn’t strong in 
this one... So you attract it but then with conditions.  
 
B7a Of course the one who is not multi banked you are more confident, 
however in Kenya most people are multi banked. So for the one who is 
not multi banked they have better bargaining power. However even for 
the one who is multi banked, you giving a better offer can bring them 
over from the other side. So that is also a way to bargain but of course 
you have to be able to establish that from your discussion with the 
client. You have to be able to see that indication from them, their sort 
of commitment or their commitment to us and sometimes in the letter 
of offer, as you are giving the offer you’re making it clear that ok we 
expect that now you will provide a certain percentage of your income… 
you need to give us a bigger share of your banking.   
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B7b I will be hesitant to give someone who is multi-banked by choice, I 
mean you know, these big they don’t have a choice, because they have 
to, because the nature of business, because the size, and because of their 
needs in terms of financial needs, and everything. I will understand 
these. But this other one, I will be quite hesitant. 
 
 
The results on how concentration of banking impacts lending decisions are summarized 
in the table below: 
 
Table 4.14b Summary Concentration of Borrowing 
Concentration 
Effect  
Respondents  No. of 
Respondents   
No. of   
Banks   
Negative B1a, B4a, B5b, 3 3 
No effect B1c, B6b 2 2 
Considered 
with conditions 
B1b (based also on turnovers), B1c, 




There are mixed responses regarding the impact of concentration of borrowing on the 
SME lending decision. There are those respondents that indicated that being multi-banked 
is a negative, that is banks would not lend to such a customer; those that are neutral, that 
treat the multi-banked customer just like any other that is not; and those that consider the 
multi-banked customer but with conditions. The consensus, which is evident from 13 out 
of the 15 responses, is that being multi-banked impacts the SME lending decision. 10 out 
of the 13 responses reveal that the multi-banked borrower is only considered based on 
certain conditions. The most prevalent condition that is cited by all 10 respondents is the 
requirement that a minimum percentage of their banking be rerouted to the bank. In most 
cases this minimum percentage 50% (B3a, B3b &B5a), 70% (B6a) and 80% (B5c) results 
in the bank ending up being their main banker. One of these respondents also cites that 
being multi-banked does not matter as much as the turnovers.  
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Three respondents from three banks consider being multi banked as a negative, citing as 
one of the reasons that banks that have had clients that are multi banked have ended up 
with non-performing loans (NPLs) because these customers can over borrow from the 
various banks and because being multi banked means there is no control of borrowing 
(B1a).  
 
Two respondents from two banks indicate that the treatment would be same between a 
multi banked and a non multi banked customer and therefore being multi banked would 
not factor into the SME lending decision. This least popular category was further 
examined in detail and the results reveal that the respondents, even though from different 
banks, appreciate that in the current business world customers may be multi banked for 
various reasons for instance, having businesses in places where the bank does not have 
branches or because of looking for solutions which may not be offered by all banks. 
 
What is evident from the above results is that banks, because of the need to grow their 
business, do not out rightly refuse to deal with a multi banked customer. They listen to the 
customer, understand their need and agree to lend based on certain requirements. In this 
way banks are able to on board the customer with a view of eventually attracting most of 
their banking to them. B6b rationalize this by looking at it from another perspective; that 
you can have a customer who is faithful to one bank and does banking that are much less 
than a multi banked customer. What emerges from the impact of concentration of banking 
on the SME lending decision is similar to the conclusion for the other two measures of 
relationship lending discussed earlier, duration and scope; that concentration of banking 
is not considered in isolation but other factors such as turnovers, reasons why the customer 
is multi-banked and whether they agree to meet certain conditions come into play.  
 
4.5.3 Role of Relationship in Lending 
Research sub-issue: What is the role of the “relationship” in the SME lending 




In the following discussion, banks were asked to detail the role of relationships in the SME 
lending decision. Literature suggests that relationship lending is the preferred 
methodology when dealing with SMEs due to their opaque nature. Literature also 
highlights that transactions lending is easily detectable than the employment of 
relationship lending, as the information required under transactions lending is easily 
available or appreciable at the time of loan origination which may not be the case for soft 
information. As such this sub-issue was a further probe to determine whether relationships 
exist between bank and customers and if they do what role they play in the lending 
decision. This would further provide evidence or be an indication of the practice of 
relationship lending. 
 





B1a You cannot have SME lending without relationship 
management…existing customer is on a scale 70% more likely to get 
an approval. When you know the client and the business they do, 
decision making is very quick especially if the customer has a positive 
relationship with the bank, in a sense, they “earn marks”. 
Existing clients also enjoy special products for instance cheque 
discounting where a client may have a post-dated cheque and needs 
cash, the bank may pay cash on the strength that this is a client whose 
cheques are usually paid. 
The bank can even bend back and require 50% of the security if the soft 
factors are favourable.  
The bank does not lend to start-ups; the enterprise has to have been in 
operation for six months and one year in registration. However if these 
start-ups do not meet the two requirements but have a seasoned 
businessman as the promoter, then the bank may reconsider their 
decision and lend to such an enterprise. 
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B1b It is actually an added advantage to the bank. How you treat and 
personalize the experience for that one client will speak louder to other 
people than you leaving the client alone… so it plays a very, very 
important role. 
When asking for collateral, an existing client may be required to meet 
50-70%, while a walk in client 110%; however this is done on a one on 
one case basis. 
 
B1c If you look at relationship as being the data of the SME customer, being 
a bank customer, because you cannot have a relationship when you are 
not a customer, then it is very critical…a different reality to lend a new 
to bank customer and a customer. The reason is very simple. For a 
customer you have banked with, there are very many things you can 
determine about their behavioural habits when it comes to financial 
management, even understanding their business…but you would not do 
it for a customer who doesn’t have a relationship with you. 
Relationship between the bank and the client significantly determines 
the likelihood that the customer will be determined to be good or not 
good for a certain amount…there is an end value in critical information 
in terms of determining whether you can lend that may not be got by 
looking at the customers documents. And I have talked about the 
history. If you are servicing your debt you are better off than a guy who 
does nice business but has no loans. So the role of relationship is very 
good, to service debt. 
 
B2a The bank does not engage much in relationship lending, relies on 
transactions lending. 
 
B3a, B3b If the COO (Chief Operating Officer) of an established company that 
banks with us starts his own small outfit and would like a facility, he is 
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likely to get it without say meeting the 3 month account requirement 
because we say “a business is as good as the owner”. 
 
B4a …we can work around something that’s not strictly within the 
guidelines because if you’re a new to bank client we might not do any 
waivers on documentation or anything (but an existing one) yeah, 
they’ve not met a certain criteria fully but based on the history and 
length of time then you can consider them. 
Repeat borrowers also have an advantage compared to new borrowers. 
For an existing person we can do a few concessions even if your 
statements are not that strong but we can see you’ve been with us for 
this period and it’s also easier for the existing guy to explain why this 
statement is like this or why this business is like this. 
B5a Maybe 30% of our applications would be declined; relationship lending 
is key…there are different sections in the application and one of the 
sections is who are the owners and their profile, the management team 
and its profile and then also the business itself and its profile, those, 
other than financials, also play a part in the decision making. 
 
B5b It has a big role to play… one, a person whom we have a very good 
relationship we are able to negotiate…, we are able to discuss; from the 
period of the loan, the pricing and the security requirements. We can 
discuss with a person who has a strong relationship… so we are able to 
give concessionary provisions for a person who we have a relationship 
than a person who we do not have…You might find a customer who 
has a logbook for example, we can seek for exemption approval to 
accept the logbook as security because we already have a very strong 
relationship with the customer… as opposed to someone who just walks 




B5c From a lending point of view… you the relationship manager... you 
know the customer more than the approver and the credit analyst who 
is going to support or decline the case. So the relationship aspect goes 
beyond the documents that are provided by the client, because based on 
the existing relationship that you have with the client there is a character 
element attached to it which also now then informs the decision to lend. 
 
B6a If you’ve been banking with us we already have the benefit of having 
received some revenues from you whether it’s through the fees for 
RTGS (Real Time Gross Settlement) or whatever it is the transaction 
fees, we’re already earning something from you so if you were to even 
ask for a concession, you’re a better candidate for us in terms of giving 
you flexibility because we know you and we’re already receiving a 
return, we have a mutual relationship so to speak with you as opposed 
to a brand new customer…but a brand new customer again it depends 
on who you are and what level of turnovers you’re willing to push to 
us. 
 
B6b There are two basic roles… one and I will repeat…it is value addition. 
The customer enjoying the whole basket of what we offer and two, 
customer retention. 
 
B6c It is very; very critical… because again it is through relationships that 
you are able to dig out … the banks that are being successful with SME 
are the ones that have realised that they have to invest into the process. 
You realize for an SME you are not just the banker. There are many 
times you can be the advisor. So times have changed where people used 
to come to the bank to deposit or to with draw cash… There are other 
channels. So what happened is that the person that goes to the bank is 
the person that wants to discuss a structure. I said business is driven by 
SMEs, so an SME will come in and you discuss all these things that 
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they are doing and they are looking for advice … so relationship 
management becomes critical and it is the only way to go.  
Repeat business always attracts better pricing, even when an analyst is 
making a decision they make a faster decision. Even in terms of what 
they need to provide is less than the person that is coming in new… 
because you already have a history. Your record determines… a longer 
term, even discounts on fees that we charge. In fact for most products, 
there is a discount for repeat business on what you are charged on 
appraisal fee. 
 
B7a I think it does play a major role…in case of a person that you already 
have it is much safer and it’s much easier to make a decision. But 
relationships have to start somewhere, so at some points you will still 
have to take a risk and bring in new guys who you don’t know.  
They can bargain lower rates and everything …so definitely with the 
relationship it is better. 
 
B7c The relationship lending comes in by introducing transactional products 
to help him pay his tax on time, to pay suppliers on time efficiently 
from his desk, cashless solutions, reducing his risk but before if you 
rewind to two years ago where he was just supplying tomatoes to one 
supplier, and all he needed was to pay one supplier and then load one 
truck and have one end buyer, he did not need a relationship. All he 






The table below summarises the role of the relationship in lending. 
 
Table 4.15b Summary Role of Relationships in Lending 
Role of Relationships in 
Lending 




1) Approval Customer B1a, B1c, B5a, 
B5c, B6c, B7a 
5 4 
2) Markets the bank Bank B1b 1 1 
3) Special products Customer B1a 1 1 










B1a, B1b, B5b 


































6) Value addition Customer B6b 1 1 
7) Customer retention Bank/Customer B6b 1 1 
8) Advisor Bank/Customer B6c 1 1 
 
On the role of relationships in SME lending, the general theme is that the banks 
acknowledge that relationships do play a major, if not a critical role especially when 
dealing with SMEs “you cannot have SME lending without relationship management” 
(B1a), “big role” (B5b), “critical role” (B6c), “major role” (B7a). In comparing how 
relationships affect decision making between an existing customer and a new customer, 
the consensus is that it favours existing over new customers. The results reveal that 
relationships lead to benefits for both customers and banks.    
The most popular of these benefits are “waivers” which are cited by eight respondents 
from 4 banks. These waivers are on required documentation, security requirements and 
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start-up requirements, implying that if a relationships exists between a bank and customer, 
the customer may not be required to present some of the requirements as would a new to 
bank customer. This benefit was closely followed by “approval” which had 5 responses 
from four banks, implying that relationships led to faster decision making and most likely 
approval of application. The other benefits for customers resulting from relationships are 
concessions and value addition.  
A specific benefit accruing to the bank is marketing for the bank which was cited by 1 
respondent who claimed that relationships are an added advantage to the bank because 
how you treat and personalize the experience for that one client will speak louder to other 
people.  
The mutual benefits, for both customer and bank are “advisor” and “customer retention”. 
It can be argued that benefits for the customer also lead to benefits for the bank; for 
instance the “approval “ benefit cited by banks for customers may conversely be looked 
at an increase in loan income for the bank, customer numbers and so on. In fact in all cases 
where a customer is enabled to borrow from the bank, this may lead to more business for 
the bank and eventually translate to higher profitability.   
 
4.5.2 Summary 
The summary of the results shows evidence of the use of transaction lending, relationship 
lending and a combination of both lending technologies within the banks in the study. 
Each bank gives instances when they use a method and what emerges is that transaction 
lending can be employed exclusively while relationship lending is employed together with 
transaction lending and is only considered after borrowers meet requirements under 
transaction lending. Interestingly, the one respondent that out rightly states that they do 
not use relationship lending; alludes to the use of this method when they indicate their 
consideration of borrower character and behaviour in their lending decisions. 
 
To confirm and inform on the practice of relationship lending, a further investigation is 
carried to determine banks’ use of the traditional measures of relationship lending found 
in literature. The study reveals that these measures even though considered by banks, are 
not used in isolation but together with other considerations. Duration on its own has no 
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effect and is based on the activity in the account, scope in isolation also has no effect but 
is based on activity and type of products and finally, concentration of banking has an effect 
in the decision making so long as the borrowing customer agrees with the requirements 
percentage of banking of each bank. The results also reveal that the consideration of 
duration results in benefits for both banks and for borrowers and more so benefit 
borrowers as only one benefit is indicated for lenders. The most common benefit of 
duration, indicated by five respondents, is that it favourably impacts approval of the loan. 
Other benefits for borrowers in order of frequency are; lower rates, longer tenure, lower 
fees and waiver on start-ups. The only benefit of using duration for banks is that it adds to 
information. The results on the impact of scope on the SME lending decision reveal that 
similar to the duration measure, the consideration of scope yields benefits for both banks 
and borrowers, however benefits for the borrower are more prevalent as only one out of 
the total ten responses indicates a benefit for the bank. The most common benefit for 
borrowers is that scope leads to lower pricing, while others are borrowing advantage, 
concessions and a deepener relationship (which is seen as an advantage for both borrower 
and bank due to the additional benefits that may be gained due to such a relationship). 
There are mixed responses regarding the impact of concentration of borrowing on the 
SME lending decision. There are those respondents that indicated that being multi-banked 
is a negative, that is banks would not lend to such a customer; those that are neutral, that 
treat the multi-banked customer just like any other that is not; and those that consider the 
multi-banked customer but with conditions. The most prevalent response is that being 
multi-banked impacts the SME lending decision with the multi-banked borrower only 
considered based on certain conditions.  To note also is that what emerges from the inquiry 
on the impact of concentration of banking on the SME lending decision, is similar to the 
conclusion for the other two measures of relationship lending discussed earlier, duration 
and scope; that concentration of borrowing is not considered in isolation but other factors 
such as turnovers, reasons why the customer is multi-banked and whether they agree to 
meet certain conditions come into play.  
 
On the role of relationships in SME lending, the general theme is that the banks 
acknowledge that relationships do play a major, if not a critical role especially when 
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dealing with SMEs.  In comparing how relationships affect decision making between an 
existing customer and a new customer, the consensus is that it favours existing over new 
customers. Further the results reveal that relationships may result in benefits for 
customers, benefits for the bank and mutual benefits. The benefits for customers resulting 
from relationships are; in order of preference, waivers, approvals, concessions, and value 
addition. Benefits accruing to the bank are marketing for the bank, while the mutual 
benefits, for both customer and bank are “advisor” and “customer retention”.  
 
 
4.6 Benefits Generated from Engaging in SME Lending by Commercial 
Banks in Kenya 
 
The potential benefit of SME lending has been documented in several recent studies. As 
commercial banks have been involved in SME lending for some time, a sector which was 
previously ignored or avoided due to its high risk, this was an attempt to understand 
whether banks are reaping actual benefits. 
 




B1a  The bank grows its SME book and grows deposits when these 
enterprises bank their sales through the bank…the more you have, 
the more the cheaper deposits because these are not large amounts 
that are deposited by any one SME customer such that they cannot 
demand a higher deposit rate. 
 Interest income from the loans…transactional income from for 
instance, RTGS, cheque book processing, TT. 
 Successional business growth – growing to corporate with them still 
means we get their retail income. 
 SMEs have income tentacles; we capture their employees in retail 
business without marketing for it. 
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 SMEs assist the bank to serve the country in every sector. When 
you are the key bank with SMEs you will get 80% of the businesses. 
It enables the bank penetrate to all sectors of the economy e.g. 
technology, media, manufacturing; whereas banking big corporates 
limits the bank’s penetration to only a few sectors e.g. agriculture 
and pharmaceuticals. SMEs are everywhere. 
 
B1b  Referrals for instance if a customer is in the transport business he 
can have 5 other referrals who deal in different aspects of transport 
for instance, logistics. You can get Sh.30M from 1 person in a year.  
 There are also the workers, staff accounts from this one customer. 
 SMEs market for you as the brand sells itself  
 
B1c  There are direct benefits and indirect benefits, the drive to go for 
SMEs is derived from the perceived risk levels currently and the 
opportunity there is for the bank. The opportunity for the bank 
always is to be able to intermediate profitably. Today, banks have 
already determined that there are some customers who don’t have 
collateral and can borrow and service their facilities promptly. 
Never mind some will not pay. Some will pay and will pay 
profitably to the extent that if you are lending an unsecured facility 
because the risk is high, you price higher.  
 There are other benefits of course that banks have from SMEs. 
SMEs are known to be net borrowers…the minute that you have a 
salary coming in but the loan is more than the salary, then you are 
a net borrower. SMEs have a tendency to keep borrowing. Now, 
corporates are the opposite. Very little customers are the opposite. 
Now SMEs, from their activity of borrowing, they benefit from 
what we call gearing, you have a market that is not saturated, so you 
can trade more, you can gear up your profits. It is because from that 
trade activity, the bank generates more revenue from SMEs; 
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because there are other services they come for which we charge 
them and which they cannot come for when they are not trading 
actively or more actively.  
 So there are very many benefits but very generally see it from the 
perspective of income and their being lucrative, to be the main 
reason why banks are very interested in SMEs.  
 
B2a  Interest income…non-funded income which is any income not 
generated from borrowing which includes commissions from other 
services offered e.g. bid/performance bonds as these enterprises 
supply government, transactional income from normal operations 
of account-withdrawals, cash handling fees (small but many 
transactions), commitment fees on loans. To note is that in 
comparison the larger firms have negotiated for a lot of concessions 
as they have bigger bargaining power and may not pay some fees. 
 Referrals to other SMEs who are suppliers or clients of the SME 
client, essentially SMEs can generate a pipeline 
 Generate products out of the relationship with SMEs as they are a 
source of ideas. One may develop a product and test it with a 
particular client and if it does work may roll it out as a product for 
all SMEs. 
 They are a source of foreign exchange for those that deal in foreign 
currency…this is an untapped market that is huge/big and has 
potential for growth.  
 It is a market that is not sensitive to pricing as their deposits are not 
huge and therefore do not have bargaining power but they do need 
loans, in essence this market needs the bank.  
 
B3a, B3b  It enables the bank to serve a full spectrum, all biggies have side 
businesses; it is a fulfillment game…penetration strategy- the SME 
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may offer leads to a big corporate though this may also work the 
other way, i.e. big corporate to SME. 
 Finance SMEs to meet needs of distribution…SMEs are a lever as 
they interdependent on so many other existing and potential 
clients…at the end of the day enables us make profit. 
 
B4a  Benefit returns more in SME sector because big corporate bargain 
for concessions can push on rates.  
 For them it’s more I need the money, they take loans more seriously 
than the bigger corporates (scared of implications) unlike a 
corporate who will know the bank will take 90 days before they 
send an auctioneer. 
 You might be able to get a higher return on SMEs.   
 New upcoming guys, winning tenders they don’t have capital, take 
smaller loans, pay, take. 
 
B5a  Revenues – lending, we are revamping SME strategy- e-channels, 
we have not reaped yet. 
 
B5b   The value is the incomes we get from the customers. 
 The reputation. When you deal with these SMEs, the communities 
decide that you really care about them… so your reputation will 
also be…the brand name is stronger than someone who is not 
dealing with the SMEs. 
 The government also appreciates the financial institutions that 
support SMEs, since you are contributing to the economic growth 
of the country of the nation. So you find that the government will 
also invite you for conferences, meetings to discuss SMEs lending 
on the strength that you are in that particular market. There is also 
the issue of… sometimes government disburses funds targeted to 
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the SMEs. So they would channel those funds through banks that 
they know are dealing with the SMEs and that is a source of cheap 
deposits for the bank... when the government disperses money 
through your bank. 
 Yes also the commissions and the ledger fees… everything is about 
profitability.  
 
B5c  There is a profitability component assigned. 
 
B6a  It affects profitability for sure but remember you only are profitable 
to the extent your customers are profitable, so the two of you are 
linked so if am lending to unsuccessful businesses it will also come 
back and affect me in provisioning and my cost of actually making 
sure that your loan is performing because it means your loan will 
not be performing because you don’t know how to operate your 
business, you’re not growing so to speak so you’re not increasing 
your revenue generation so it’s all interlinked and that’s why we say 
we want to capacitate them so that then our work is easier in terms 
of monitoring we know you’ll do your thing because you know how 
to do it. 
 
B6b  A lot ranging from transactional accounts, of course those are the 
normal account you have…your current account, your savings 
account we have fixed deposits, we have call deposits. 
 Apart from the loans we also have workshops. We do workshops a 
lot of workshops for the SMEs…we also do trips for our customers 
to expose them to external markets…what we are getting from our 
customers is the relationship…you see that is our key focus in 
relationships because you see banking is changing and now we are 
focusing more on other items apart from just getting income from 
the customer… the rest of course will just come in handy because 
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you see if you have that relationship with a business, tomorrow the 
business person will ask you… I have this shortfall in cash…are 
you able to come in? You know when you relate with your 
customers you tend to keep them longer in your bank as opposed to 
when the relationship is just transactional. 
 If you are in business there is competition. The more you relate to 
this customer the more you are better placed to understand the 
current needs… so that of course even to your end as a bank we 
become even more innovative. By becoming more innovative that 
will give you a competitive advantage to serve them more… and of 
course now if you have a competitive advantage, let me say it… 
there is income to it. 
 
B6c  SMES are very simple, they want things done fast… an SME will 
rarely sit down to negotiate with the bank. The corporate are very… 
the business up there at the corporate level is very 
competitive…have bargaining power. So even in-terms of margin 
that you can get are very slim but an SME…they all want…want 
working capital... give me working capital I move on, move my 
business… so there is a lot of money that a bank can make from the 
SMEs.  
 They do a lot of trading so even in terms of what we call non-funded 
income…all these other things like LCs (letters of credit) when you 
are importing things and trading FX (foreign exchange). Sometimes 
you need to change dollars to Kenyan shillings… the bank makes 
some money there on the exchange. That is where SMEs are 
operating… because they are trading. So it’s a huge opportunity and 
unfortunately not many banks have taken time to understand SMEs. 
Because an SME... you just have to understand them based on their 
activity. So it is an investment that is worthwhile even for the bank 
to take it. 
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 It is the most profitable sector for the bank…in short what I am 
saying is that SME is the engine of the economy. So even as a bank 
if you ignore that sector you are setting yourself up for failure. 
There are the people that drive the profitability that you see here. 
 
B7a  To answer … I mean …like how many corporates are there vis-a-
vis how many of them can you get vis-a-vis SMEs. Competition for 
them may not be as high as for corporate. Corporates are fewer but 
probably more strict in terms of where they also want to bank or if 
you are a multi-national maybe you have regulations you can only 
bank with this kind of bank… so then for a bank like us we may not 
be able to have as many corporate maybe as other banks. But SMEs 
is a playing field out there which is open… open market. 
 Another thing is also profit margins…margins in terms of what you 
can make out of the business…for corporate like I said they have 
large bargaining power, they give you huge deposits…billions, 
billions and they say lend us at this rate or we will go…and you 
know there is so much competition. They go with the deposits you 
are left without and you need the deposits to lend. The interest 
margins for corporate are much, much slimmer than SMEs. SMEs 
of course have the best margins because of demand. 
 Then of course in Kenya, SMEs are the ones who drive the 
economy. They employ many people and everything that is where 
the money is circulating. They are the ones that need to grow so 
they need to borrow so that is where there is a lot of business…focus 
for the bank. And even people who borrow as retail…retail 
borrowers…still borrow as SMEs. You know the way Kenyans 
are…you are employed and you still have a business. They also 
have employees so we are still able to grow on our retail avenues 
and they are always growing so there is so much more that you can 
do for them.  
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B7b  SMES are profitable, they are a good market, if they are handled 
well they can give you maximum returns. The bank wants to 
maximize profit essentially. 
 This segment doesn’t care how much you charge, they don’t care as 
long as you give them the money. SME don’t care about the pricing. 
So we can be able to get more, I mean more returns to the facility 
to which we have given to them.  
 In terms of utilization, in most cases you realize that we give things 
like ODs (overdrafts). An OD is essentially an overdraft, and SMEs 
are usually constrained in terms of cash flows as compared to big 
corporates. If I come to a big corporate and I give them an overdraft 
of 1billion, they might never use that for the whole year. They never    
utilise compared to an SME who I give sh.10million they are always 
at sh9.999million. They are close, yes, always utilizing that. So I 
think that it is a benefit as well.  
 They are easy to convince and they are a bit, they trust easily. In 
most cases they are easy to tell, for example the KBRR rates 
increased their rates the other day. We had difficulty to convince 
the big corporates that we are pricing this at 11% we want to 
increase the rate at least to match with the market. 
 
B7c  An SME is a driver to the economy; an SME will always look for 
opportunities on where they can service the end user either directly 
or indirectly. They are more flexible, they have more risk appetite. 
Now what’s then happening in the banking sector, the banking 
sector is becoming extremely competitive which means that banks 
are then having to accommodate SMEs and having to come up with 
products where SMEs can be able to benefit.  
 An SME wants to know, I need money, when can I get it? 
Interestingly not even concerned about how much does it cost me, 
it’s where can I get it … where and when?  
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Table 4.16b Summary: Benefits of SME lending to commercial banks  





1) Banking the economy     B1a, B7a, B7c 2 2 9 
2) Growth in the SME bank 
book 
B1a, B2a, B6b 3 3 6 
3) Cheap deposits  B1a, B2a, B7a 3 3 7 
4) Higher interest B1a, B1c, B2a, B4a, B5b, 
B6c, B7a, B7b, B7c 
8 6 1 
5) Not yet reaped any B5a 1 1  
6) Reputation building and 
a stronger brand 
B1b, B5b, B6a 3 3 5 
7) Government recognition 
and support 
B5b 1 1 14 
8) Non-funded income B1a, B1c, B2a, B5b, B6b, 
B6c 
4 4 4 
9) Successional business 
growth 
B1a 1 1 13 
10)  Income tentacles B1a, B1b, B2a, B3a, B3b, 
B6c, B7a 
7 5 3 
11)  Innovation of 
products/competitive 
advantage 
B2a, B6b, B7c   3 3 8 
12) Source of foreign 
exchange 
B2a, B6c 2 2 10 
13) Relationship  B6b 1 1 12 
14) Less competition B7a 1 1 11 
15) Profitability B1c, B3a, B3b, B5c, B6a, 
B6c, B7a, B7b 




4.6.1 Benefits of SME Lending 
There is agreement that there is value in lending to SMEs and the value is articulated as 
below: 
1) Banking the economy 
B1a states that banking SMEs implies banking almost all businesses in the economy as 
SMEs form 80% of the businesses. B7a agrees and explains that SMEs allow banks to 
penetrate all sectors of the economy, an aspect that is not present when banks concentrate 
only on the big corporates. SME banking enables the bank meet its target in terms of what 
they refer in a soft way as corporate social responsibility, as this is one of the sectors that 
the bank strategically tries to support (B6c). B7a concludes that as SMEs are driving the 
economy, that is where money is circulating. 
2) Growth in the SME bank book 
As the SME market is huge and untapped it has potential for growth (B2a) concurring 
with B1a’s assertion that there is value in banking SMEs as they grow the bank’s SME 
book.B6b adds that being relational helps retain customers as opposed to being just a 
transactional. 
3) Cheap deposits 
SMEs are a source of cheap deposits to the banks as compared to deposits placed by large 
corporates. This is because the amount deposited by any one SME customer is not that 
large compared to corporate deposits and as such SMEs are not able to negotiate for high 
deposit rates (B1a, B2a &B7a).Banks are therefore able to save on SME deposits. 
4) Higher interest 
B1c highlights that the higher the risk as is the case with SMEs the higher the return and 
as such banks that bank SMEs have an opportunity to price higher. B4a finds that as SMEs 
need the money, they take loans more seriously than the bigger corporates (scared of 
implications) unlike a corporate who will know the bank will take 90 days before they 
send an auctioneer. The lack of bargaining power by SMEs due to the small amounts of 
deposits placed means that SMEs are also unable to negotiate for lower rates on lending 
and as B6c puts it, SMEs are very simple and all they want is to get a loan and fast, are 
easy to convince (B7b) and will rarely sit down to negotiate with a bank that does 
accommodates them (B7c). B2a agrees when they emphasize that the SME market is not 
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sensitive to pricing as their deposits are not huge and therefore do not have bargaining 
power but they do need loans. Corporate are able to negotiate for lower lending rates (B4a) 
and concessions (B2a) due to the huge deposits they place at banks and to some extent 
banks’ hands are tied because competition for the big corporates is so high. The interest 
margins for corporates are much, much slimmer than SMEs and as such banking SMEs 
allows banks to enjoy higher interest margins as SMEs of course have the best margins 
because of demand (B7a).As such interest income is a prevalent benefit for banks that 
lend to SMEs (B1a, B2a, B4a, B5b, B6c,B7a, B7b&B7c). 
5) Reputation building and a stronger brand 
According to B5b, banks can also build a reputation and a stronger brand through dealing 
with SMEs. B6a agrees and explains that capacitating SMEs to grow translates to easier 
monitoring of these enterprises which translates to lower risk and costs, and eventually 
more revenue for the bank. B1b summarizes that SMEs market for the banks, as the brand 
sells itself. 
6) Government recognition and support 
Banks that support SMEs also get government recognition and support as these banks are 
contributing to the economic growth of the country, of the nation (B5b). B5b gives the 
example of such recognition and support by government; invitation to conferences and 
meetings to discuss SMEs lending. Further, the government may also choose to disburse 
funds targeted to the SMEs through these banks resulting again in cheap deposits for the 
bank and additionally, earnings on commissions and ledger fees. 
7) Non-funded income 
Bank lending to SMEs also results in additional income that arises from transactions 
(transactional income) for instance, RTGS (Real Time Gross Settlement), cheque book 
processing, TT (Telegraphic Transfer) amongst others, which banks refer to as non-funded 
income (B1a, B1c). B2a explains that non-funded income is any income not generated 
from  lending which includes commissions from other services offered and adds examples 
of these; bid /performance bonds, transactional income from normal operations of 
account-withdrawals and cash handling fees (small but many transactions).These also 
include commissions and ledger fees (B5b). As SMEs do a lot of trading, banks are able 
to make some money through collection of non-funded income (B6c). Trading may also 
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see these SMEs deal in foreign currency and thus are a source of foreign exchange for the 
bank (B2a, B6c). B2a adds that this is an untapped market that is huge/big and has 
potential for growth. 
8) Successional business growth 
B1a adds that banks also benefit through successional business growth, growing with 
SMEs to corporate implies that banks continue to enjoy their retail income. 
9) Income tentacles 
According to B1a, SMEs have income tentacles, which B2a agrees to and refers to as a 
“pipeline" and B3a, B3b call a “penetration strategy”. Apart from non-funded income, 
SMEs open up avenues to additional sources of income for the bank. These income 
tentacles include; banking SME employees without necessarily incurring costs marketing 
for it (B1a, B1b& B7a). Whereas banking big corporates limits the bank’s penetration to 
only a few sectors e.g. agriculture and pharmaceuticals, SME banking enables banks 
penetrate to all sectors of the economy e.g. technology, media and manufacturing. This 
occurs through referrals, for instance if a customer is in the transport business he can have 
5 other referrals who deal in different aspects of transport for instance, logistics (B1b) and 
referrals to other SMEs who are suppliers or clients of the SME client (B2a). B3a, B3b 
further state that SMEs may offer leads to a big corporate, just like a big corporate may 
offer leads to a SME and conclude that it is important to finance SMEs to meet needs of 
distribution as SMEs are a lever, because they are interdependent on so many other 
existing and potential clients. B6c agrees and adds that since the environment we operate 
in is based on value chains, and most SMEs will probably be the primary mover in their 
independent value chain, a bank that ignores this sector is setting itself up for failure (B6c). 
10) Innovation of products/competitive advantage 
B2a and B7c add that another benefit of banking SMEs is that they are a source of ideas 
and out of the relationship, drive bank innovation of products which B6b agrees and adds 
that this may lead to the bank having a competitive advantage. Further, B2a states that 
when such a product is rolled out, it can be tested with the same SMEs before rolling it 
out for all SMEs. Related to product innovation, B6b mentions that one source of value 
they are getting from their customers is the relationship as they recognise that this leads 
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to fulfilment of a customer need in future which may lead to an innovation and ultimately 
give the bank a competitive advantage to serve them more.  
11) Source of foreign exchange 
B2a indicates that SMEs are a source of foreign exchange for those that deal in foreign 
currency…this is an untapped market that is huge/big and has potential for growth. A 
similar benefit is stated by B6c that SMEs do a lot of trading, importing things and trading 
FX (foreign exchange) and the bank makes some money there on the exchange which is 
a huge opportunity and unfortunately not many banks have taken time to understand 
SMEs. 
12) Relationship 
B6b states that they get a relationship form their customers because such a focus ensures 
continued business with these customers…you see that is our key focus in relationships 
because you see banking is changing and now we are focusing more on other items apart 
from just getting income from the customer… the rest of course will just come in handy 
… you know when you relate with your customers you tend to keep them longer in your 
bank as opposed to when the relationship is just transactional. 
13) Less competition 
According to B7a, another benefit from banking SMEs is that competition for them may 
not be as high as for corporates. Corporates are fewer and may have restrictions as to 
where they can bank for instance in the case of multinationals.B7a refers to the SME 
market as an open playing field.   
14) Profitability 
Respondents were found shy to state that the end result of banking SMEs is the profits 
they make. Those that out rightly state it include B1c that states that with SMEs there is 
an opportunity for the bank to be able to intermediate profitably, while B3a, B3b refer to 
SMEs as levers that enable them make profits. The only value B5c indicates is 
profitability. B6c states that it is the most profitable sector for the bank which is echoed 
by B7a and B7b.  However, B6a qualified that it is important to remember that banks are 





The data collected on SME lending benefits yields about fourteen benefits that banks 
enjoy due to lending to SMEs. Respondents from each of the seven banks in the study 
indicated one or more benefits they enjoy from lending to SMEs. Interestingly, one 
respondent, B5a, indicates that their bank has not yet started reaping the benefits of SME 
lending which is in disagreement with other respondents from the same bank who detail 
benefits they are already enjoying. The most prevalent is higher interest which is indicated 
by 8 respondents from 6 banks and this benefit is closely followed in popularity by 
profitability indicated by 8 respondents from 5 banks. It can be argued that higher interest 
may lead to higher profits and as such these two benefits may be related. The least popular 
benefits, as these were indicated by only one respondent in each case, are; government 
recognition and support, successional business growth, relationship and less competition. 
Again some, if not most, of the benefits may be interlinked. For instance, the relationship 
may lead to product innovation which may in turn lead to government recognition that 
results in growth of the SME book, higher returns and increased profitability for the bank. 
This implies that there are indirect and direct benefits with the ultimate benefit being 
increased profitability as would be the case for any for profit organization. The conclusion 
is that there are actual benefits being enjoyed by banks that engage in SME lending which 










This chapter provides a discussion of the findings of the study that are presented in chapter 
four. The findings are discussed in accordance with the research objectives that this study 
intended to achieve and within the context of the literature reviewed.  
 
The broad result of this work is that both relationship lending and transaction lending 
matter because they allow the loan manager to evaluate both the ability and the willingness 
to repay the loan. The ability to pay is checked by hard information and the willingness to 
pay by soft information. Hard information as determined by this study and as suggested 
in previous literature is easily identifiable, whereas soft information is importantly 
collected by the bank and is critical in the determination of the character of the borrower. 
Once these two factors about the borrower are established by the commercial bank, they 
are combined to come up with a transactional product that suits the client’s needs. As a 
result, relationship lending is not used in isolation but always together with transaction 
lending and hence the suggestion that the lending methodology that employs some 
relationship aspects be referred to as relational transaction lending.  
 
The study also establishes the actual benefits being enjoyed by banks engaged in SME 
lending and that these benefits are interlinked and directly or indirectly translate to value 
for the bank in terms of increased profitability. The immediate and direct benefit of SME 
lending is that it adds to the SME book. Lending to an additional SME may then indirectly 
lead to three benefits; interest income perhaps from higher priced loans due to the higher 
risk, cheap deposits (due to lack of bargaining power by SMEs since deposit amounts are 
small relative to corporate deposits) and non- funded income arising from transactions. 
The three benefits may translate to greater profitability for the bank. Alternatively, 
growing the SME book by adding an SME customer may indirectly result in several 
income tentacles; for instance; referral to a firm (both SME or big corporate) in the SMEs 
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value chain or referral to other SMEs or banking of the SME employees. These income 
tentacles may market the reputation or brand of the bank or form part of the corporate 
social responsibility strategy for the bank. However, the converse may also occur such 
that the reputation, brand and CSR activities of the bank result in the income tentacles. As 
a result, the income tentacles also lead to interest income, cheap deposits and non- funded 
income arising from transactions which may translate to greater profitability for the bank. 
The indirect benefit of income tentacles may imply that a bank gets to support more SMEs 
and banks that support SMEs may get government recognition and support as these banks 
are contributing to the economic growth of the country. Also, the reputation or brand and 
CSR activities of the bank may lead to such recognition by the government. An example 
of such recognition and support by government is invitation to conferences and meetings 
to discuss SMEs lending. Banks may benefit if the government chooses to disburse funds 
targeted to the SMEs through them, resulting again in cheap deposits for the bank and 
non-funded income which translates to greater profitability. 
 
The rest of the chapter is organised as follows: section 5.2 discusses the background of 
the respondents while section 5.3 discusses the SME lending process. Sections 5.4 to 5.6 
discuss the results in accordance with the three research questions; borrower knowledge 
acquisition, processing and transfer; lending technologies employed and, the value 
generated from engaging in SME lending by commercial banks in Kenya. Finally section 
5.7 provides a summary of the chapter. The outcomes of the findings are the development 
of models representing the SME lending process, how banks make decisions on SME 
lending technologies to be employed and finally, a flow diagram representing the actual 
sources of value for banks engaged in SME lending. 
 
 
5.2 Respondents’ Background 
 
This section discusses the respondents’ background by detailing their designations, the  
duration they have been working with the SME customer, and their responsibilities. This  
information was collected to determine their suitability as participants for this study. 
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Most of the respondents interviewed have a designation that specifically assigns them the 
SME or work in or closely with the department within the bank that deals with SMEs. 
Additionally, most of the respondents have been dealing with SMEs for over six years, 
indicating significant experience in dealing with the SME customer and further 
confirming their suitability as participants for this study. The most prevalent designation 
is Relationship Manager-SME. 
 
The data collected on the responsibilities of the respondents resulted in five key areas; 
operations/management, business development, relationship management, profitability 
and, product/service development, with the consensus being that the SME manager’s role 
mainly involves business development.  
 
 
5.3 The SME Lending Process 
 
This section discusses the SME lending process because it is the process within which two 
of the research objectives occur; specifically the objective of borrower knowledge 
acquisition, transfer and use; and the SME lending methodologies employed by 
commercial banks. 
 
5.3.1 Source of Customer 
The SME lending process begins with the sourcing of the potential borrower customer. 
The study revealed that the sources of potential borrowing customers in order of frequency 
are; walk-in (71% of banks), referrals from existing customers (57%), marketing 
campaigns (57%), cold calling (49%) and poaching (14%). However, it can be argued that 
the least popular source, poaching, which involves attracting a competitor’s customer, can 
be as a result of any one of the other three sources that is the referrals, marketing 
campaigns or cold calling. Banks were also found to employ more than one customer 





Figure 5.1 Customer Acquisition Strategies 
 
 
Source: Researcher’s own 
 
The customer acquisition strategies revealed from the investigation concur with those 
established by Beck et al. (2008) and IFC (2007). Beck et al. (2008) use data from a survey 
of 91 banks in 45 countries to characterize bank financing to SMEs around the world and 
find that banks in developing countries focus on attracting SMEs that are clients/suppliers 
of existing clients or rely on existing deposit clients. The IFC (2007) “Benchmarking 
Banks” report ranks client acquisition channels in the following order; direct visits by bank 
sales staff to SMEs’ premises to present the bank’s offering to prospective clients, referrals 
from existing customers and, mass communication techniques such as direct mail and 
telemarketing to reach new clients. The current study agrees with prior studies that the 
acquisition strategies of marketing of product offerings by bank staff and referrals by 
existing customers play an important role in client acquisition. On the other hand, contrary 
to IFC (2010) that finds that SMEs are less likely to be actively seeking bank products and 
services because many SMEs lack basic knowledge of how they can benefit from banks, 
















(2010) study also emphasizes that this is especially true for developing countries which 
again is contrary to the findings as Kenya is a developing country.  
 
5.3.2 Initial Discussion and Business Visits 
After sourcing for customers, the banks indicated that they have an initial discussion with 
the potential borrowing customer to establish the need. The initial discussion is usually 
followed by a visit to the customer’s business premises by the SME bank manager. One 
bank indicated that they do not always carry out a visit as it depends on the amount 
borrowed, nature of business and how comfortable the bank is. These business visits 
enable the bank not only to confirm that a business does actually exist and to confirm the 
need, but also allow the bank to collect more information that would not be evident during 
the customer call or visit to the bank. The initial discussion and subsequent business visits 
which banks in the study invest in so as to establish a “need” concur with Freixas (2005) 
who emphasizes that the bank makes the necessary investment to obtain borrower-specific 
(often proprietary) information. Additionally, banks in the study invest in acquiring 
information at the onset of a relationship which concurs with IFC’s (2010) suggestion of 
the importance of acquiring borrower specific information at the point of loan origination 
as a way of borrower screening to manage credit risk. Two banks in the study added that 
the visits are undertaken more than once and could be on an ad hoc basis indicating that 
banks not only initially screen customers, but also subsequently monitor them. This is in 
agreement with Boot (2000) and Freixas (2005) who argue that banks need to invest in 
acquiring information and processing of the same, as well as subsequent monitoring of 
firm activities. This also concurs with Diamond (1984) and, Rajan and Winton (1995) 
who affirm that banks obtain borrower specific information when they provide monitoring 
services.  
 
The determination of the “need” appears very important for banks (71% of banks) as this 
is a subject of the initial discussion held with the customer and also a reason for the 





Figure 5.2 Initial Discussion and Business Visits 
 
 
Source: Researcher’s own 
 
The figure above illustrates that the initial discussion and business visits are activities 
primarily held to establish the customer need which the bank may be able to fill. This 
determination of need assists the bank in structuring the appropriate solution/product for 
the customer which concurs with IFC (2010) that banks are starting to understand the 
particular needs and preferences of SMEs and are developing tailored approaches to 
overcome the historical challenges of high credit risk and cost to serve. Business visits are 
also carried out to confirm that a business really exists and also cross check information 
collected during the initial discussion with the customer. 
 
5.3.3 Bank Requirements 
During the process of sourcing for the SME customer and, the initial discussion and 
business visits, the RM/RO also considers whether the potential credit customer meets 
certain bank requirements for lending. The investigation found out that the most prevalent 
bank requirement as cited by 86% of the banks, is the provision of bank statements, 
whether from bank customers or non-customers which concurs with Beck et al. (2008) 
who find that 49% of banks in developing countries included in their study, consider the 
financial assessment of a business as the important factor in SME lending. In addition to 
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Customer (KYC) documents such as PIN (Personal Identification Number) and ID 
(Identity Document). This concurs with Elyasiani and Goldberg (2004) who find that 
borrowers go through a structured application process which requires borrowers to 
provide specific financial information and security in order to qualify for the loans. Further 
and in agreement with the current study, Beck et al. (2008) find that in developing 
countries, 87% and 93% of the banks require collateral to make business loans to small-
sized enterprises and medium sized enterprises respectively.  
 
The results also reveal differences in requirements not only between but also within banks. 
What emerges is that banks do not have standard similar requirements for SMEs and as 
such, SMEs must be aware that different banks have different requirements. Further and 
more intriguing is that respondents in the same bank cited different requirements, 
indicating either flexible requirement criteria which may depend on the customer involved 
or the SME manager. For instance, one respondent stated that they always make business 
visits while another respondent from the same bank indicated it is not always the case. 
What is worth noting here is that the two respondents occupied different hierarchical 
levels which may suggest that the strategy implemented depends on the loan manager 
involved. Other examples of enquiries that yielded contrasting results were on business 
duration. This refers to whether banks lend to start-ups and if not, how long a business 
needs to have been in existence to be considered for financing by a bank. There were 
differences between banks in that regard but even more interesting within banks. The bank 
requirements are represented in table 5.1. 
 
Table 5.1 Bank Requirements 
 














The table above shows that the highest rated requirement for lending consideration is the 
provision of bank statements. The results also reveal that banks may require a customer 
to meet more than one requirement. 
 
5.3.4 Loan Approval Process 
After having gone through the first and second steps and consideration of the bank 
requirements, the RM/RO puts together a package of documents that goes through the 
loan approval chain. This concurs with Elyasiani and Goldberg (2004) who find that 
borrowers go through a structured application process in order to qualify for the loans. 
Most banks indicate that this process starts with the Relationship Manager and depending 
on the bank structure, goes through the following steps; Branch Manager, Regional 
Branch Manager, Analyst, Head of Credit/SME/Retail or Centralized Decision, Credit 
Committee, Approval Levels and Board Committee. Even though the results yielded about 
eight distinct steps in the loan approval process, it should be noted that some of the steps, 
although termed differently, might refer to the same step in another bank, the difference 
perhaps being due to bank organization structures. Finally, a decision is made on whether 
to approve, approve with conditions or decline an application. The loan approval process 




Figure 5.3 Loan Approval Process 
 
Source: Researcher’s own 
 
The loan approval process is also an iterative process as approvers may return the 
application to a lower level for clarification or to the analyst, for rework. After the package 
of documents goes through to the highest level, depending on the loan amount applied for, 
a decision is made on whether to approve, approve with conditions or decline an 
Board Committee
(B1a, B1b, B2a)- 29%
Approval Levels
(B1a, B1b, B1c, B5b, B6c)- 43%
Credit Committee
(B1a, B2a, B7a, B7b)- 43%
Head of Credit/SME/Retail/Centralized 
Decison/Head Office
(B1b, B2a, B3a, b3b, B6a, B7a)- 71%
Analyst
(B1b, B5a, B5c, B6a, B6c)- 43%  
Regional Branch Manager 
(B7a)- 14%
Branch Manager 
(B1a, B1b, B7a)- 29%
Relationship Manager 
(B1a, B1b, B5a, B5b, B6b, B6c, B7a, 
B7b)- 57%
The package of documents generally follows a 
down to top process but may be returned to a 
lower level for clarification at any level. 
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application. The most prevalent approving authorities in order from the first step are; the 
relationship manager (57%), analyst (43%), head of credit (71%), credit committee (43%) 
and approval levels (43%). The least prevalent steps are the branch manager (29%), 
regional branch manager (14%) and the board committee (29%). The few banks that 
indicated that the approval chain involves the branch manager and the regional branch 
manager (having a representation of 29% and 14% respectively) also indicated that the 
application first originates from the relationship manager. Finally, of the two banks that 
indicated the use of a board committee, one bank followed 88% of the steps in the process 
detailed above and the other bank 25% of the steps in the figure above. The results indicate 
that banks do not necessarily go through all the steps in the approval chain represented 
above because first, the approval levels an application will go through depends on the 
amount borrowed and secondly, some of the steps although termed differently, might refer 




All banks in the study were found to have a structured loan application and approval 
process that begins from sourcing for the customer to submission of a package of 
documents through an approval process. The information from the results enabled the 
researcher model a process flow chart for SME lending within the Kenyan banking 
industry which is represented in figure 5.4 and is further summarised in figure 5.5. 
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Figure 5.4 The SME Lending Process 
Customer Acquisition Strategies
 



































Figure 5.5 Summary SME Lending Process 
 
 
Source: Researcher’s own 
 
The figure above summarizes the SME lending process as discussed in the previous pages, 
from the sourcing of the customer through to the approval of the loan. The study concludes 
that banks go through each of the five steps above but may differ in the method of 
execution of each stage. For instance, some banks indicated that they require a customer 
to complete a credit application form while another bank indicated that they only require 
a letter from the customer. Interestingly, respondents in the same bank also showed 
differences in requirement indicating either flexibility to make a decision or that the 
decision was dependent on the bank staff involved. For instance, one respondent from the 
same bank indicated that bank visits are a necessity while another indicated that visits are 
not always carried out. 
 
Step 1








• Approval Process (elaborated in Figure 5.4)
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The SME lending process is an iterative process as approvers may return the application 
to the relationship manager for additional information who in turn may need to go back to 
the customer to get the information to fill in the gaps (as shown in figure 5.5); similarly, 
approvers may return the application to a lower level of approval for clarification or to the 
analyst, for rework.  
 
 
5.4 Borrower Knowledge Acquisition and Transfer   
 
This section discusses the findings in relation to the research objective aimed at 
determining how soft information is collected from borrowers, how it is processed, and 
the bank structure within which it is transferred for use in making the SME lending 
decision. Further, there is a brief discussion on how soft information collected is stored 
and the social ties between loan managers and the local community. 
 
5.4.1 Borrower Knowledge Acquisition 
The study revealed that the RM/RO is not only the primary collector of hard information 
about the borrower as indicated in section 5.3.3, but also of soft information which concurs 
with Berger and Udell (2002; 2006) and to some extent with a more recent study by 
Hattori, Shintani, and Uchida (2015). Berger and Udell (2002) model the inner workings 
of relationship lending and suggest that loan officers, who have the most frequent and 
personal contact with borrowers and their stakeholders, obtain soft as well as hard 
information about the borrowers. Hattori, et al. (2015) conduct a survey on heterogeneous 
banks in Japan and find that loan officers (those who are at the bottom of the bank’s 
hierarchy) collect at least some soft information and at smaller banks, branch managers 
may have direct contact with the borrowers and collect soft information although less 
frequently. 
 
As the interest of the enquiry was on collection of soft information, the results revealed 
that soft information may be externally generated or internally generated. 86% of the 
banks in the study (the exception being the one bank that indicated they did not employ 
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relationship lending) indicated that they generate soft information internally or that which 
is primarily generated by the RO/RM. 71% of the studied banks indicated that they collect 
soft information generated by parties external to the bank or non-bank staff. This indicates 
that banks do invest in obtaining borrower specific information which is in agreement with 
Freixas (2005) who argues that banks which are interested in such firms need to first invest 
in acquiring information and processing of the same, as well as subsequent monitoring of 
firm activities.  
 
The most frequent source of internally generated soft information is the business visits 
made by the RM/RO which was cited by 71% of the banks. During the business visits, 
information is collected through observation, discussion with employees of target 
business, discussion with the person operating the neighbouring business and other people 
if the business is in a small town. These sources of soft information correspond with those 
suggested by Berger and Udell (2002; 2006) and Schwarze (2006) that additional 
borrower information may be gathered through communications with SME’s suppliers, 
customers, or neighbouring businesses who may give specific information about the firm 
and owner or general information about the business environment in which they operate. 
The earlier discussion on customer acquisition strategies also suggests the use of soft 
information when loan managers use referrals in customer acquisition. The use of referrals 
imply that the loan manager uses the assessment (soft information) of the existing 
customer as a lead to new customers which further implies that loan manager must have 
a level of trust (soft information about the existing customer) in the existing customer. 
 
What also emerges from the current study is that since 86% of the banks in the study 
indicated that they collect and use soft information, this may indicate the use of 
relationship lending because in line with Berger and Udell (2006); relationship lenders 
collect information beyond that which is available on the firm’s financial statements and 
that which is readily available to the public. Further support that banks in the study employ 
relationship lending is confirmed from the suggestions of Elyasiani and Goldberg (2004) 
and Schwarze (2006) that relationship lending is based significantly on soft qualitative 
data gathered over the course of a relationship with the borrower.  
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The sources of soft information are represented in the figure 5.6 below which highlights 
the most prevalent sources of soft information.   
 
Figure 5.6 Sources of Soft Information 
 
Source: Researcher’s own 
 
5.4.2 Soft Information Processing and Transfer  
The current study finds that soft information is first processed by way of verifying (71% 
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process. The top three strategies for processing soft information are; visit by a shadow and 
other bank staff, cross check with formal information and consultation with other bank 
staff. A closer look at the respondents listed under each strategy revealed that a bank may 
employ multiple strategies to verify soft information suggesting that the information being 
collected may not be easily observed or verified by others which concur with Berger and 
Udell (2006) that soft information may not be easily observed or verified by others. 
 
The process of verification also acts as a first step in the transmission or transfer of soft 
information. Interestingly, most of the verification strategies include the involvement of 
another bank staff, who is not the primary collector of the soft information, to ensure that 
the information eventually used is objective and valid. This also indicates that banks not 
only prefer to generate their own soft information but also prefer to rely on their own 
internal mechanisms to process or verify the soft information collected. This implies that 
soft information remains proprietary to the bank that collects it but more importantly, is 
not proprietary to the loan officer who collects or first comes into contact with it. This 
contradicts Boot (2000) and Freixas (2005) who suggest that soft information may often 
be proprietary to the loan officer and may not be easily transmitted to others within the 
financial institution.  
 
The analysis reveals that soft information is also transferred through documents such as 
the call report or questionnaire that captures information collected during the business 
visit(s). This is consistent with the evidence from Japan by Nemoto, Ogura, and Watanabe 
(2011) that shows that any information collected by employees in the branch is filed in a 
loan proposal, which even includes a record of casual conversation with borrowers. The 
call report or questionnaire is part of the package of documents that goes through the loan 
approval chain and as such, the transfer of soft information also occurs within the loan 
application process which agrees with the findings of Paravisini and Schoar (2012), when 
they find that sharing of soft information can occur during the decision making process 
by credit committees that consist of multiple bank employees including loan officer who 
collects the information, the branch manager (the loan officer's immediate superior),and 
one or two additional credit specialists. 
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5.4.3 Soft Information Storage 
Contrary to the conventional view that loan officers are the sole repository of soft 
information (Berger & Udell, 2002; 2006; Scott, 2006), the current study found that the 
repository of soft information is the common system in the bank, and soft information is 
accessible to all authorized staff. Information from the application form and the call report 
is recorded in this system and as such any soft information captured is also stored in this 
system. This coincided with the findings of Nemoto, Ogura, and Watanabe (2011) for 
banks in Japan that the loan proposal which captures all, even casual conversations with 
borrowers, is circulated so that all staff in a branch have access to it. The findings of the 
study agree with Hattori et al. (2015) up to the point that the loan officer may not be the 
repository of soft information but differ when they find that at least for smaller banks, it 
is the branch managers (who are likely to be decision makers) who are the most important 
repository of soft information. In an indirect way, Scott’s (2006) findings in the U.S., 
greater loan officer turnover has a more adverse effect on the availability of credit. This 
suggests that the loan officer is the repository of soft information which contradicts the 
results of this study. A summary of the process of soft information processing, transfer 
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Figure 5.7 shows that soft information is first processed by way of verifying it after which 
it is then transmitted through the decision making channels of the loan application process. 
As the process of verification also involves exchange of information, it acts as a first step 
in the transfer of soft information. Once information is verified and subsequently 
transmitted through the loan decision making process, it is then stored in a common 
system in the bank. This storage of information also acts as a further transfer mechanism 
because any authorized bank staff can access this information.   
 
5.4.4 Link between the Local Loan Manager and Local Community 
Most respondents indicated that all SME managers at a bank branch are equipped to 
handle any SME issue or query and as a result, there is no link between the local loan 
manager and the local community. There was an exception on two respondents from the 
same bank who indicated that there is a link between the local loan manager and local 
community in the case where loan managers are assigned to customers in their proximity 
and required to deal with their “local community”. The study’s analysed results disagree 
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with Berger and Udell (2002; 2006) who argue that the loan officer is only able to collect 
relevant information about the firm, its owner and business conditions in local markets 
from other local firms and individuals because they typically live in the local community. 
 
5.4.5 Summary 
In summary, soft information is generated externally or internally with banks preferring 
to generate this information internally, or primarily through their own SME bank 
managers. The soft information is more frequently collected during the business visits 
made by the RM/RO to the clients’ premises suggesting that the RM/RO is the primary 
collector of soft information.  
 
As regards soft information transfer, information is first processed by way of verifying it 
and then transferred through the channels of the loan application process. The verification 
strategies suggest that banks not only prefer to generate their own soft information but 
also prefer to rely on their own internal mechanisms to process or verify the soft 
information collected. To note is that the verification strategies employed also become a 
first step in the process of transmitting or transferring soft information. In most banks, soft 
information is not proprietary to the loan manager who comes into contact with the 
customer, but is made available to other relevant decision makers when this soft 
information is shared for decision making. Even though the primary collector of soft 
information is the RM/RO that comes into contact with the customer, there is agreement 
among all banks that the soft information collected and processed is stored in a common 
system that is accessible by all authorized bank staff.  
 
Finally, 43% of the banks indicated that all SME managers at a bank branch are equipped 
to handle any SME issue or query and as a result, there is necessarily no link between the 
local loan manager and the local community. 29% of the banks gave exceptions in the 





5.5 Role of Transaction Lending (TL) and Relationship Lending (RL) in  
SME Lending 
 
This section presents a discussion on how commercial banks make a decision on which 
lending methodology or technology to use when dealing with the SME customer and 
especially whether relationship lending, the preferred technology found in literature, is 
employed. 
 
5.5.1 Lending Methodologies Employed 
The summary of the results show evidence of the use of transaction lending, relationship 
lending and a combination of both lending technologies in financing SMEs within banks 
in the study. This adds to the findings of Uchida et al. (2006) who, using data from a 
unique survey in Japan, find that multiple lending technologies are usually employed at 
the same time. Also, De la Torre et al. (2010) in bank surveys for a total of 48 banks (plus 
one leasing company) in 12 countries establishes that apart from relationship lending, 
banks are increasingly applying different transactional technologies. Other studies that 
present similar results are Columba, Gambacorta, and Mistrulli (2010) and Bartoli et al. 
(2012) who find that group lending Mutual Guarantee Institutions (MGIs), through peer 
monitoring and joint responsibility, help banks to mitigate SMEs’ asymmetric information 
problems. Finally and more recently, Bartoli et al. (2013) investigate SME financing in 
Italy and find that banks lend to SMEs by using both transaction and relationship lending, 
independent of the size and proximity of borrowers. The results of the study support the 
earlier views of Berger and Udell (2006) and Uchida et al. (2006) that lending technologies 
can be complementary. 
 
The most common lending technology employed by banks in the current study is the 
exclusive use of transaction lending while the least common technology is the exclusive 
use of relationship lending. This agrees with Uchida et al. (2006) who find that financial 
statement lending, a transaction technology, is most commonly used and contradicts 
traditional literature such as in Berger and Udell (2002) who focus on relationship lending 
as the prime lending methodology for SMEs. 
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The transaction lending technologies cited by respondents in this study include; asset 
financing, invoice discounting, LCs, loans and overdrafts, which confirm Berger and 
Udell’s (2002; 2006) classification of these methods of financing as transaction lending 
technologies. Additionally, some banks in the study stated they use both hard and soft 
factors suggesting the use of both transaction and relationship lending. Examples of soft 
factors cited are; character of the directors, business knowledge of the owner, whether the 
client chases for tenders, how many tenders they have won, whether he or she is passionate 
about the business, behaviour, and account transactions. These examples concur with 
Berger and Udell’s (2002; 2006) examples of soft information which confirms that banks 
in the study do use qualitative “soft” data about the borrower and further suggesting the 
use of relationship lending. Further evidence that suggests the use of relationship lending 
is the use of referrals in customer acquisition. The use of referrals indicates that loan 
managers use soft information in two ways; by trusting the current customer who provides 
the names of potential new customers and by the use of referrals which imply the use of 
soft information provided by the existing customer to acquire new customers. As a 
consequence, apart from the soft factors cited by respondents in the study, there is 
evidence of the use of soft information which implies the use of relationship lending, 
corresponding with Schwarze’s (2006) proposal that the more qualitative information is 
used in credit decision making, the more one can speak of the granting of credit under 
relationship aspects 
.  
All banks in the study that indicated the use of relationship lending also indicated the use 
of the transaction lending methodology. Further, when these banks gave examples of when 
they employ each methodology, it was evident that when they employ relationship 
lending, it is usually together with transaction lending and relationship lending is only 
considered after meeting requirements under transaction lending. This adds to the findings 
of Uchida et al. (2006) that financial statement lending and relationship lending are often 
used in tandem. The findings also confirm Berger and Udell’s (2006) proposal that lending 
technologies are not necessarily mutually exclusive and De la Torre et al.’s (2010) 
findings that banks can apply both relationship lending as well as different transactional 
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technologies. It can therefore be concluded that banks can either employ transaction 
lending exclusively or a combination of both transaction and relationship lending.  
 
As regards lending technologies employed in SME lending, this study makes two 
conclusions; first it concurs with Berger and Udell (2006) and Uchida et al. (2006) that 
lending technologies are complementary and not necessarily mutually exclusive. 
Secondly, contrary to amongst others, Berger and Udell (2006), Bhattacharaya and Thakor 
(1993), Elsas (2005), Memmel, Schmieder, and Stein (2008), Ongena and Smith (2000) 
and Petersen and Rajan (1994) who define relationship lending as a distinct lending 
technology; this study finds that relationship lending is not used as a distinct methodology 
or exclusively but always together with transaction lending. The findings from the current 
study show that the consideration of soft qualitative data in lending is only after borrowers 
provide hard quantitative information as required by the banks. Therefore banks are seen 
to consider employing “relationship lending” only when a borrower has met requirements 
under transaction lending. This study therefore proposes the use of the term “relational 
transaction lending” to refer to the transaction lending method that considers qualitative 
soft information in decision making.  
 
5.5.2 Measures of Relationship Lending 
5.5.2.1 Duration 
The study reveals that duration, or the length of time that the bank has provided loan, 
deposit, or other services to the firm, is a consideration in making the SME lending 
decision for banks as it is considered by 71% of banks in the study. Interestingly, the study 
reveals that in 80% of these banks, duration is always considered together with activity; 
represented by turnover and profitability. The banks explain that the activity in the account 
matters more or is more important than duration because the tenure or duration alone does 
not necessarily show the activity on the account as a bank may have better information 
about an account with a shorter duration than one with a longer duration. This alludes to 
the definition of relationship lending by Boot (2000) who suggest that relationship lending 
centers around two critical dimensions; proprietary information customer and multiple 
interactions. Activity implies multiple transactions which may give better information 
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about the borrower than simply looking at duration. In other words activity reduces 
information asymmetry between banks and customers.  
 
The results of the current study concur with those of Elsas (2005). Using a sample of 
small- and medium-sized corporate borrowers of five major German universal banks Elsas 
finds that the duration of the bank-borrower relationship is not related to Hausbank status 
but as a bank’s share of payment transactions increases, it is more likely to be a Hausbank. 
Overall, the current study differs with Petersen and Rajan (1994, 1995), Berger and Udell 
(1995), and Ongena and Smith (2000), who posit that duration is the most widely used 
measure of relationships. 
 
The results also reveal that the consideration of duration, together with the activity in the 
account, results in benefits for both banks and for customers and more so benefits 
customers as only one benefit is indicated for lenders. The most common benefit of 
duration is that it impacts approval of the loan, which confirms Degryse and Van Cayseele 
(2000) preposition that the positive relationship between duration and information flow 
should improve the bank’s willingness to provide funds and thus availability of finance to 
the borrower. Further, the current study’s findings also coincide with those of Boot (2000) 
and, Berger and Udell (2002) that duration positively affects the availability of credit. 
 
The other benefits for customers in order of preference are; lower rates, longer tenure, 
lower fees and waiver on start-ups. This result agrees with Berger and Udell (1995) who 
examine the role of relationship lending in small firm finance and find that borrowers with 
longer banking relationships pay lower interest rates. Boot (2000) also found that duration 
results in a fall in interest rates over the life of the relationship. However, the study’s 
results differ from those of Degryse and Van Cayseele (2000) who, in a study of Belgian 
enterprises, find that borrowing rates increase as the bank-firm relationship lengthens. 
 
The current study finds that the benefit of using duration for banks is that it provides 
information; which agrees with Berger and Udell (1995) who support the proposition that 
bank-borrower relationships provide important information about borrower quality. 
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Additionally, in later studies, Berger and Udell (2002) and; Degryse and Van Cayseele 
(2000) posit that theoretically, there is a positive relationship between duration and 
information flow which should improve the bank’s willingness to provide funds and thus 
availability of finance to the borrower. 
 
What emerges in this subsection is that duration is a consideration in SME lending so long 
as it is considered together with the activity in the account.   
 
5.5.2.2 Scope 
The results reveal that respondents from seventy percent of the banks indicate that scope 
or the number of different services or interaction over multiple services between the bank 
and the customer is a consideration in making the SME lending decision. This is consistent 
with Fredriksson and Moro (2014) that banks try to make money by also diversifying their 
product offering. Additionally, similar to the duration measure, scope is also qualified by 
some respondents who indicate that it is not considered in isolation but together with the 
activity in the account and type of products the customer enjoys, with a preference for 
loan products.  
 
The consideration of scope results in benefits for both the bank and the borrower. In this 
case, benefits for the borrower are more prevalent. The most common benefit for 
borrowers is lower pricing. The reason behind this is that since scope of products may 
lead to higher earnings for the bank from the array of products that the customer is already 
enjoying, the bank considers lowering the price of loans or offering some concessions. 
This result concurs with evidence provided by Degryse and Van Cayseele (2000) who, in 
a study of the impact of relationship banking on Belgian enterprises, found that borrowing 
rates decrease when the scope of the bank-firm relationship increases. Other benefits cited 
for borrowers are; borrowing advantage (cited also by the one bank that indicated the sole 
use of transaction lending which may imply minimal use of relationship lending), 
concessions and a deeper relationship (which is seen as an advantage for both borrower 
and bank due to the additional benefits that may be gained from such a relationship). These 
results provide specific benefits of considering scope in the lending decision and add to 
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those of Cole (1998) who found that scope of a relationship as proxied by the purchase of 
multiple information-sensitive products (such as checking accounts) from a bank, 
increased the probability of getting loans from that bank. This is also consistent with 
Degryse and Van Cayseele (2000) and Santikian (2009) who report that information 
gathered from the interaction over multiple services between the bank and the customer 
may have an effect on the credit terms with the borrower.  
 
In this subsection, what emerges is that even though a larger scope may be a sign of more 
entrenchment, commitment and attachment by a customer to a bank; positive activity is a 
consideration. Following that argument, if activity and performance of the account is what 
is more important; then a strong lending relationship is possible even without additional 
financial services. This concurs with Wood’s (1975) position that a lending relationship 
may develop independently of a deposit relationship. 
 
5.5.2.3 Concentration of Borrowing 
With the exception of one bank that indicated that concentration of banking had no impact 
as the bank relies on transaction lending, there was consensus that being multi-banked 
impacts the SME lending decision. The impact could be threefold: negative (banks would 
not lend to such a customer); neutral (banks indifferent between a multi banked and non 
multi banked customer) and positive (banks consider the multi-banked customer but with 
conditions). The results also reveal that similar to the conclusion for the other two 
measures of relationship lending; duration and scope, concentration of borrowing is not 
considered in isolation but together with other factors such as turnovers (again alluding to 
the activity in the account), reasons why the customer is multi-banked and whether they 
agree to meet certain conditions. Again this implies that concentration of borrowing is 
useful in reducing information asymmetry problems associated with SMEs concurring 
with Cole, Goldberg, and White (2004) that prior loan relationships give banks additional 
information about the applicant. 
 
The most prevalent impact is the positive impact, where banks consider the multi-banked 
borrower based on the agreement to meet certain conditions. Further, the most frequent 
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condition is the requirement that the borrower maintains a minimum percentage of 
banking. The minimum percentages differ for banks as evidenced by the three possible 
percentages determined in the current study as; 50%, 70% and 80% and with the bank 
having such proximity to the customer, the aim is to eventually end up being the main 
banker which concurs with Elsas (2005) that having one exclusive relationship promotes 
closer ties between bank and borrower. Further, the study revealed that bank concentration 
is a way of accessing additional information, as well as monitoring the borrower 
performance and being able to spot any emerging issue as soon as possible. This concurs 
with Foglia, Laviola, and Reedtz (1998) who, in a study of an Italian bank find that the 
larger the number of bank relationships, the higher the riskiness of the borrowers because 
monitoring of the borrower tends to be weaker. The results also concur with the proposal 
of Diamond (1984) that a single bank relationship is optimal because it avoids duplication 
of screening and monitoring effort. Interestingly, most respondents indicated that because 
of the need to grow their business, they do not out rightly refuse to deal with a multi 
banked customer. This suggests that even though banks may not want to deal with a multi 
banked customer because of the increased information asymmetry, they generally do end 
up dealing with such a customer because they realise that SMEs will in most cases be 
multi banked. Commercial banks have realised that this characterizes the SME market that 
even if you are their main banker, SMEs will be multi banked. Banks look at it from the 
point of view of the customer and understand that SMEs are multi banked to avoid being 
let down by one bank when they most need funds, the SMEs make sure they have options. 
Some respondents also rationalized this by looking at it from another perspective; that you 
can have a customer who is faithful to one bank and does banking that is much less than 
a multi banked customer.   
 
The second most prevalent category is the negative impact, where banks would not lend 
to a multi banked customer and which agrees to the findings of Cole (1998) that in the 
US, a lender is less likely to grant credit to a firm if the firm deals with other financial 
counterparts. One respondent justifies that their reluctance to lend to a multi banked 
customer is based on the fact that there is no control of borrowing and emphasizes that a 
bank needs all the information to be able to assess the need which again concurs with 
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Diamond (1984) that a single bank relationship is optimal because it avoids duplication of 
screening and monitoring efforts. In agreement with the results of the current study and 
Diamond’s (1984) preposition, Foglia et al. (1998) reason that multiple bank relationships 
increase the riskiness of the borrowers as borrower monitoring tends to weaken. However, 
regarding a multi banked customer as a “negative” contradicts the results of a study by 
Dahiyab, Saunders, & Srinivasan (2003) that shows the existence of a prior relationship 
is important since banks favour firms with pre-existing banking relationships at the time 
of loan renewal and approval because it provides more information about the applicant for 
the bank. Similarly; Cole, Goldberg, and White (2004) in agreement with Dahiyab et al. 
(2003) add that a prior loan relationship gives the bank additional information about the 
applicant and small banks rely more heavily on it as it provides insights into the character 
of a borrower. 
 
The least popular category, neutral, implies that banks are indifferent about being multi 
banked and not being multi banked. This was examined in more detail. The results 
revealed that banks appreciate that in the current business world, customers may be multi 
banked for various reasons such as, having businesses in places where the bank does not 
have branches, and looking for solutions which may not be offered by all banks. This 
concurs with Iturralde et al.’s (2010) suggestion that the number of relationships may be 
influenced by the characteristics of companies and the social and economic environment 
of a particular country because the characteristics of a company determines the “need” for 
which the bank provides a solution. Also, the social and economic environment 
determines investment of these banks in particular parts of the country.  
 
5.5.3 Role of Relationship in Lending 
On the role of relationships in SME lending, the general theme is that the banks 
acknowledge that relationships do play a major, if not a critical role especially when 
dealing with SMEs. “you cannot have SME lending without relationship management” 
(B1a), “big role” (B5b), “critical role” (B6c), “major role” (B7a). This concurs with 
García-Appendini (2007) who in a survey of small business finances (SSBF) for U.S. 
firms showed that hard public information may not be used in loan underwriting when 
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banks have a strong relationship with the borrower, and that soft information, if available, 
is the driving determinant in loan underwriting. 
 
In comparing how relationships affect decision making between an existing customer and 
a new customer, the consensus was that it favours existing over new customers and that 
relationships may result in benefits for customers, benefits for the bank and also mutual 
benefits. The benefits for customers resulting from relationships are; in order of 
preference, waivers (on documentation, security requirements and start-up requirements), 
approvals (including faster decision making), concessions, and value addition. This is in 
agreement with Bharath et al. (2003) who determine that the existence of a prior 
relationship is important and banks favour firms with pre-existing banking relationships 
not only at the time of loan renewal but also for approval as is determined by Sohn and 
Choi (2004) and Chakravarty and Yilmazer, (2008). More specifically, the respondents 
indicate that relationships inform the decision and as such improve the chances of 
approval concurring with Puri, Rocholl, and Steffen (2010) that prior relationships allow 
the bank to produce information that goes beyond publicly available information and 
allows it to better assess loan applicants’ creditworthiness. This also concurs with 
Elyasiani and Goldberg (2004) that continuous contact between borrower and lender can 
produce valuable information which the lender can use in making decisions on whether to 
extend credit or not, how to price loans, whether to require collateral and whether to attach 
other conditions to the loan. 
The specific role of relationships for banks was “marketing for the bank”; which was cited 
by one respondent who claimed that relationships are an added advantage to the bank 
because the way they treat and personalize the experience for that one client will portray 
a better image to other people. The mutual benefits for both customer and bank are 
“advisor” and “customer retention”. It can be argued that benefits for the customer also 
lead to benefits for the bank; for instance the “approval “ benefit cited by banks for 
customers may conversely be looked at an increase in loan income for the bank, and 
growth of the loan book amongst other benefits. In fact, all cases where a customer 
qualifies for borrowing, may lead to future business with the same customer, translating 
to more business for the bank and eventually higher profitability. This conforms with the 
187 
 
suggestion by Bharath et al. (2005) that relationships may result in a greater probability 
of providing future loans compared to a lender lacking such a relationship. 
 
The results of the study also revealed that relationships do lead to some concessions and 
especially so for existing clients of the bank as these are the ones most likely to have a 
relationship with the bank. Only one bank gave an indication of when a new customer 
may also be considered for concessions. The banks further indicated that these 
concessions were considered on a case by case basis and were qualified, that is, were 
dependent on soft factors and performance. This result is similar to the results of how 
duration, scope and concentration of borrowing are considered, not in isolation but 
together with the activity in the account which further emphasizes that what is important 
in relationships is the activity in the account.  
 
Examples of concessions cited as having been enjoyed by existing clients were; lower 
rates, longer term and fee discountsconcurring with Elyasiani and Goldberg (2004) and in 
agreement with Bharath et al. (2003) that continuous contact between borrower and lender 
can produce valuable information which the lender can use in making decisions on how 
to price loans. Generally, most  banks  were  in  agreement  that  for  an  existing  customer,  
things  would  move  faster  and requirements may not be as stringent . This is consistent 
with Hodgman (1961) who posited that a customer’s deposit relationship with the bank 
influences the availability and cost of credit to that customer and leads to more favourable 
loan conditions for a customer than a non-customer. 
 
5.5.4 Summary 
On the lending technology employed by commercial banks in SME lending, this study 
makes two conclusions. Firstly, that lending technologies are complementary and not 
necessarily mutually exclusive. Secondly, in agreement with the first conclusion, and 
more importantly contrary to amongst others, Berger and Udell (2006), Bhattacharaya & 
Thakor (1993), Elsas (2005), Memmel, Schmieder, and Stein (2008), Ongena and Smith 
(2000) and, Petersen and Rajan (1994) who define relationship lending as a distinct 
lending technology; this study finds that relationship lending is not used as a distinct 
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methodology or exclusively but always together with transaction lending. Even though 
some banks in the study indicated that they do employ relationship lending, it was found 
that these same banks also used transaction lending and as a result, no bank showed 
evidence of the exclusive use of relationship lending. Further, the consideration of soft 
qualitative data in lending (which is used in relationship lending) was only after borrowers 
provided hard quantitative information (which is used in transaction lending) as required 
by the banks. Therefore, banks are seen to consider employing relationship lending only 
when a borrower has met requirements under transaction lending. This implies that 
relationship lending has to be considered as a contributor to transaction lending and not 
as an alternative.  In other words, relationship lending is only synergistic with transaction 
lending and not orthogonal nor antithetical to transaction lending. As such, the resulting 
method should not be referred to as relationship lending but instead, this study proposes 
the use of the term “relational transaction lending” to refer to the transaction lending 
method that considers qualitative soft information in decision making.   
 
On the measures of relationship lending, the study establishes that banks do not apply 
duration, scope and concentration of borrowing as is suggested in literature, but apply 
these measures together with other considerations. Duration on its own has no effect and 
is based on the activity in the account. Scope, in isolation also has no effect but is based 
on performance and finally, concentration of borrowing has an effect and is considered 
together with the percentage banking requirements for each bank. This leads to the 
conclusion that what actually matters most is the activity in the account and the 
performance of the account and not duration and scope of products. Activity in the account 
can also give information about the behaviour or character of the borrower and provides 
much more information for decision making than duration, scope or concentration of 
borrowing. Duration on the other hand can be likened to the minimum term that banks 
require borrowers to have had an account to be considered for borrowing, hence it may be 
argued that it does not provide soft information for use in relationship lending but is 
actually hard information that can be used when employing transactional lending. 
Furthermore, when banks require financial statements from potential borrowers, they are 
interested in determining the activity. These financial statements are an example of “hard” 
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information and as such can be considered when banks employ transaction lending. As 
such, it can also be argued that the determination of activity is the use of hard information 
and hence the application of transaction lending.  
 
This study therefore concludes that the way the measures of duration and scope are 
considered in the current study may not only imply that they are measures of relationship 
lending or the evidence of the use of soft information, but also of hard information. This 
is because in reality, what is under consideration is the activity, turnovers or performance 
which represent hard information used in transaction lending, further endorsing our earlier 
suggestion that relationship lending cannot be used exclusively. 
 
After consideration of the above findings, a model of how commercial banks make a 
decision on SME lending method to employ is developed and provided in figure 5.8 on 
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Combining the results on borrower knowledge and lending methodologies employed leads 
to the suggestion that two major factors are considered by commercial banks when lending 
to SMEs; the ability to pay and the willingness to pay. The ability to pay is proxied by 
hard information and the willingness to pay by soft information. Hard information as 
determined by this study and as suggested in previous literature is easily identifiable, 
whereas soft information is importantly collected by the bank and is critical in the 
determination of the character of the borrower. Once these two factors about the borrower 
are established by the commercial bank, they are combined to come up with a transactional 
product that suits the client’s needs. As a result, relationship lending is not used in isolation 
but always together with transaction lending and hence the suggestion that the lending 
methodology that employs some relationship aspects be referred to as relational 
transaction lending.  
 
 
5.6 Benefits of Engaging in SME Lending by Commercial Banks in Kenya 
This section provides detailed information on the actual benefits that the commercial 
banks in the study indicated as arising from engaging in SME lending which adds to 
literature. A vast prior literature has either tended to focus on borrower benefits or only 
provided potential benefits (see amongst others Bharath et al., 2005; Berger & Udell, 
1995; Calice et al., 2012; Cole, 1998; De la Torre et al., 2010; Elsas & Krahnen, 1998; 
Harhoff & Körting 1998; Petersen & Rajan, 1994, 1995). Table 5.2 below shows the 
benefits and rankings based on the responses. 
 
Table 5.2 Benefits to Banks of SME Lending 
Benefits Rank 
1) Banking the economy     9 
2) Growth in the SME bank book 6 
3) Cheap Deposits  7 
4) Higher interest 1 
5) Reputation building and a stronger brand 5 
6) Government recognition and support 14 
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7) Non-funded income 4 
8) Successional business growth 13 
9)  Income tentacles 3 
10)  Innovation of products/competitive advantage 8 
11)  Source of foreign exchange 10 
12)  Relationship  12 
13)  Less competition 11 
14)  Profitability 2 
 
The enquiry on the benefits of SME lending to commercial banks resulted in fourteen 
benefits that banks enjoy due to lending to SMEs. Respondents from each of the seven 
banks in the study indicated one or more benefits they enjoy from lending to SMEs. One 
respondent indicated that their bank has not yet started reaping the benefits of SME 
lending which is in contrast with other respondents from the same bank who detail benefits 
they are already enjoying. The most prevalent benefit is higher interest which is closely 
followed by profitability and the least popular benefits are; government recognition and 
support, relationship, successional business growth and less competition. Some, if not 
most of the benefits may be interlinked. For instance, it can be argued that higher interest 
may lead to higher profits; hence these two benefits may be related. Another example is 
that the relationship between borrower and bank may result in product innovation which 
may in turn lead to government recognition of the bank’s support of SMEs. Eventually, 
this may lead to growth of the SME book, higher returns and increased profitability for 
the bank. As the aim of this study was to determine the benefits that commercial banks in 
SME lending enjoy, the benefits established, in order of frequency were; higher interest, 
profitability, income tentacles, reputation building and a stronger brand, non-funded 
income, growth in the SME bank book, cheap deposits, innovation of 
products/competitive advantage, banking the economy, source of foreign exchange, 
relationship, less competition, successional business growth and government recognition 
and support. Each of these benefits is discussed below.   
 
Interest earned from SME lending was the most prevalent benefit for lenders and was cited  
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by 86% of the banks in the study. As one bank highlights the higher the risk, as is the case 
with SMEs, the higher the return. In that case, banks that bank SMEs have an opportunity 
to price loans higher which concurs with the findings of Holod and Peek (2013). The lack 
of bargaining power by SMEs due to the small amounts of deposits placed means that 
SMEs are also unable to negotiate for lower rates on lending and as one bank states, SMEs 
are very simple and all they want is to get a loan fast, they are easy to convince and will 
rarely sit down to negotiate with a bank that accommodates them. The banks explain that 
corporates are able to negotiate for lower lending rates and other concessions due to the 
huge deposits they place at banks and to some extent; banks’ hands are tied because of 
intense competition for the big corporates. The interest margins for corporates are much, 
much slimmer than for SMEs. Thus, banking SMEs allows banks to enjoy higher interest 
margins. As one bank puts it, SMEs have the best margins. Several studies in literature 
have argued against the high interest margins enjoyed by banks from SME lending, for 
instance, Garriga (2006) who states that a bank may end up having a monopoly of 
information over other lenders and thus be able to extract more interest income from 
borrowers. Others studies that concur with Garriga (2006) include Lehmann and 
Neuberger (2001) and, Hernandez-Cánovas and Martinez-Solano (2006) who also find 
evidence of higher cost of credit. Holod and Peek (2013) differ and explain that this higher 
cost of credit, though higher than is justified by the level of credit risk perceived by an 
informed lender, is lower than the interest rate that would be charged by other potential 
lenders to the firm, due to the higher risk premium required to compensate them for the 
added risk associated with being less informed about the firm. 
 
Another benefit indicated by 29% of the banks is that SME lending leads to banking the 
economy. Banking SMEs implies banking almost all businesses in the economy because 
SMEs form 80% of all businesses in the economy, allowing the bank the opportunity to 
penetrate all sectors of the economy. Whereas banking big corporates limits the bank’s 
penetration to only a few sectors, for instance, agriculture and pharmaceuticals, SME 
banking enables banks penetrate to all sectors of the economy such as technology, media 
and manufacturing as most SMEs will probably be the primary mover in their independent 
value chains. Hence, the SME market is huge and untapped and as a result, competition 
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for SMES may not be as high as for corporates, which means it has potential for growth. 
For one bank, banking the SME sector is strategic and supporting this sector meets their 
target in terms of what they refer to, in a soft way, as corporate social responsibility. This 
confirms the findings of Calice et al. (2012) who in their study to establish the extent of 
bank lending to SMEs in Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania and Zambia, find that banks perceive 
the SME segment as large, unsaturated, with good prospects and strategically important.  
 
Banks also benefit from cheap deposits from SMEs. As indicated by 43% of the banks, 
this is because SMEs do not have bargaining power as do the large corporates that make 
huge deposits. These deposits enable banks to lend which results in interest income for 
the bank and therefore, having cheap deposits implies that the bank is able to save on 
returns to depositors which may result in greater profitability. This benefit concurs with 
Holod and Peek (2013) who suggest that banks may profit from relatively inexpensive 
core deposits placed by their relationship borrowers. Additionally, this confirms De la 
Torre et al.’s (2010) perception from a bank survey of 48 banks (plus one leasing 
company) in 12 countries that the SME segment is more profitable than corporate banking 
because of near zero spreads on corporate lending. 
 
Respondents from 57% of the banks indicated that bank lending to SMEs also results in 
additional non-funded income which is any income not generated from lending. This 
includes; transactional income from normal operations of account-withdrawals and cash 
handling fees (small but many transactions), commissions, ledger fees, RTGS (Real Time 
Gross Settlement) transfer charges, cheque book processing and TT (Telegraphic 
Transfer). 29% of the banks also indicated that some SMEs may also be engaged in foreign 
trade and may need foreign exchange. As SMEs do a lot of trading, banks are able to make 
some money through collection of non-funded income, confirming the supposition of 
Calice et al. (2012) and De la Torre et al. (2010) that the perceived profitability of working 
with SMEs not only derives from lending products, but also from the potential for cross-
selling other products. Further, this findings concur with Fredriksson and Moro (2014) 
who find that bank profitability is not only dependent on interest margins but also on 
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charges from additional services that SMEs enjoy from banks, for instance, from cash 
management, risk management and payment management. 
 
Banks also benefit from the income tentacles provided by SMEs which banks also refer 
to as a pipeline or penetration strategy. This was a benefit enjoyed by 71% of banks in the 
study and gave examples of income tentacles as including; banking SME employees, 
referrals to other SMEs or even referrals to big corporates, confirming De la Torre et al.’s 
(2010) finding that one of the common drivers of bank involvement with SMEs is reverse 
factoring. Whereas banking big corporates limits the bank’s penetration to only a few 
sectors e.g. agriculture and pharmaceuticals, SME banking enables banks penetrate to all 
sectors of the economy such as technology, media and manufacturing; again linking back 
to the benefit of banking the economy. Most SMEs will probably be the primary mover in 
their independent value chain and it is worthwhile for a bank to be a part of that channel. 
Banking the SME pipeline leads to a multiplication of the benefits already being enjoyed 
from the one SME such as additional cheap deposits and additional non-funded income 
which translates to greater profitability. This concurs with Ochieng (2010) and, Elyasiani 
and Goldberg (2004) who emphasize that investment by commercial banks in intricate 
relationships with clients could lead to growth in their customer base and loan book value, 
which translates into increased profitability. One respondent added that as SMEs 
experience successional business growth. This implies that banks continue to enjoy their 
retail income which again results to the benefits as articulated above. 
 
Banks also benefit from the relationship with the SME customer, which was cited by 14% 
of the banks, who explained that focusing on relationships is key because everything else 
depends on the relationship. Further, SMEs take loans more seriously than the bigger 
corporates because more than anything else, they need the money and are afraid of the 
implications of not paying back. This is unlike a corporate that knows for instance, the 
bank will take 90 days before they send an auctioneer. This finding agrees with a study by 
IFC (2010) that established that banks have found that SMEs actually value relationships 




Another benefit closely related to the one above on relationships is that SMEs are a source 
of ideas and out of the relationship, drive bank innovation of products which may lead to 
a bank having a competitive advantage. This benefit was indicated by 43% of the banks 
and is in agreement with Holod and Peek’s (2013) suggestion that profits might accrue to 
the bank from future opportunities to continue and expand the menu of products and 
services provided to the firm as it expands.  
 
Banks can also build a reputation and a stronger brand through dealing with SMEs.  In 
other words, SMEs market for the banks, as the brand sells itself. This benefit was cited 
by 43% of  the banks in the study; 67% of these banks use marketing and walk-ins as 
customer acquisition strategies, while 33% use poaching and walk-ins, indicating the 
importance of these banks in selling their brand well so that subsequently, SMEs do the 
same. Additionally, banks that support SMEs may also benefit from government 
recognition and support as these banks are contributing to the economic growth of the 
country. An example of such recognition and support by government is invitation to 
conferences and meetings to discuss SME lending. Further, the government may also 
choose to disburse funds targeted to the SMEs through these banks resulting again in 
cheap deposits for the bank and additionally, earnings on commissions and ledger fees.  
 
Finally, 72% of the banks in the study indicated that greater profitability is a benefit of 
lending to SMEs. Even though respondents were shy of stating that the end result of 
banking SMEs is the profits that banks make. They indirectly alluded to the fact that SME 
lending leads to greater profitability for the bank and evidently so from the other benefits 
which they specified and discussed above. For instance, a respondent stated that with 
SMEs, there is an opportunity for the bank to be able to intermediate profitably, while 
other respondents referred to SMEs as levers that enabled them make profits while another 
qualified that it was important to remember that bank profitability depended on customer 
profitability indicating the dual benefit. With all these factors considered, SME lending 
adds to the profitability of the bank, with even one bank emphasizing that it is the most 
profitable sector for the bank. This provides empirical evidence to support Calice et al. 
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(2012) and De la Torre et al.’s (2010) findings that perceived profitability is a major driver 
of bank involvement with the SME segment. 
  
To summarise, as previous studies that focus on the benefits of SME lending to lenders 
tend to provide only indirect evidence about the value-enhancing effects of lending 
relationships on the banks (Holod & Peek, 2013), this study establishes the actual benefits 
being enjoyed by banks engaged in SME lending. Further, the study shows that these 
benefits are interlinked and directly or indirectly translate to value for the bank in terms 
of increased profitability. The immediate and direct benefit of SME lending is that it adds 
to the SME book. Lending to an additional SME may then indirectly lead to three benefits; 
interest income perhaps from higher priced loans due to the higher risk, cheap deposits 
(due to lack of bargaining power by SMEs since deposit amounts are small relative to 
corporate deposits) and non- funded income arising from transactions. The three benefits 
may translate to greater profitability for the bank. 
 
Alternatively, growing the SME book by adding an SME customer may indirectly result 
in several income tentacles; for instance; referral to a firm (both SME or big corporate) in 
the SMEs value chain or referral to other SMEs or banking of the SME employees. These 
income tentacles may market the reputation or brand of the bank or form part of the 
corporate social responsibility strategy for the bank. However, the converse may also 
occur such that the reputation, brand and CSR activities of the bank result in the income 
tentacles. As a result, the income tentacles also lead to interest income, cheap deposits and 
non- funded income arising from transactions which may translate to greater profitability 
for the bank. 
 
The indirect benefit of income tentacles may imply that a bank gets to support more SMEs 
and banks that support SMEs may get government recognition and support as these banks 
are contributing to the economic growth of the country. Also, the reputation or brand and 
CSR activities of the bank may lead to such recognition by the government. An example 
of such recognition and support by government is invitation to conferences and meetings 
to discuss SMEs lending. Banks may benefit if the government chooses to disburse funds 
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targeted to the SMEs through them, resulting again in cheap deposits for the bank and 
non-funded income which translates to greater profitability. 
 
A diagrammatic representation of these benefits and their interconnectedness is presented 
in Figure 5.9 below.  

























Source: Researcher’s own  
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The benefits determined in this study confirm the perceived benefits in prior studies and 
add to the existing knowledge on the benefits of SME lending to commercial banks. With 
these actual benefits, it may be possible to predict the viability and scale of relationship 









This final chapter of the thesis engages in the third activity according to Miles and 
Huberman (1993) which is conclusion drawing. The chapter is organised as follows; 
Section 6.2 presents the major conclusions for each of the research objectives that guided 
this study. Section 6.3 presents the contribution to knowledge of the study and section 6.4, 
the implications of the study. Section 6.5 discusses the limitations of the study and finally, 
section 6.6 provides recommendations for further research.   
 
  
6.2 Major Conclusions 
 
The main objective of the study was to determine the lending technologies employed with 
specific reference to the commonly referred technology of relationship lending in SME 
lending and the benefits that commercial banks enjoy from engaging in SME lending. This 
main objective was further broken down into three specific objectives whose major 
conclusions are discussed below.  
 
Objective 1: To examine how soft information about the borrower is acquired, 
transferred and used by a bank to make the SME lending decision.  
The first research objective sought to find out how banks acquire borrower knowledge, 
specifically soft information, that can be used in making the SME lending decision and to 
examine how the same knowledge is transmitted to other relevant decision makers. The 
major conclusion that is drawn is that commercial banks mainly prefer to collect their own 
soft information as opposed to that which is collected by non-bank staff; as such banks 
prefer to use internally generated soft information. The internally generated soft 
information is more frequently collected during the business visits made by the RM/RO 
to the clients’ premises, suggesting also that the RM/RO is the primary collector of soft 
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information. Soft information is first transferred to other bank staff in the organisation 
through the verification process and subsequently through the sharing of this information 
for decision making. As such, even though the primary collector of soft information is the 
RM/RO that comes into contact with the customer, there was agreement from all banks 
that soft information is not proprietary to the loan manager but is stored in a common 
system that is accessible by all authorised bank staff.  
 
Objective 2: To investigate the role of transaction lending and relationship lending, 
more specifically, the importance and interplay of the two methods in making the 
SME lending decision.  
The second research objective sought to distinguish between the research methodologies 
employed by commercial banks when lending to the SME customer. More specifically, 
this objective sought to establish whether the preferred method of relationship lending, 
suggested in literature as appropriate while dealing with SMEs, is employed. The study 
makes two conclusions; first, that lending technologies are complementary and not 
necessarily mutually exclusive. Second, in agreement with the first conclusion and more 
importantly contrary to previous research that refers to relationship lending as a distinct 
lending technology, this study finds that relationship lending is not used as a distinct 
methodology or exclusively but always together with transaction lending. As such, 
commercial banks employ either transaction lending exclusively or a mix of relationship 
and transaction lending technologies when contracting with SMEs. This implies that 
relationship lending has to be considered as a contributor to transaction lending and not 
as an alternative. In other words, relationship lending is only synergistic with transaction 
lending and not orthogonal nor antithetical to transaction lending.  As such the resulting 
method should not be referred to as relationship lending but instead this study proposes 
the use of the term “relational transaction lending” to refer to the transaction lending 
method that considers qualitative soft information in decision making.    
 
On the measures of relationship lending, the study establishes that banks do not apply 
duration, scope and concentration of borrowing as is suggested in literature, but apply 
these measures together with other considerations. Duration on its own has no effect and 
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is based on the activity in the account, scope in isolation also has no effect but is based on 
performance of the account and finally, concentration of borrowing has an effect and is 
considered together with the percentage banking requirements for each bank. This study 
makes the following suppositions; that on the one hand, activity in the account can give 
information about the behaviour or character of the borrower and on the other hand, 
activity can also be considered as hard information; to illustrate this we can use financial 
statements that banks require from potential borrowers. When banks request for financial 
statements, which is considered as hard information, they are interested in determining the 
activity in the account. As such, it can also be argued that the determination of activity is 
the application of hard information which is useful for transaction lending. Also, duration 
can be likened to the minimum term that banks require borrowers to have had an account 
to be considered for borrowing and as such may be argued that it does not provide soft 
information for use in relationship lending but is actually hard information that can be 
used when employing transaction lending. This study therefore concludes that duration, 
scope and concentration of banking may not only be measures of relationship lending but 
also of transaction lending because in reality what may be under consideration is the 
activity and performance which are all “hard” information, further confirming our earlier 
argument that relationship lending cannot be used exclusively but always together with 
transaction lending. 
 
Combining the results on borrower knowledge and lending methodologies employed leads 
to the conclusion that two major factors are considered by commercial banks when lending 
to SMEs; the ability to pay and the willingness to pay. The ability to pay is proxied by 
hard information and the willingness to pay by soft information. Hard information as 
determined by this study and as suggested in previous literature is easily identifiable, 
whereas soft information is importantly collected by the bank and is critical in the 
determination of the character of the borrower. Once these two factors about the borrower 
are established by the commercial bank, they are combined to come up with a transactional 
product that suits the client’s need and as such relationship lending is not used in isolation 
but together with transaction lending and hence the suggestion that the lending 
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methodology that employs some relationship aspects be referred to as relational 
transaction lending.   
 
Objective 3: To establish the benefits generated from engaging in SME lending by 
commercial banks in Kenya. 
The third research objective sought to establish the benefits being enjoyed by commercial 
banks engaged in SME lending in Kenya. As previous studies that focused on the benefits 
of SME lending to lenders tended to provide only potential benefits or indirect evidence 
about the value-enhancing effects of lending relationships on the banks, this study 
established the actual benefits being enjoyed by banks engaged in SME lending.  
 
The study established fourteen benefits being currently enjoyed by commercial banks 
engaged in SME lending in Kenya which in order of frequency are; higher interest, 
profitability, income tentacles, reputation building and a stronger brand, non-funded 
income, growth in the SME bank book, cheap deposits, innovation of 
products/competitive advantage, banking the economy, source of foreign exchange, 
relationship, less competition, successional business growth and, government recognition 
and support. 
 
The study concludes that these benefits are interlinked and directly or indirectly translate 
to value for the bank in terms of increased profitability. The immediate and direct benefit 
of SME lending is that it grows the SME loan book and the other benefits, categorised as 
indirect benefits, arise from lending to that one SME customer and all may lead to greater 





6.3 Contributions of the Study 
 
The major conclusions presented in the preceding section enable the determination of the 
contributions of the study which are presented in the table below and thereafter discussed 
in terms of theoretical, methodological and empirical contributions. 
Table 6.1 Contributions of the Study 
Objective 1: To examine how soft information about the borrower is acquired, 
transferred and used by a bank to make the SME lending decision.  
 
Confirmed Knowledge that: Advanced Knowledge that: 
  The primary collector of soft 
information is the RM/RO. 
 Soft information is transferred 
during the loan decision making 
process.    
 
 Commercial banks prefer to use soft 
information that they have primarily 
generated. 
 Soft information is transferred during the 
verification process, 
 The repository of soft information is not 
the RM/RO but a common system in the 
bank accessible to all authorised bank 
staff.   
 
Objective 2: To investigate the role of transaction lending and relationship lending, 
more specifically, the importance and interplay of the two methods in making the 
SME lending decision.  
 
 Advanced Knowledge that: 
 The two SME lending technologies are complementary and not necessarily mutually 
exclusive.  
 Contrary to previous research that refers to relationship lending as a distinct lending 
technology; this study finds that relationship lending is not used as a distinct 
methodology or exclusively but always together with transaction lending. As such, 
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commercial banks employ either transaction lending exclusively or a mix of 
relationship and transaction lending technologies when contracting with SMEs.    
 Ability to pay is proxied by hard information and the willingness to pay by soft 
information. Hard information as determined by this study and as suggested in 
previous literature is easily identifiable, whereas soft information is importantly 
internally generated by a bank and is critical in the determination of the character 
of the borrower. 
 On the measures of relationship lending, duration and scope may not only be 
measures of relationship lending but also of transaction lending because in reality 
what may be under consideration is the activity, turnovers or performance which 
are all “hard” information used in transaction lending.  
 
Objective 3: To establish the benefits generated from engaging in SME lending by 
commercial banks in Kenya. 
 
Confirmed Knowledge that: Advanced Knowledge that: 
 Confirmed the perceived benefits 
cited in prior studies as resulting 
from SME lending. 
 
 Advanced knowledge by establishing 
fourteen benefits enjoyed by commercial 
banks engaged in SME lending. 
 
 
 6.3.1 Theoretical Contribution    
The primary contribution this study makes is an enhanced theoretical perspective of the 
SME lending process and especially in relation to the use of the relationship lending 
technology. The study reveals that relationship lending is not a distinct lending technology 
that can applied on its own or exclusively but is always applied together with transaction 
lending.  Commercial banks employ either transaction lending exclusively or a mix of 
relationship and transaction lending technologies when contracting with SMEs.   
 
In previous studies when banks have employed relationship measures in a lending 
decision, this has been referred to as using relationship lending, a distinct lending 
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technology which is separate from transaction lending. However, as this study finds that 
relationship lending is always used together with transaction lending, this study suggests 
that when banks employ relationship aspects to a lending decision the resulting method 
should not be referred to as relationship lending but instead proposes the use of the term 
“relational transaction lending”. 
 
Based on the above primary contribution, the study also finds a link between typologies 
used in lending. Hard information as determined by this study and as suggested in previous 
literature is easily identifiable whereas soft information is importantly internally generated 
by a bank and is critical in the determination of the character of the borrower. This study 
suggests that the ability to pay is proxied by hard information and the willingness to pay 
by soft information. 
 
6.3.2 Methodological Contribution  
The research used a qualitative multiple case study methodology to consider the SME 
lending process, an approach that has rarely been used in similar research. This enabled 
the researcher gather rich descriptions of the lending process, the lending technologies 
employed, including whether and how relationship lending is applied and, the benefits 
enjoyed by commercial banks engaged in SME lending. The semi structured interview 
process used to collect the data and subsequent analysis enabled the gathering and 
discovery of detailed information and knowledge about the research problem. Deviating 
in this manner from the commonly employed quantitative approach has enabled 
confirmation of some of the current knowledge around commercial bank lending to SMEs 
and also the advancement of knowledge about SME lending. 
 
6.3.3 Empirical Contribution 
By addressing the gaps in literature which were highlighted, the study has contributed to 
a greater understanding of the SME lending process, how relationship lending is used and 




The study has now provided detailed descriptions of how banks are engaging the SME 
sector from the time of engagement with the potential customer to approval of the loan 
and subsequent monitoring. 
 
The study has established that not only do the relationship measures suggested in prior 
studies play a role in SME lending but they are the same measures that are also applied in 
transaction lending.  
 




6.4 Implications of the Study   
 
Researchers interested in the area of SME lending will find this study useful as it has 
added to the existing body of knowledge on SME lending by exploring the supply side or 
lender’s perspective in commercial banks in Kenya (a developing country in sub Saharan 
Africa) and has also made a methodological contribution by using a qualitative approach 
in the study of SME lending methods employed and benefits to commercial banks.   
 
For commercial banks interested or already involved in SME lending this study has 
provided information on the lending technologies and how they are applied by the various 
banks. Additionally, benefits that can accrue due to SME lending are articulated. This 
information will enable banks make decisions on whether and how to continue contracting 
with the SME segment; as such whether SME financing is viable for them in future.  
  
SMEs owners/managers will find this study useful as it has provided information on the 
steps involved and requirements for successful SME lending. Further, some commercial 
banks offer training to SMEs on what banks look for so as to enable these customers be 
better prepared when they need financing. Put together, this information should enable 
SMEs prepare applications that will most likely be successful and as such enhance SME 
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access to credit which is necessary for their growth and success. The successful growth of 
SMEs should translate to greater economic growth for the country given that these 
enterprises are widely known as drivers of economies. 
 
Regulators and policy makers will find the knowledge gained, especially on the methods 
or technologies that have worked in SME lending that benefit both borrower and lender, 
useful in policy making that improves the effectiveness of SME lending. This can be 
achieved for instance through legal, regulatory or tax initiatives which should in the long 
run translate to better access to financial services and indeed overall financial development 
that is crucial to economic growth and poverty reduction.  
 
Capital providers such as the government and other agencies aimed at promoting access 
to finance for SMEs will find this study useful as the information on SME lending can 
enhance the incentive structuring by these bodies to boost financing to SMEs.  
 
  
6.5 Limitations of the Study 
 
The limitations of the study are first addressed in terms of general limitations that are 
commonly levelled against qualitative studies that employ a case study design and the 
interviewing technique. Further, two limitations specific to this study are addressed. 
  
The first limitation relates to the generalisability of qualitative studies and more 
specifically, the case study design. The common criticisms of case studies are that one 
cannot generalise from a single case and a single case does not add to scientific 
development. As the nature of the study is qualitative, it does not claim to be generalisable 
and is based on specific epistemological foundations that have a way of contributing 
knowledge (Adelman, Jenkins & Kemmis, 1980). The knowledge generated by this study 
is thus significant in its own right. However being that it was a multiple case study there 





Another common limitation is related to the cost and time associated with qualitative 
interviewing. Qualitative interviewing is generally held to be more resource hungry than 
other data collection techniques (e.g. email surveys). It is true that a significant amount of 
time was required to carry out this study but this was expected for a study at PhD level 
and as such was not seen as a limitation but a necessity in order to fulfil the research 
objectives. 
 
The third limitation is related to the difficulty associated with organising research 
interviews with corporate executives (Adler & Adler, 2003). This limitation had minimal 
impact as all except one participant could not be available during working hours and 
suggested for a meeting outside the bank premises. Given the nature of the research and 
the need to carry out the interviews in the “natural environment” of the bank premises, in 
this case the interviewer had to look for an alternative respondent in the same institution 
who was available to be interviewed in the bank premises.    
 
A fourth criticism routinely levelled at qualitative interviewing is that the interviewer may 
exert bias throughout the course of the interview and may ask certain questions differently 
or probe more intensively with some respondents than with others (Dooley, 1990). Prior 
to and after each interview, the researcher reflected on the issue of interviewer bias in 
order to reduce the likelihood of such bias occurring. A standardised, comprehensive 
interview guide was also of assistance in reducing the impact of interviewer bias. This 
process is articulated in chapter three. 
 
Having addressed the common limitations levelled towards such a study, there were two 
specific limitations: 
 
Four interviewees were reluctant to have the interview recorded. This had already been 
noted in chapter three, as one of the disadvantages of using this method of data collection 
and may have resulted in some information not being captured. As these respondents had 
already expressed their willingness to participate in the study, in these cases, the 
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researcher requested to take notes during the interview process and all the respondents 
agreed. To further allay their concerns about confidentiality of the information, the 
researcher assured them that the reporting of the results would be such that it would not 
be possible to identify the bank. Further they would be given an opportunity to validate 
the interview by confirming that what was represented in the interview transcript was what 
was discussed and where they had an opportunity to amend the transcript; including and 
removing any data.  
 
This study was carried out in banks that operate only in Kenya and as such can only be 
applicable to other countries or financial markets after due consideration of the differences 
in financial and regulatory environment. However as the basis of this research was to gain 
knowledge and not to generalise to other contexts, it forms a basis for building theory. 
 
 
6.6 Recommendations for Further Study 
 
In this section recommendations for further research are made based on the knowledge 
gaps that remain. 
  
It would be insightful to have an in-depth qualitative exploration to understand the 
relationship investment from the customer’s/borrower’s perspective.  This may enable 
banks to develop a better understanding of the way customers make judgments about using 
and retaining particular banks. 
 
As this study determines benefits that commercial banks are enjoying from SME lending, 
it would be useful to also consider the attendant costs so as to have a complete picture to 
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Appendix 1: Letter of Introduction  
 
NAME OF BANK (optional) ……………………….. 
Date: …………………………… 
 
Dear (Respondent) …………………………., 
 
My name is Lilian Ollows, a lecturer and doctoral candidate at Strathmore University, 
Nairobi. In this respect, I am carrying out a study to understand the value that commercial 
banks in Kenya gain from engaging in SME financing. My study is titled, “Does 
Relationship Lending Really Matter? The Value of Small and Medium Enterprise 
(SME) Lending to Commercial Banks: Evidence from Kenya.” 
 
I would like to request your participation in this study by way of availing some time for 
an interview. The interviews will be carried out from mid-February to mid-August, 2015 
at a date and time that is most convenient to you and will generally take 60-75 minutes. 
With your permission, I would like to tape record the interview for analysis purposes only. 
I assure you that the data collected will be treated with utmost confidentiality and only 
used for academic purposes. The results from the interview will be used to develop general 
findings and conclusions without specific reference to your institution or clients except 
where information may be independently available in the public domain or where 
permission has been granted. The findings of this study will be availed to you upon your 
request. 
 
Kindly let me know whether you would be willing to participate in this study.   




Lilian Ollows (Doctoral candidate – Strathmore University, Nairobi) 
231 
 
Appendix 2: Informed Consent to Participate 
 
 
To (Respondent) ……………………………… 
(COMMERCIAL BANK)………………………  
 
From:  Lilian Ollows 
Strathmore University, Nairobi 
Date: ………………………. 
 




Thank you for your willingness to participate in the interview. Your participation is 
voluntary. You understand the intent and purpose of this research. If for any reason, at any 
time, you wish to stop the interview, you may do so without having to give an explanation. 
Your time and involvement is profoundly appreciated. The entire interview will take 
approximately one to one and a half hours.  
 
To maintain the essence of your words for the research, the interview will be tape-recorded 
and the interviewer will take notes. This is done for data analysis. At any time you may 
request to see or hear the information I collect. The tape will be transcribed by the 
interviewer and kept confidential in a password-protected computer. Participant identity 
and confidentiality will be concealed using coding procedures. Excerpts from the 
interview may be included in the final dissertation report or other later publications. 
However, under no circumstances will your name or identifying characteristics appear in 
these writings. As per the Strathmore Graduate School procedures, data will be retained 





If you have any questions about this study, you are free to contact the student researcher 
(Lilian Ollows, lollows@strathmore.edu, +254 710 109 302) or the internal supervisor 
(Dr. Freshia Mugo-Waweru, fwaweru@strathmore.edu, +254 712 874 055). I would be 




___________________________  _______________  ________________ 
Name of Participant    Date    Signature 
 
 
Lilian Ollows              






Appendix 3: Interview Guide for the SME Relationship/Loan Manager 
 
1. Introduction 
a) Purpose of the research – to establish the value of small and medium enterprise 
(SME) lending to commercial banks in Kenya with emphasis on relationship 
lending. 
b) Research will be confidential, with tape recorder for analysis purpose only, and 
will be undertaken by the doctoral researcher. 
2. Respondent background 
a) Job title 
b) Length of service 
c) Responsibilities 
3. Technical/functional aspects 
a) How does your bank define an SME?  
b) For how long has your bank been engaging with SMEs? 
4. SME Lending 
a) Kindly elucidate why your bank engages in SME lending.  
b) Describe in detail how a decision to lend to an SME is made (how you collect 
information, how you analyse it and how you make the decision according to 
differences in the client/analysis results/evaluation/etc). 
c) Distinguish between the lending methodologies that are employed by your bank 
when dealing with SMEs and how you decide when to you use each? 
5. Relationship Lending (soft information) 
a)  Discuss how the following factors impact the SME lending decision: 
i. Personal information about the owners of the SME, 
ii. Duration (length of time that the SME has had an account),  
iii. Scope (breadth of the relationship, that is, number of different services or 
interaction over multiple services between the bank and the SME); 




b) What are the sources of soft information and how formal or informal is the 
collection process (i.e. do you pay attention to  rumours about the borrower or stick 
only to very reliable and sound sources even if they provide soft information)? 
c) How is the soft information processed? Do you formalize this soft information in 
some way or is the repository the loan manager? 
d) How does the loan manager transfer his opinion and personal evaluation based on 
the soft information to the next level? How much of the soft information is lost in 
the process? 
e) What is the link between the local loan manager and the local community? Does 
he/she live there? 
f) Overall what role does the relationship play in the lending decision with SMEs? 
6. Value/Benefits 

















Thank you very much for your time and participation in this study 
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Appendix 4: Confidentiality Agreement for Research Assistant 
 
I understand that at all times I must maintain the confidentiality of information that I 
become aware of during the course of my role as research assistant and agree: 
1. To keep all the research information shared with me confidential by not discussing or 
sharing the research information in any form or format (e.g. disks, tapes, transcripts) 
with anyone other than the Principal Investigator; 
2. To keep all research information in any form or format secure while it is in my 
possession [make sure that research information is not accessible to unauthorised 
people, i.e. no discussion of information in a public place; papers and records will be 
kept secure and not able to be accessed by the public; careful emailing of information; 
transporting information securely using formal processes; turning screens away from 
public viewing and using screen lock-out]; 
3. Not to keep any copies of the research information and return all research information 
in any form or format to the Principal Investigator when I have completed the research 
tasks; 
4. After consulting with the Principal Investigator, to permanently delete all files related 
to this research from my computer and any other research information in any form or 
format regarding this research project that is not returnable to the Principal 
Investigator (e.g. information stored on computer hard drive, flash disks, external hard 
drive etc.). 
I have read and understand my responsibilities 
Research Assistant’s signature: ________________________________ 
Research Assistant’s name: ________________________________ 
Date: ________________________________ 
 
Signature of Principal Investigator: ________________________________ 
Name of Principal Investigator:  ________________________________ 
Date: ________________________________ 
Note: The Research Assistant will be given a copy of this form to retain for her/his records. 
